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End of Cold War Opportunity for World Nuclear Disarmament

HK2705105192 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 21, 25 May 92 p 26

["International commentary" by Shi Jinkun (4258 6930 0981): "Strive To Promote Process of Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] The end of the tense confrontation between the two military blocs provides an extremely favorable condition for the realization of nuclear disarmament in the world. Accelerating the process of nuclear disarmament and safeguarding world peace and security are the urgent tasks of the international community at the moment.

The primary responsibility for carrying out nuclear disarmament still lies with countries with the world's biggest nuclear arsenal, namely: The United States and Russia. Both countries are presently redefining their military strategies and their combat targets based on the distinctive features of the new situation as they both need to carry out a certain degree of nuclear disarmament in line with their own strategic interests and in order to reduce the unbearable and enormous costs of nuclear armament. The reduction plans presented by the United States and Russia on 28 and 29 January this year represent considerable improvements over their past positions. But looking at the substantive parts of their proposals, the intentions of the United States and Russia are still vastly different from one another: The United States wants to take advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union to undermine further the remaining nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union and eliminate the potential danger of nuclear proliferation stemming from the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union as a result of the latter's disintegration. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation [as published] is deliberately evading the United States' precondition that the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] destroy all land-based multiple warhead ballistic missiles before the United States reduces its nuclear arsenal any further. Instead, it proposes that the offensive strategic weapons left over from cutbacks by the two sides should not be pointed at each other as a way to lure the United States into allowing Russia to keep the backbone of its strategic nuclear forces. It is not difficult to see that while the United States and Russia would like to carry out a greater degree of nuclear disarmament, what they want to remove are their own outdated weapons or those which are not as advanced as the other side's.

Aside from expressing a cautious welcome of their proposals, the different countries of the world still maintain their reservations as they wait to see how the proposals will be implemented. France has indicated that it will only consider taking part in the nuclear disarmament process when the United States and Russia have cut down their respective nuclear arsenals to the level of France's nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, Britain claimed that it will stick to its plan to purchase

four new Trident strategic missile systems. Britain's Defense Minister Tom King asserted that in the next 10 to 15 and even 20 years, "the territory of the former Soviet Union is bound to produce a huge amount of nuclear weapons," hence, Britain's development of its strategic nuclear force is a necessary "defensive measure" taken against this eventuality. On the other hand, many nonnuclear countries maintain that while the nuclear disarmament plans of the United States and Russia are proceeding rapidly, they are still at a bargaining stage, and even if an agreement should be reached, it would still fall far behind the level of genuine and massive destruction of nuclear weapons as demanded by the international community.

As China has always advocated comprehensive and total nuclear disarmament, it believes that in the case of the U.S. and Russian efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenal, it is better to cut back than not to cut back at all and to cut back more than to cut back less. Over the years, China has always indicated its willingness to join the different countries of the world in promoting the process of nuclear disarmament. In recent times, it even actively adopted a series of new measures to promote nuclear disarmament and arms control. Last 29 December, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China adopted the following resolution: China is to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, demonstrating once more to the world that China does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons. On the export of nuclear materials intended for civilian use, China has also always accepted supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency. On 27 April this year, China's ambassador to the disarmament conference Hou Zhitong submitted an official working document to the UN Commission on Disarmament where he outlined ten steps and six necessary conditions to boost the process of international nuclear disarmament.

The two countries with the biggest nuclear arsenals are duty-bound to take the lead in carrying out massive nuclear disarmament. The reason is that even if both the United States and Russia make good their latest proposals on nuclear disarmament, the move will not affect in the least their status as nuclear superpowers. Even if they destroy 4,000 or 2,500 warheads, the combined nuclear weapons of these two countries will still make up a greater portion of the total number of strategic nuclear warheads in the world while they will still possess "super kill" powers enough to blow up the world several times. Mankind does not thus eliminate the threats of a nuclear war. Therefore, looking simply from the perspective of quantitative reduction, both the United States and Russia should at least reduce and destroy the greater part of their nuclear arsenals, and lower the number of remaining nuclear weapons to a level comparable with those of medium nuclear states. Meanwhile, the nuclear

weapons of all nuclear states should be kept to a level consistent with the defensive purpose of containing a nuclear war.

Reducing the quantity of nuclear weapons is not the final objective, as the final objective should be the total ban and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Before achieving the aforementioned objective, the countries with the biggest nuclear arsenal should be asked to accomplish the "three ends" simultaneous with their drastic reduction of nuclear weapons in order to prevent the eruption of a nuclear war: Put an end to the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. In other words, the nuclear superpowers should renounce the attempt to achieve nuclear superiority not only in terms of quantity but also of quality. The "three ends" and "one reduction [of nuclear weapons]" is a complete concept which should not be taken apart. Based on this concept, the nuclear superpowers cannot prove their sincerity on nuclear disarmament to the world. Hence, the time to convene an international disarmament conference which will discuss the joint reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear states will only be truly ripe when the "three ends" and "one reductions" have been accomplished.

It is necessary to create a peaceful and stable international environment in order to contribute to the realization of an effective nuclear disarmament. In this world where we live, the cold war pattern may have come to an end, but regional conflicts have mushroomed; economic, territorial, ethnic, and religious contradictions remain very complicated; and in particular, acts of blatant hegemonism and disrespect for the territorial sovereignty of other countries are all turning into factors which could provoke an arms race. All countries should respect each other's sovereign rights, treat each other on equal terms and coexist peacefully, refrain from interference in other country's internal affairs, oppose the use of force and the threat of use of force in international relations, and settle disputes between states in a peaceful way. If these principles are respected, then it could create a favorable international climate needed to expedite the nuclear disarmament process.

U.S.-Russian Relations Remain Unsettled

*OW3005101792 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 21, 25-31 May 92 pp 10-11*

[Article by Pu Qihua: "No Longer Foes, But Still Vigilant"]

[Text] The Russian Federation, the major republic of and successor to the disintegrated Soviet Union, has borne the brunt of the United States' diplomatic drive in the former Soviet area since Gorbachev's plan for a union disappeared into the pages of history.

This year's US-Russian relations are characterized by frequent exchange of visits by high-ranking US and Russian officials, which has promoted the development of their claimed partnership. Russian President Boris

Yeltsin, when attending the United Nations Security Council summit meeting early February, paid a visit to the United States and met with U.S. President George Bush. In their joint communique, they declared that they will no longer see each other as potential enemies, but instead, they will be partners with shared values. They also committed themselves to promote closer cooperation in the fields of politics, economics, military and diplomacy.

Washington supported Russia as successor to the former Soviet Union in its UN Security Council permanent membership and its nuclear forces, thus helping it establish its "big-power" position in the West. In turn, Russia managed to meet Washington's interests in the Middle East peace conference, arms control, disarmament and withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Especially, Russia ideologically braces the West and carries out a Western-style reform in its social system.

Present U.S.-Russian relations are based on mutual need. On the part of the United States, it wants to integrate Russia into the Western world to serve its strategic purpose. For the Russia's part, it badly needs U.S. aid.

It is known to all that the Russian economy is deteriorating and almost in a mess. How to aid Russia and other former Soviet republics is an important factor in U.S.-Russian relations. When Yeltsin visited the United States, he appealed to the West to invest in his country and extend assistance to help accelerate Russia's transition to a market economy. But the United States hesitated to move because of its serious economic recession, a rising sentiment for isolationism and the pending elections.

Then, in April, Bush announced a package of assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to the plan, the United States, along with its Western allies, will provide U.S.\$24 billion in financial aid to the CIS countries. U.S.\$6 billion will be used for stabilizing the ruble and the rest for stabilizing and readjusting the economy.

In addition, Bush will present an omnibus bill to the U.S. Congress to urge it to allow the United States to offer another U.S.\$12 billion to the International Monetary Fund. He suggested that restrictions on trade and investment in the former Soviet Union be lifted. Also, the United States will provide guarantees for U.S.\$1.1 billion in agricultural loans.

The U.S. move reflects a change in its policy. At present, Russia's reform is at a difficult stage and the prospect worrisome. U.S. politicians believe that it is imperative to provide aid to the CIS, or else the West will lose the historic opportunity to transform the former Soviet Union. Bush said that if the democratic reform in Russia failed, the West would lapse into a world darker than in

the cold war era. Besides, Bush hoped to raise his prestige among the voters through a string of sensational diplomatic activities.

Before this package, the debtor republics of the former Soviet Union and the Group of Seven industrialized countries reached an agreement in January in Paris allowing the CIS to defer the repayment of its debt of U.S.\$80 billion. In addition, the United States supported Russia to participate in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at an earlier date in order to enable Russia to obtain loans from these two financial bodies.

Nuclear weapons are another factor in shaping U.S.-Russian relations. Washington is concerned about the danger of Soviet nuclear weapons getting out of control and of nuclear proliferation. It urged the newly independent former Soviet republics to abide by the U.S.-Soviet treaty on reduction of strategic nuclear forces by putting their nuclear weapons under the unified control of Russia.

Last December, the U.S. Congress agreed to allot U.S.\$400 million from the 1992 defence budget to help Russia and other former Soviet republics destroy or dismantle their nuclear weapons. When visiting Russia in February this year, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised to provide vehicles to help concentrate the former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons in Russia.

The United States, together with the European Community and Japan, also offered to finance the establishment of a scientific centre in Russia to attract the Soviet Union's nuclear scientists and prevent them from being hired away by countries hostile to the United States.

Furthermore, the United States and Russia initiated new nuclear disarmament proposals aimed at reducing the number of warheads far below what the U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons reduction treaty prescribes. Washington proclaimed that it will remove its 1,000 nuclear warheads targeting at the former Soviet Union, while Russia declared that its warheads will aim at no U.S. targets.

Though based on mutual needs, current U.S.-Russian relations still show much incoordination [as published] and many contradictions due to differences in their national interests and strategic position. The two countries remain vigilant over each other.

The United States has the fear that Russia would change into a despotic, nationalist country seeking to restore the Russia empire. Thus, the Pentagon still sees Russia as an imaginary enemy when mapping out future war plans. On the Russian side, it is worried that it will be treated as a second-class partner by the United States.

As for providing economic assistance to Russia, the United States, which suffers a serious recession, can hardly be of great help. Statistics show that of the US\$19 billion that Russia received from the West by

January this year, the United States only shared U.S.\$2.5 billion. In investment, American business circles have taken a "wait-and-see" attitude.

To cripple Russia's military industry so that it will not be a future threat to the United States, Washington refused to import Russian space technology products and maintained strict restriction on technology exports to Russia.

The U.S. stand aroused Russia's resentment. Yeltsin complained that Western aid was just lip service and warned that the arms race, the cold war and the hot war would come back if Russia's reform failed.

On nuclear weapons, the two sides have shown an even deeper division. In putting forward the new nuclear disarmament proposals of January, the United States wanted to force Russia to further reduce its strategic nuclear weapons, especially the superior Russian land-based, multi-warhead, long-range missiles. But Yeltsin's proposal is aimed at forcing Washington to considerably cut its superior submarine-based strategic nuclear forces.

Yeltsin proposed to establish a "global defence system" against missile attacks in order to maintain a strategic parity with the United States and break its monopoly over anti-missile technology, and prevent the outflow of Russian nuclear specialists. U.S. Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney expressed his opposition to the proposal, considering it immature. Obviously, both the United States and Russia, out of consideration of their national interests, seek to develop a partner relationship, but there is still a gap between the desire and reality for them to bridge.

Chinese Spokesman Views Nuclear Testing, Environment

*OW2905103192 Beijing Central People's Radio
in Mandarin to Taiwan 2200 GMT 28 May 92*

[From the "News and Current Events" program]

[Text] [Announcer] At a news briefing on 28 May, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Wu Jianmin issued a statement in connection with China's decision to send a representative to Rio de Janeiro to attend a UN conference on environment and development. He also answered other questions put by reporters.

The following is a report by reporter Fang Xiaojia:

[Begin recording] [Fang] At a Foreign Ministry news briefing on 28 May, a reporter asked: The United Nations will soon hold a conference on environment and development. A foreign report says that the problem of environmental pollution is serious in China. What is your comment on this? Furthermore, China conducted a large-scale nuclear test last week. Is this going to affect the environment? Wu Jianmin said that for many years the environmental situation in China has remained basically stable and that the situation has even been

improved. Among the five nuclear powers, China has conducted the fewest nuclear tests.

[Wu Jianmin] It is China's consistent national policy to protect the environment. We have achieved initial results in protecting the environment. For many years, the environmental situation in China has remained basically stable and, in certain places, the situation has even been improved. In the past 10 years, more than 10 billion trees have been planted in China, and the artificial afforestation area has covered more than 40 million square hectares. As a result, either the total or per capita emission of carbon dioxide in China is very small. Up to now, among the five nuclear powers, China has conducted the fewest nuclear tests. China has also exercised restraint in the scale of its nuclear test and will continue to do so in the future. [end recording]

U.S. Criticizes Indian Medium-Range Missile Test

*OW2905222792 Beijing XINHUA in English
2117 GMT 29 May 92*

[Text] Washington, May 29 (XINHUA)—The U.S. Administration today criticized the test firing by India of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, and said that such actions undermined security in that region.

Richard Boucher, deputy spokesman of the State Department, said "we regret India's decision to proceed with the further testing of its intermediate-range ballistic missile."

"We believe that ballistic missile programs in areas where there are chronic regional tensions undermine rather than enhance regional security," Boucher said.

An Indian Defense Ministry spokesman announced that an Agni surface-to-surface missile was launched today from a military range in Chandipur in the eastern state of Orissa. The Agni, which means "fire" in Sanskrit, has a range of 1,550 miles.

The Agni missile has the range to hit targets as far away as Iran in the west and Hong Kong in the east. It can strike any city in neighboring Pakistan, with which India has fought three wars.

"Introducing and developing ballistic missiles in that environment does not enhance security, but rather it makes it more difficult to achieve stable regional security," Boucher added.

India first tested the Agni in May 1989, making it the seventh country after the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Israel to possess ballistic missiles.

Three weeks ago, the United States imposed limited economic sanctions on the Indian space research organization because of its proposed purchase of Russian rocket technology.

The United States contended that the technology could be applied to developing ballistic missiles, ignoring Indian insistence that the technology will be used only to put civilian satellites in orbit.

Qin Huasun Agrees on Guidelines at Middle East Arms Control Forum

*OW3005044692 Beijing XINHUA in English
0254 GMT 30 May 92*

[Text] Washington, May 29 (XINHUA)—Representatives from the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain agreed today on guidelines related to weapons of mass destruction.

The guidelines were worked out at a five-power meeting on arms control in the Middle East.

[Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese at 0257 GMT on 30 May in a similar report adds here: "Qin Huasun, Chinese delegation head and director of the Department of International Organizations and Conferences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told a XINHUA reporter that he was satisfied with the outcome of the meeting."]

The five nations were "determined to work towards maintaining world peace and freeing mankind from the threat of weapons of mass destruction," the guidelines said.

But "international non-proliferation efforts should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of states in the exclusively peaceful uses of science and technology for development," they said.

All five nations reaffirmed their commitments not to assist—either directly or indirectly—non-nuclear-weapons nations or any other nations in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling or deployment of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

During the meeting, delegates also discussed the transfer of conventional arms to the Middle East, including measures to reduce arms exports to the region.

Senior U.S. officials told reporters Washington had sold 13 billion dollars worth of arms to Middle East nations since the end of the Gulf war last year.

This was the third five-power gathering following meetings in Paris last July and London last October.

At the London meeting, agreement was reached on guidelines for conventional arms transfers.

Delegates also agreed that their next meeting would be held in Moscow with the focus once again on the issue of arms control in the Middle East.

JAPAN

Watanabe Supports Estonia on Pullout of Troops

OW2705042792 Tokyo KYODO in English 0406 GMT
27 May 92

[Text] Tokyo, May 27 KYODO—Japan “basically supports” Estonia’s calls for a faster pullout of troops of the former Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe said Wednesday.

Ministry officials said Watanabe expressed the view in a meeting with Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi, who replied that Estonia “totally supports” Japan’s call for the return of four Russian-occupied islands seized at the end of World War II.

They quoted Vahi as saying that the continued presence of some 25,000 Russian troops on Estonian soil is “the basic root of instability in the domestic political situation.”

Watanabe called the issue “a very important one” and said Japan “basically supports Estonia’s position on this matter.” He then solicited Estonian support for Japan in its territorial dispute with Russia.

Last Friday, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev reportedly said the schedule for a pullout of the over 100,000 former Soviet troops from the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could be accelerated if the three states were to provide funds in convertible currency or aid in housing and barracks construction to accommodate officers and conscripts.

Estonia wants a total withdrawal by the end of this year, while Russia says all the troops will be out by the end of 1997.

Vahi, who is the second-highest official in Estonia after President Arnold Ruutel, arrived in Japan on Sunday on a four-day visit, the first visit to Japan by an Estonian leader.

Vahi repeated a call he made in talks Tuesday with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa for Japanese investment in Estonia.

He also suggested a bilateral investment protection agreement.

He said the liberalization of the Estonian economy is making it attractive for foreign investment, and that so far some 1,600 joint ventures have been set up using foreign capital.

Watanabe replied that Japan wants to monitor how bilateral economic ties develop before considering an investment protection pact, saying there is no record of Japanese investment in Estonia.

He said Estonia should appeal to the Japanese private sector for investment, and said a good opportunity to do so will be when the powerful Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) dispatches a mission to Estonia in September.

Vahi called for official financial assistance as well as help in the medical field, an apparent reference to shortages of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.

Watanabe said Japan will invite seven Estonians to Japan for technical training this fiscal year, which began in April, as well as one Estonian diplomat for Japanese language training.

He said that from June, Japan’s Embassy in Finland will assume responsibilities for diplomatic dealings with Estonia, now covered by its embassy in Moscow. Next January, Japan will set up a diplomatic liaison office in the Estonian capital, staffed by one diplomat.

Japan established ties with the three Baltic states last October.

MONGOLIA

Mongolia Regrets Recent Nuclear Test in China

LD2905102392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0900 GMT 29 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dugar Sanjiyev]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar May 29 TASS—The Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Relations has expressed regret over the recent nuclear test on the territory of neighboring China. The test was carried out at a time when Central Asia is facing the prospect of getting rid of nuclear weapons.

A complete termination of nuclear weapon tests everywhere meets the interests of global security and serves confidence building among nations. Mongolia will henceforth help common efforts aiming to end nuclear arms tests, eliminate all mass destruction weapons in the world, especially in Central Asia, the Mongolian Foreign Ministry said in a statement published by the national press today.

COLOMBIA

Report on Guerrillas' Weapons Shipment

PA0406225092 Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO
in Spanish 28 May 92 p3A

[Report by Miller Rubio]

[Text] In mid-February, the Greek-registered ship El Kiran delivered its shipment of 100 powerful Soviet-made RPG-7 antitank rocket launchers for the Colombian guerrillas.

According to intelligence reports by the Colombian Armed Forces, representatives of the Simon Bolivar National Guerrilla Coordinating Board [CNGSB] and weapons dealers from Central America, who have connections with several countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, began the negotiations for the weapons in January.

The reports added that the first meetings to purchase the war materiel were conducted between CNGSB representatives and dealers in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.

In those first three countries, the CNGSB representatives and the weapons dealers agreed that the arrival of the weapons, which would probably come from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, was to be coordinated from Panama—a country where the Colombian intelligence service lost contact with the informant providing details of the operation.

Those details indicated the war materiel transported aboard the El Kiran, a freighter with a 20,000-ton capacity, included 900 Soviet-made AK-47 and Israeli-made Galil rifles.

Although the Colombian agents have not been able to pinpoint the exact location where the weapons were shipped, it is known the vessel covered the Thailand-Bulgaria-Libya-Central America route. The information gathered in the past three months also showed that before the weapons' arsenal was loaded, the weapons were disassembled and placed in wooden crates marked with the word Caterpillar.

To answer the question what the El Kiran vessel was doing in the Tripoli, Libya port during a two-day stopover, the intelligence service focused its work on establishing if the war materiel was shipped from that Mediterranean port.

That is one of the chief hypothesis proposed by the Armed Forces investigators to clarify the origin of the

weapons the guerrillas ultimately received. There is not sufficient information to draw a complete picture, however.

As for the RPG-7 rocket launchers, which are capable of countering armored personnel carriers in combat, it was known that 40 crates containing these launchers were unloaded while El Kiran was on the high sea off the coast of Colombia.

An Army of National Liberation (ELN) support network operating on the Atlantic coast received the weapons and was ultimately responsible for taking the arsenal to the interior of the country.

Regarding the unloading of the weapons, the investigators learned the weapons dealers decided the deliveries would be made in three different areas of Colombia's two coasts to avoid detection by the authorities.

The three sites where the support network allegedly received the weapons were Barranquilla, on the Uraba Gulf Coast; and Acandi and Buenaventura on the Pacific Coast.

The security agencies discovered the rebels of the ELN "Luis Fernando Giraldo Builes" Column, which handled the land transportation, carried the antitank RPG-7 rocket launchers to the Simiti region (Bolívar Department), in the lower Magdalena region.

The "Manuel Gustavo Chacon" Column received the weapons there and distributed the materiel among the Anori Company, which operates in northeastern Antioquia Department, and the 1st, 24th, 25th, 10th, and 22d war fronts.

The first lead on the use of the weapons was known one month ago when Army troops found a starter [iniciador] for a RPG-7 rocket launcher following a rebel attack in Santa Rosa, Antioquia.

A second phase of the operation began at an unspecified location on the Pacific coast, where 400 AK-47 and Galil rifles were unloaded.

This shipment was delivered to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 6th Front, which operates in Cauca Department and controls the towns of Corinto, Toribio, and Santander de Quilichao.

The 6th Front, led by Miguel Angel Pascuas, "Sergeant Pascuas," coordinated with a FARC finance committee the payment for the rifles to the guerrilla's contacts in Central America.

Armed Forces spokesmen stated the 6th Front paid \$20 million in the past four months to get the weapons, and its men were in charge of the operation and transporting the weapons to other fronts in Huila and Tolima Departments.

The investigators lost track of the remaining rifles because of the unexpected disappearance in Panama of the informant providing details of the operation.

The state security corps also revealed the guerrillas have purchased dynamite and weapons in the past four months to begin an offensive against the state within the framework of the "Marquetalia 30 Years" operation.

One week ago, Interpol experts concurred in saying the guerrillas are acquiring large amounts of weapons in Eastern Europe.

"The new restructuring of the East European countries is alarming us because of the possibility a large number of weapons may be sold in Latin America's black markets for areas of conflict," Interpol Secretary General Juan Carlos Antoniassi stated.

JORDAN

**Jordan's Chief Delegate to Arms Talks
Interviewed***JN3106205492 Amman Jordan Television Network
in English 1900 GMT 31 May 92*

[Interview with Dr. 'Abdallah Tuqan, Jordan's chief delegate to the arms control and regional security committee arising from the multilateral talks, by Murid Hammad in the television studio—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Hammad] You recently returned from Washington where you attended the multilateral peace talks on arms control in Washington. What went on there? You have stated Jordan's position, and you have made specific demands. Now can you brief us on what happened in Washington?

[Tuqan] Certainly. The first multilateral peace negotiations on arms control regional security took place in Washington between May 11th and 14th. It was basically a seminar approach for mutual familiarization of terms in this field. Now, what happened there in the first couple of days—we were given seminars; we were given presentations by top leading U.S. diplomats who were involved in the U.S.-ex-Soviet bilateral arms control negotiations to present the concepts and ideas.

On the first day, we were all given a chance to present our position papers. I presented the Jordanian position paper and, basically, we asked for two basic requirements: One is that when we talk about regional security—i.e. the prospect of preserving peace and stability—this must be looked at in all dimensions of the political, military, and economic dimension. Therefore, all the other multilateral baskets, you might call them, and working groups—which is environment, water, economic development, and refugees, as well as arms control—regional security should be linked and there should be a linkage issue between them. Secondly, when we talk about weapons of mass destruction in the region, we have reached the point where it's become extremely dangerous. At one hand, you have Israel that has the nuclear capability. On the other hand, you have other states that have the chemical capability.

What we are looking for and hoping for is that based on the Bush initiatives of May 1991, as well as UN resolutions, Security Council Resolution 687—whereby in Paragraph 14, they state that this will be the first step in establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free-zone in the Middle East—that the following steps could be taken. One is that all countries in the region could sign and ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and will abide by the International Atomic Energy Agency rules. Two: To sign the biological weapons convention of 1972. Three: To sign and abide by the upcoming chemical weapons treaty that is being at the moment negotiated in Switzerland and, hopefully, that it might be completed by this year. Four is to stop acquiring and producing and testing of ballistic missiles and other surface-to-surface

missiles, which, as we know, has been increasing in range from year to year. And the fifth point is to stop the acquisition, production, and all related research and development into fissionable materials and nuclear weapons development, and, finally, to maybe establish a regional agency to monitor and control and to do the implementation of the above.

[Hammad] Let me interrupt you and ask you. The first one on the list that you made was signing the nonproliferation agreement. Israel has nuclear weapons, although it publicly denies that, but it is a fact. It remains a fact. But it is not a signatory to the nonproliferation agreement. Would there be an effort by the United States and the Russians—the cosponsors of the peace talks—to push Israel into signing this agreement?

[Tuqan] You see, there are a number of things. One is Israel... [changes thought] We all know and it's a known fact that Israel has nuclear weapons. There have been statements from Israel that they will not be the first country to use or introduce it into the area. They say that it is a weapon of last resort. You see, all these three terms are a contradiction in terms between each other. This nuclear policy ambiguity has been creating and breeding insecurity in the Middle East, which is giving rise to the concept of poor man's atomic bomb, which is the chemical and the biological weapon. So, therefore, what we want to do initially is there is the concept of acknowledgement. They have to acknowledge, and they have to come out and renounce them, and acknowledge the fact that they have them.

The next step is we start with these signatures of these treaties. And, then third, when you sign there is the implementation and there is the verification aspect of it. Just as a point of interest, when we were in Washington, they invited us to an agency called the On-Site Inspection Agency, which was established to monitor and inspect between Russia and the United States of the intermediate-range ballistic missiles, nuclear ballistic missiles, part of the so-called INF Treaty. Now they have scheduled visits and they have unscheduled visits, which means challenging. And they challenge each other to different facilities to see whether they are adhering to the treaty. This is where we come into the implementation, verification. But that is, obviously, a later on stage. Now, in the initial stage, it is a recognized international norm for all civilized countries to renounce these weapons and to sign and ratify these treaties.

[Hammad] Dr. Tuqan, one final question. We don't have very much time, but I want to ask you about the future. You will be meeting in the fall in another attempt to talk about regional arms disarmament and so on. What will be your next step?

[Tuqan] Well, one of the things we've asked for in the upcoming next seminar is that if we can have regions within the states, within the regions, countries within the region present their perceptions of regional security requirements. They are, obviously, different in many

ways. We want to have a look at them and then we want to introduce the concept that one has to look in the political and economic dimension. And, again, this might take the form of a seminar once more because the multilaterals are complementary to the bilaterals. They do not replace the bilaterals; they reinforce them. So, there are some fundamental issues which have to be solved in the bilaterals. For example, we have borders. We cannot talk about confidence security-building measures; i.e., establish joint military information exchange or inform each other about any military movements when the borders are not defined. So there are some basic issues that have to be defined and have to be solved in the bilateral, then we look at the multilateral in the future to see what issues can be then implemented to reinforce the bilaterals. So, really we are working on this seminar approach at the moment to look at the concepts and ideas and the examples and lessons learned from the history of the arms control.

[Hammad] Dr. Tuqan, thank you very much for coming here and it's a pleasure to have talked to you.

[Tuqan] Thank you.

SYRIA

Al-Asad Views Peace Process, U.S. Ties, Lebanon
*JN0206155692 Damascus SANA in Arabic 1415 GMT
2 Jun 92*

[Text] Damascus, 2 Jun (SANA)—President Hafiz al-Asad met with a BBC radio and television team comprised of Hugh Prycer-Jones and Qasim Ja'far. He answered questions asked by both members of the team.

The following is the text of the questions asked and the president's answers:

[Question] Mr. President, only a few weeks separate us from the Israeli elections, while the peace process began months ago. You always noted the limitations of this process and the obstacles it faces. Why did Syria decide to participate in the peace process?

[al-Asad] As you know, since the early seventies, we have been emphasizing the peace process, especially in the wake of the 1973 October war. We agreed on Resolution 338, which encompasses Resolution 242 and calls for peace and then for convening a peace conference. A peace conference was held once in Geneva near the end of 1973. Its sessions were then stopped. This is what exists on the one hand. On the other hand, new signs have emerged that indicate the international community's recent enthusiasm to stress the importance of implementing UN resolutions and of adhering to international legitimacy. Discussions began and invitations were issued on this basis by some of the concerned countries or by those with the greatest influence within the international community and the Security Council. At that time, those countries were the United States and the Soviet Union. We realized that all of this is in line

with what we want, with our acceptance of Security Council Resolution 338 and with our desire to attain a genuine, just, and lasting peace—something we have stressed over the past years. It is also in line with the desire of the international community and its enthusiasm—which has come to the surface—to implement the UN resolutions, which is what prompted us to participate in the peace process.

[Question] How do you feel now that six months have gone by since the peace process began? The process is still continuing, and the Arab side has accepted UN resolutions that are in effect a recognition of Israel. Over these months, have you become more hopeful or more concerned?

[al-Asad] We have always believed that the Israeli rulers do not want peace. They want territory, occupation, and expansion—consecutive expansion every now and then. Nevertheless, in light of the new developments and talk about the importance of implementing the resolutions of international legitimacy, we found that there might be an opportunity to achieve a just peace by implementing these resolutions. The past six months, however, have not given any indication that the Israeli Government seeks or wants to achieve peace in the region. During these months, it emphasized—and continues to emphasize daily and publicly through its various officials—the need to keep the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the need for the Arabs to sign what they in Israel call a peace treaty while Israel itself will continue to keep the occupied Arab territories. Nevertheless, we believe that there is at least some benefit to be gained from what has occurred during the meetings between the Arab and Israeli negotiating teams. The benefit is that the world, whether through its public opinion as a whole or the conviction of many state officials, must now have a better realization of who is for peace and who is against peace. I am quite sure that any person in the world who follows up common causes and international affairs, who respects impartiality and objectivity, and who really believes in peace and its elements—as well as in justice, which should prevail everywhere, especially in relations among the world's nations—must now have realized that Israel does not want peace but wants to swallow the territory of others. In any case, we are not talking about metaphysical things. The Israeli prime minister himself reiterates a great deal that he cannot and will not cede—and he calls this concession—that he cannot abandon the occupied Arab territories as long as he lives.

[Question] What, then, is required, Mr. President, to make the peace process successful, given that the process is not moving along at the necessary pace?

[al-Asad] The international community, and particularly the international organization—the Security Council—must execute its commitments in accordance with its charter and must implement its resolutions. This is especially true given that this Council is composed of influential states that confirm that today's world is one of international legitimacy. The Security Council and its

influential states can implement the resolutions of international legitimacy—the Security Council resolutions, which is the truly guaranteed road to peace.

[Question] Does this mean, Mr. President, that you might call on the United Nations to supervise the peace process instead of the United States, which has been supervising it?

[al-Asad] There is no contradiction in this matter. In our previous talks just prior to the peace process, as well as in discussions that occurred some time before and during it, we continued—until now—to speak about the role of the United Nations. They are also talking about a UN role. Only Israel objects to this role. The United States and Russia, the two concerned countries, are two permanent members of the Security Council. What I am saying does not conflict with what is now occurring regarding supervising the peace process. In all cases, however, these two states—as far as we understand it—are operating under an umbrella and within the framework of terms of reference represented by Security Council Resolutions 338 and 242. The United States and Russia, backed by the Security Council, can implement the resolutions of legitimacy that I mentioned.

[Question] If Israel continues its intransigence under all circumstances, do you expect an operation similar to that that occurred in the Gulf against Iraq to get Israel to accept the UN conditions?

[al-Asad] I do not want to recommend anything specific to the Security Council or try to stick to specific measures. We adhere to the rule that the international body, which is obligated to maintain peace according to its charter and the many general international resolutions, is dutybound to search for an effective, certain, and guaranteed means to implement these resolutions. When they adhere to this objective, they themselves will find the ways and means to implement their resolutions. Anyway, we do not want different and contradictory criteria to apply in dealing with various countries. Therefore, we do not want to see the Security Council resolutions applied in a certain place and then kept in drawers elsewhere.

[Question] For you to obtain a UN-sponsored process, or at least a UN diplomatic initiative, you must depend heavily on your relationship with “the United States” and the West, which you supported during the Gulf war. What do you have to say about this relationship? And how strong is it?

[al-Asad] As a matter of fact, it was the principles governing inter-Arab ties that determined Syria's position regarding the Gulf war. Under no circumstances could we endorse the occupation of an Arab country by another Arab country regardless of the amicable ties that we might have with the aggressor or the country aggressed against. That is why we spelled out our position against the occupation of Kuwait during the first hours of the event.

With respect to ties with the West in general—and I guess you are referring to the United States in particular—I would like to say that the ties between us and the United States are better than they have been in the past. Contacts have been continuous between us during recent years. These contacts are most often marked by cordiality. Both of us are talking about a desirable future improvement in these ties, as well as the wish to promote these ties in the interest of both our countries and as much as possible.

[Question] Despite the fact that there have been clear indications of an improvement in ties with the West during the past two years, there are some insinuations that Syria is sponsoring terrorism. There are whispers about the Lockerbie affair and drugs. How do you feel about these insinuations?

[al-Asad] This issue exclusively concerns the United States and not the West in general. It is the United States that talks of terrorism and that issues lists of the countries sponsoring it. Of course, Syria has said, and still says, that it has never at any time supported terrorism. We believe that the charges of terrorism, which are made repeatedly in the United States, are prompted by domestic circumstances in the United States and not by facts regarding Syria or other world states. If you were to go to the United States and demand to know the grounds for these charges and to be shown proof that corroborates these charges by those who are leveling them there, and if you were to be apprised of their argument in this regard, then you would reach the conclusion that Syria opposes terrorism. You would not find in their possession anything that could convince you of the validity of the charges that are made from time to time.

The charges that Syria is implicated in terrorist acts have nothing to do with Syria's activities. Rather, these charges are connected with Syria's position toward Israel. Hence, the terrorism charge leveled against Syria is an Israeli rather than a U.S. fabrication.

[Question] Allow us to settle this matter once and for all in this very hall and say that Syria has no connection with the blowing up of the Pan Am plane over Lockerbie.

[al-Asad] We discussed this matter in length with U.S. officials. We insisted that they provide us with any evidence, proof, or anything at all indicating Syrian involvement in this affair. They did not do so, because they do not have what we are requesting. I do not know if they are still accusing us, or if they fell silent only temporarily. Therefore, we have begun to doubt every accusation that they direct against any party related to these issues. Any accusation needs evidence; it needs proof. But I can say that even this accusation is related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the position toward Israel.

I wish to point out that in the past we have greatly helped people from Western states who have fallen into certain difficulties. It may not be correct to describe all of these difficulties as acts of terror, because each incident had its own circumstances and assessment by those who perpetrated it. In all cases, and regardless of what these acts are

called, we helped Westerners from various countries; we helped to secure their release. Our efforts enabled them to return to their homes and families and to live in freedom. We did not expect gratitude from anyone; we did this out of our belief that we are dutybound to help with any matter that has humanitarian dimensions when we can, and this we did. I wish to say that at the top of those whom we helped were the Americans, probably because the number of Americans involved in these problems was the largest.

[Question] As you said, resolving the hostage crisis has indeed helped to improve Syria's image, which was tainted by terrorism allegations as in the case with the al-Hindawi and Lockerbie affairs. I wish to ask about Britain in particular. How have your relations with it improved in the past few months?

[al-Asad] Each country has dealt with the issue, causing a dispute between us at some point in the past according to its own views at that time. We believe that that issue is now behind us, and we now consider our ties with Britain to be cordial and good. We exchange cables and letters and hold contacts every now and then. We both express the hope that we will also be able to march ahead toward better ties of cooperation. We do not see any obstacles preventing an improvement in our relations, and we in Syria are very concerned about this. The fog that separated us in the past no longer exists.

[Question] Mr. President, can we say that British Prime Minister John Major is someone you can deal with, and is he eager to deal with you?

[al-Asad] As you know, we began to resolve problems at the end of the previous British Government's term and the beginning of that of the current government. There is ongoing progress. Yes, in my opinion, we can cooperate and we can do a great deal of service to benefit our two countries.

[Question] Western countries have an inclination, as well as a pattern, that emerges in their relations with other countries. For instance, Western states expect other countries to do certain things, such as implement pluralism or, rather, to adopt the Western pattern in terms of its positions and political institutions. I know that many changes have occurred in Syria and that you released thousands of prisoners upon your reelection. But how much change can the West expect to occur internally in Syria?

[al-Asad] We must not forget that in the first place each group of people determines its affairs according to its own interests, wishes, and ambitions without anyone being able to dictate to it what it should do, which is a fundamental to which we adhere to in Syria. I believe that all the world's peoples adhere to this basis or want to adhere to it. We want to adhere to it, and we do adhere to it, which, of course, does not contradict the interactions that occurred among the world's various peoples. Each group of people will adopt what it thinks is beneficial to, or is in harmony with, the primary factors that determine the rules and formulas it pursues. Democracy is the objective of all peoples. Democracy ultimately

means freedom. Hence, it is the objective of every person. All people work to find formulas through which they can exercise their freedom. They discover formulas that can be developed later on or that can be amended every now and then.

There remains, however, the defining of lines for these formulas that differ with the economic level, the cultural level, the traditional values, the spiritual values, the political situation, the political awareness, and other major characteristics of each group of people. Anyone who oversteps these defining lines, or who seeks to abandon them, will be moving away from what is suitable for them, which is what exists on the one hand. In light of this, we act and discuss things with our people on the widest level possible. We have participants in major decisions, people who are in our opinion difficult figures. They would not be available in many countries. I mean, here, the big figures who contribute toward such decisions.

Regarding patterns, there is no one pattern in the West similar to the one you are talking about. There are different systems in the West, because the matter is related, to a great extent, to what I have already mentioned. If we examine the history of these Western states in general, we will find that there are republican systems, monarchic systems, parliamentary systems, and presidential systems. There is a presidential system in the United States that is, of course, a presidential-republican system. In Germany, for example, there is a parliamentary system. In Britain, there is a combined parliamentary and monarchic system, and in France, there is a presidential-parliamentary system. Therefore, we rarely see two states that have the same system at the same time. There is no one pattern that can be called a democratic pattern or a Western democratic pattern. Just as no singular side in the West affects another side and cannot impose its patterns upon it, no one should try to impose his pattern on the nations of the world.

In brief, I would like to say that cooperation is necessary and useful for all nations, and it does not conflict with democracy, especially with what we call international democracy. It does not conflict with it; rather, it falls within its framework and benefits everyone. No one should force any side—or should be forced—to accept the process of imposition. History shows that every force that has tried to impose its pattern has retreated. History is a great teacher.

[Question] A major ally of yours has disappeared. The Soviet Union vanished, leaving the Middle East in a state of imbalance regarding the weapons of mass destruction. It is no secret that Israel has nuclear weapons. I know that there are plans to monitor strategic weapons in this region, although we do not know much about it. Do you have any proposals in this regard?

[al-Asad] Syria and the Arabs defended their rights in the past before their ally, the Soviet Union, came into existence. The Arab-Israeli conflict began before the Soviet Union became an ally of the Arabs; moreover, it

began at a time when Israel was receiving considerable support from some Eastern states. Since then, relations between Syria and the Arabs, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, have developed. Now this has changed, as you have said. The Soviet Union no longer exists, but nations adapt to their circumstances. And they can always find and create ways to defend themselves.

About supervising arms and weapons of mass destruction, we support such supervision if it is fair and equitable. When we say supervising arms in the Middle East, this means there should be restrictions leading to similar results for both Arabs and Israelis. This is not what those who propose this supervision mean. None of them proposed that Israel's arms production or arms imports be supervised.

You hear a hue and cry raised sometimes about what they believe is going to come to an Arab country. They talk loudly, and the loudest is the Israeli voice, which apparently is meant to guide the others. They speak about supervising weapons. We would like to have limitations on weapons, or a supervision of weapons; but, as I have said, this should be applied to everyone, leading to similar results. Here I say that supervising weapons does not mean supervising the weapons that a certain country buys; rather, the supervision must apply to the weapons a country manufactures. When a Western nation gives Israel factories—these factories are the same as those in the West and are daily producing everything from pistols to long-range missiles, planes, tanks, and other weapons—then we must supervise what is being manufactured. We must define what the Israeli weapons factories should produce both qualitatively and quantitatively, as well as what Israel imports. The others also will be subjected to the same treatment. We support such supervision, because it will not allow the gaps that already exist between the Arabs and the Israelis. The states that call for the supervision of weapons but do not adhere to this themselves are working to mislead all of human society.

In any case, in the past we discussed all these issues with the countries that had expressed interest in the matter. We were told that what we said would be considered, meaning that this is a correct and basic issue. We cannot see any evidence that this has been the case.

At any rate, at a time when there is talk of arms control—which is, in practice, aimed against arms shipments to Syria—it is worth noting that it is Syria that makes immense effort when it imports some tanks.

We are now sitting in this place, which is in the heart of Damascus. Less than 150 km from us, there are Israeli nuclear arms and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. These missiles are capable of carrying warheads of various kinds; they are all made in Israel, thanks to the supplies and equipment it has obtained from some Western countries. Some countries show concern when a single tank is shipped to Syria, yet fail to do so when the

issue concerns the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that are already in the Israeli arms arsenal and that are ready for use.

We believe that the international community must hasten to ban the production of nuclear weapons in Israel as well as destroy the nuclear weapons there, which would show and confirm this community's concern for peace and for the prevention of any calamitous human catastrophes. Otherwise, what does arms control mean?

[Question] Excuse me. We would like to have this point made perfectly clear. Am I to understand from what you said that you proposed to some Western countries, including the United States, even and balanced arms reductions but that your proposals were not met with a favorable response?

[al-Asad] Yes. This was the focus of our talks with the United States when this topic—namely, arms control—was raised. The argument we presented was clear; it was made sufficiently clear.

[Question] Allow me to finish our interview with Lebanon. I know that Lebanon has always been important to you. You done a great deal to end the civil war there and put an end to Lebanon's crisis. Your troops are stationed in that country, and they were effective in ending the civil war. We are now hearing once again news about battles, clashes, and Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon. Israel insists that your troops in Lebanon must be used to control Hizballah in the south. Israel is also talking about the possibility of war. Will you do what Israel is asking or will you risk another war?

[al-Asad] We are not the ones taking risks. Israel is. Israel is the one threatening war. It attacks Lebanon and strikes at civilians, children, the elderly, and women. It uses the modern weapons that it received—essentially, from the United States. It refuses to implement the UN resolutions, particularly the one concerning Lebanon; namely, Resolution 425, which demands that Israel leave the Lebanese territory it has occupied. It has prevented the UN troops from reaching the international border between Lebanon and Israel. It also prevented the Lebanese Army from reaching the border, a task that was part of the Lebanese Government's plan to make the Lebanese Army work for establishing security along the international border between Lebanon and Israel in cooperation with the UN troops. In the end, Israel insists on maintaining its occupation of part of the Lebanese territory.

People of any country whose land is occupied have a strong motivation to fight against the occupier. The Lebanese are like any other people in the world. Resistance against the Israeli occupation was not born today, or this month, or this year. It began a long time ago and continued for many years.

No one can imagine that Syria, which is an enemy to Israel just as Israel is an enemy to Syria, will protect the

Israeli borders or Israel's security. No one can imagine that Syria will kill the Lebanese because they are defending their country.

The statements to which you refer—in which Israel, as you suggest, asks Syria to do such and such—demonstrate the hostile attitude of the current Israeli Government. You are aware that Syria seeks to achieve peace at this stage. Syria was the party that opened the doors to peace and the ongoing peace efforts after Israel had closed them. Therefore, Syria, which participates in the peace efforts, does not plan war at the same time. Israel is the party that will be taking risks if war breaks out. Of course, if war is launched against it, Syria will defend itself. No one, under any circumstances, can employ Syria's efforts as a protector of Israel, which occupies the territories of Lebanon and Syria as well as Palestinian territories.

If Israel really is concerned about security and peace, then the path is clear; namely, to implement the UN resolutions and the comprehensive and just peace that will be attained by implementing these resolutions. This is the path to security and stability, as well as the path that will enable every party to regain its rights.

[Question] Mr. President, do you consider war to be a possibility at this particular time?

[al-Asad] In every conflict between two or more parties, each party can start a war. But no party can confidently predict the end of this war. Therefore, I do not think war is inevitable. But, I still cannot say that Israel cannot start a war, because, it is known, previous wars have always been started principally by Israel.

Anyhow, by resorting to this escalation Israel is not seeking to respond to an operation conducted by a group of individuals or citizens from Lebanon; such operations have been carried out scores of times in past years. We in Syria, however, believe that it seeks to achieve two things. First, to obstruct the peace process. It has become clear that the current Israeli Government does not want peace. It may think that it has the opportunity, or that it can conceal this fact by talking about Hizballah and by crying "terrorism." It may think that this might justify war in the region. Naturally, war will not leave anything called a peace process or peace efforts. The second objective is an electioneering one. The Israeli Government believes that escalating the military operations will help it gain more votes in the upcoming Israeli elections.

GENERAL

Soviet Union's 'Strategic Legacy' Viewed

924P0143A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 4, Apr 92 (signed to press 17 Mar 92) pp 51-65

[Article by Konstantin Eduardovich Sorokin, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at Europe Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences: "The Strategic Legacy of the USSR"]

[Text] The burden of the many problems we are facing today in virtually all spheres of public life probably constitutes the most sizable portion of the legacy of the former Soviet Union. Some of these problems can be categorized as complex and extremely complex. The latter include the group of problems connected with the future of Soviet strategic potential, and especially of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF). These problems have been the subject of heated discussions between leaders of the independent republics and a sore spot in international relations.

Although the "strategic issue" is multifaceted, there are three main questions: Is there any need for the USSR's heirs to maintain this strategic potential, especially its nuclear component, in view of the cessation of East-West confrontation and the beginning of the "era of partnership," the disappearance or transformation of the military-political institutions of the "cold war" years, and the overall improvement of the international climate? If so, then how should the republics interact in the sphere of nuclear policy? And, finally, what kind of restructuring will this strategic potential and its nuclear component require in the qualitatively new military-political situation on the planet?

I

The question concerning the retention of the nuclear status of several republics of the former USSR (this applies primarily to Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan, where the SNF are deployed) and of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a whole is not surprising. Anti-nuclear feelings have grown much stronger in recent years in many regions of the vast Eurasian territory that are now part of the Commonwealth. It would have been impossible not to take them into account during the transition to democratic forms of government.

In principle, people in the USSR officially cursed the atomic bomb from the moment it made its first appearance. They cursed it as a diabolical invention of the Americans and imperialists, capable of causing considerable misery and destruction, but they often did this without any deep sense of apprehension about their own survival and the future of all mankind. In a conversation with NEW YORK TIMES correspondent J. Reston in October 1957, for example, N.S. Khrushchev said: "We certainly do not want to say that the socialist countries

will not suffer losses in this kind (thermonuclear—K.S.) of war.... We are convinced, however, that socialism will survive, while capitalism will not.... Only the imperialists could start a war, and if a war breaks out, people everywhere will want to put an end to the social order that engenders wars and will establish socialist regimes in their countries."¹

Opinions of this kind were widespread in the 1950s and 1960s, and this attitude probably persisted in the public mind until the beginning of the 1980s. In particular, this explains why there was no antinuclear movement or any serious antinuclear feelings in the USSR for a long time. It appears that they came into existence around the time of the debates over the deployment of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe, during which theories of nuclear war and the lethal effects of any nuclear conflict on all of the parties involved were discussed "in public" for the first time in the Soviet Union. This was followed by Chernobyl. Then people learned about the problems of ecological pollution on nuclear test sites, the problems of securing the safety of nuclear weapons in a country torn apart by conflict, etc.

Under these conditions, it is quite understandable that more and more people began to wonder whether the continuation of this perilous "coexistence" with nuclear weapons was worthwhile. After all, no one is planning to attack the now independent republics at this time: The military threat is virtually non-existent. Furthermore, the strength of a state's position in the world and its security depend less today than ever before on military strength, even when this strength is nuclear. They are depending more and more on the state's economic potential.

This kind of antinuclear logic did not escape the notice of the leaders of the independent republics. The four parties to the Alma-Ata agreement on joint measures with respect to nuclear weapons reaffirmed their willingness to strive for the elimination of all nuclear arms and fulfill all of the USSR's obligations in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. By the terms of the same agreement, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine promised to move all tactical nuclear weapons to central plant warehouses (in Russia) for dismantling by July 1992. Ukraine and Byelarus announced their wish for nuclear-free status (Ukraine, in particular, intends to get rid of all types of nuclear weapons by the end of 1994). Finally, Russian leaders repeatedly expressed a willingness to take more drastic measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament than those negotiated or unilaterally announced by the leadership of the former USSR.

The quick and complete denuclearization of the military-strategic territory of the CIS is not being considered yet, however, and it is unlikely to be given any kind of serious thought in the foreseeable future. The members of the Commonwealth will have to deal with many different "external challenges" to their security for a long time, and these will differ greatly from the traditional challenges. This is unavoidable at a time when the old

world order is disappearing while the outlines of the new world order are barely discernible. Some potential threats can only be surmised at this time, but others are quite likely to make their appearance in the near future. Above all, these include the completely realistic possibility of heightened military-political danger in the south.

The Southern countries are distinguished by a volatile mixture of intra-state and regional instability, somewhat unpredictable behavior, and a distinctive political-ideological mentality, combined with a quickly growing arsenal of state-of-the-art arms, including weapons of

mass destruction and long-range delivery systems. It has been impossible thus far to cope with instability and the arms race in the Third World with political instruments. Obviously, political methods must continue to be employed in the efforts to combat these dangerous tendencies, but it would be unwise to rely solely on them. They might not work. Meanwhile, a high percentage of the deployed or projected long-range vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction are already located close to the military territory of the CIS. Whereas the southern regions of the CIS are under the gun today, the potential zone of destruction will grow in the future (see Table 1).

Table 1. Potential of States of "Arab-Asian Crescent of Instability" To Deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction

Country	Ballistic missile potential	Combat radius of strike aviation	Existence of nuclear program	Possible possession of chemical weapons
Egypt	5 types of BM in service and development with a range of 65-956 km	Up to 840 km	—	+
Iran	3 types of BM in service, range of 40-300 km	Up to 840 km	Nuclear program under IAEA control	+
Iraq (1990)	5 types of BM in service and development, range of 300-965 km	Up to 950 km	Nuclear arms development program	+
Yemen	3 types of BM in service, range of 120-300 km	Up to 950 km	—	—
Israel	3 types of BM in service and development, range of 150-1,450 km	Up to 930 km	Possible possession of nuclear weapons	+
India	2 types of BM in development, range of 200-2,400 km	Up to 950 km	Nuclear device tested	—
Libya	4 types of BM in service and development, range of 65-480 km	Up to 950 km	—	+
Pakistan	BM in development, range of 300 km	Up to 830 km	Possible possession of nuclear weapons	—
Saudi Arabia	BM in service, range of up to 3,000 km	Up to 1,390 km	—	—
Syria	3 types of BM in service, range of 65-300 km		—	+
North Korea	2 types of BM in service, range of 65-300 km	Up to 550 km	Possible nuclear arms development program	+
South Korea	2 types of BM in service, range of 40-260 km	Up to 930 km	—	+
Taiwan	2 types of BM in development, range of 100-1,000 km	Up to 1,100 km	Nuclear program under IAEA control	+

Source: "The Military Balance 1989-1990"; B. Staar, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation. A Basis for Control" (INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, No 3, 1990, p 260); L. Ember, "Fashioning a Global Chemical Weapons Treaty" (CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, 28 March 1988, p 9); D. Papp, "Contemporary International Relations. Framework for Understanding," New York-Toronto, 1991, p 444.

In addition to all of this, there is no guarantee, and probably cannot be any guarantee in principle, of the trouble-free development of relations between CIS members and the Western countries. This is not an appropriate topic during the present period of the establishment and reinforcement of the East-West partnership, but the possibility, however unlikely it may seem, of a "renaissance" of confrontational thinking and the

West's return to some form of power politics must be taken into account in any serious plans for long-range foreign and military policy.

For this reason, all of the sovereign republics belonging to the CIS will continue to have an objective interest in reliable and effective defense in the foreseeable future—not against any specific country or group of countries,

but as a guarantee in the event of undesirable developments in world events. Another of their "interests" is certain to be the maintenance of military expenditures at the lowest permissible level. If this is the case, the SNF

will remain the mainstay of the defense of the military-strategic territory of the CIS: Only these weapons combine tremendous military strength and high deterrence potential with relatively low cost.²

Table 2. Strategic Program Financing in U.S. Military Budget (in billions of dollars, current prices)*

Fiscal year	Strategic offensive forces	Strategic defense	Strategic command, control, and communications	Total expenditures on strategic systems	Total military budget	% of military budget spent on strategic systems
1971	4.9	2.6	0.7	8.2	72.8	11.2
1973	6.6	1.9	0.9	9.3	78.9	11.8
1975	6.5	1.4	0.9	9.9	86.1	11.5
1977	9.7	1.4	1.1	12.2	107.6	11.3
1979	8.1	1.6	1.2	10.9	124.7	8.7
1981	13.0	2.0	1.7	16.7	175.5	9.5
1982	16.1	2.6	2.5	21.3	210.9	10.1
1983	21.0	2.7	3.1	26.9	236.5	11.4
1984	28.3	3.2	3.5	35.0	255.4	13.7
1985	29.2	3.9	3.1	36.2	277.5	13.0
1986	25.4	5.4	3.6	34.4	280.5	12.3
1987	22.9	6.3	4.3	33.5	283.5	11.8
1988	21.9	6.0	3.5	31.3	289.0	10.8
1989	23.0	7.5	3.7	34.1	291.6	11.7

* Including expenditures on R & D, purchasing, and maintenance of strategic forces.

Source: ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL, November 1988, p 80.

It is no coincidence that the Alma-Ata agreement says that the nuclear arms included in the strategic forces will safeguard the collective security of all members of the Commonwealth. In other words, the entire territory of the CIS will be covered by nuclear security guarantees. The four "strategic" republics will serve as the nuclear guarantors for the time being. In the future, however, when Ukraine and Byelarus achieve nuclear-free status, this function might be relegated completely to Russia, which has decided to retain its portion of the strategic potential, and possibly also to Kazakhstan.³

We must realize that the speed and dates of the projected reshuffling of the "nuclear deck" in the military territory of the CIS (the denuclearization of Ukraine and Byelarus, the transfer of tactical nuclear arms to Russia, and the fulfillment of agreements on international disarmament obligations and the announced unilateral initiatives in the sphere of arms control) might not coincide with current plans for several technical, economic, military, and political reasons.

Above all, the destruction of nuclear systems is a lengthy and laborious process. It is no coincidence that a period of seven years has been set aside for the utilization of the vehicles reduced in accordance with the treaty on strategic offensive arms. It will take more time to destroy the vehicles with the 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads that are supposed to be removed from operational status over

and above the treaty figures in accordance with the October (1991) "Gorbachev plan."⁴

In the second place, these reductions were conceived from the beginning as applying primarily to obsolete systems. The strategic nuclear systems deployed within the territory of Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan are essentially modern, however, and their quick elimination seems quite dubious from the military standpoint.⁵ The alternative solution of moving these systems to Russia and replacing some of them with the obsolete arms deployed there will probably be impossible for political reasons (for example, the unwillingness of the republics to "surrender" any nuclear weapons to Russia except those slated for immediate destruction, or the reluctance of Russia itself to increase its "nuclear burden" and the related technical, economic, and social problems) and for purely economic and technical reasons (the redeployment of fixed-site ICBM's is virtually impossible; the relocation of strategic aviation would require the costly enlargement of existing strategic air fields or the construction of new ones; the transfer of mobile ICBM's would also require the enlargement or construction of a new infrastructure).

In the third place, the problem of warehousing and processing the nuclear weapons removed from operational status, especially the strategic ones, seems almost insurmountable. In fact, the nuclear potential of the

former USSR, estimated at 27,000-30,000 warheads, was deployed throughout its territory, in Eastern Europe, and on naval ships and submarines. In accordance with Gorbachev's October initiative and the Alma-Ata decisions, two-thirds of this potential—virtually all of the tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)—would have to be moved quickly to Russia (by the middle of 1992), but Russia simply does not have enough specialized bases for the storage of this many TNW. The use of the special American credit of 400 million dollars cannot solve this problem within any kind of acceptable time frame: Experience has shown that the "absorption" of even tangible resources in a decaying economy is exceptionally difficult, that the construction of nuclear depots could be protested by the local population and, finally, that the construction of numerous complex and well-fortified installations takes a great deal of time even under the most favorable conditions.

It does not seem possible that the TNW can be amassed in Russia by the specified date. Otherwise, the methods used would not be the best or the safest (for example, the tactical weapons could be stored in unadapted or hastily re-equipped facilities or even outdoors).

Furthermore, there is no reason to expect the industrial utilization of the TNW to empty the overcrowded depots quickly. Nuclear weapons will be dismantled, of course, but the speed of this work must not be overestimated: This is a difficult, time-consuming, and dangerous process. It is no coincidence that the United States thought of purchasing the nuclear weapons for their subsequent processing in order to assist in carrying out Soviet disarmament measures. In addition to all of this, the world still does not know how to handle the radioactive "filling" of nuclear weapons, particularly the plutonium. Of course, this does not apply to its reuse in nuclear munitions and its warehousing (the latter option would create the problem of building another series of storage facilities for highly active fissionable materials).

Therefore, tactical nuclear weapons could "occupy" the lion's share of existing and new storage facilities and renovated industrial capacities for many years in the future, but if the obligations stemming from the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the strategic portion of Gorbachev's initiative, and the plans for the strategic denuclearization of Byelorussia and Ukraine are fulfilled on the scheduled dates and at the projected speed, hundreds and thousands of strategic nuclear weapons will be "let go" in the near future and will have to be stored somewhere at the very least. Obviously, this will create substantial difficulties.

These speculations are based on the assignment of priority to the tactical disarmament program over the strategic one. The grounds for this assumption consist not only of the high number of TNW and the political and military uselessness of the majority of tactical nuclear arms under present conditions, but also of the great danger posed by tactical weapons in many respects. Many of them are obsolete and simply old models that

are even dangerous to store. Some may have lost the electronic locks designed to prevent the unauthorized use of TNW. According to Western experts, tactical weapons would be the easiest to acquire for terrorists, who could use them to threaten the release of toxic radioactive materials, or for arms merchants willing to sell nuclear weapons abroad.

If the strategic disarmament program gets a "green light," the whole range of threats connected with the presence of so many dangerous tactical weapons will continue to exist for a long time. If equal value is attached to both programs, it is probable that neither will be carried out on schedule.

In the fourth place, it is evident that virtually all of the states that have taken the place of the USSR, including the four with strategic nuclear arms at this time, are suffering from internal instability. It is possible that radical political forces could take over in these republics in the event of the further exacerbation of internal economic, ethnic, and social problems. In addition to everything else, this could lead to adjustments or even revisions of the policy line on nuclear issues, including deliberate delays in the fulfillment of their share of the USSR's disarmament obligations, procrastination in the steps toward nuclear-free status, the abandonment of plans for denuclearization, etc.

II

A second group of problems connected with the future of the USSR's strategic legacy concerns the command and control of strategic nuclear potential.

Prior to the dissolution of the USSR, there was a seemingly simple and clear system of nuclear arms command and control. The political leadership (or, more precisely, the political leader of the country: first the chairman of the USSR Defense Council, who was also the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and then the president of the USSR, who was also the supreme commander-in-chief) was supposed to make a principled decision to use nuclear weapons and transmit a code along with the command for the "technical" implementation of the order to the minister of defense and the chief of General Staff. They were supposed to add their part of the code and forward the entire encrypted message to the commanders of branches of the Armed Forces, who would insert their own set of codes and turn the whole coded command for the release of nuclear weapons to the personnel directly responsible for this on the lowest level. Nuclear weapons could not be used until this entire chain of events had been set in motion.

In reality, however, the command and control system seems to have had several nuances. According to Academician V. Goldanskiy, a back-up system for nuclear launch was introduced in the beginning of the 1980s and allowed the orders of the supreme political leadership to go directly to the personnel on the lowest level, including ICBM weapon crews. Other Soviet

researchers have estimated that a fairly large group of military and technical experts responsible for the development and maintenance of the command and control system could have "figured out" the code of the political leadership and could have allowed military leaders to take action without political authorization. As for tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, until recently they could be used autonomously by a district commander (and obviously by the commanders of the groups of forces in Eastern Europe), who had an envelope with the release code⁶ and the nuclear arms themselves at his disposal.

Therefore, actual Soviet policy on the command and control of nuclear weapons put more emphasis on "positive control"—i.e., on the heightened probability that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons could be made and carried out even if one or several links in the chain of command should be "out of commission" (for example, as a result of a first nuclear strike against our

country)—than on "negative control"—i.e., the diminished probability of the unauthorized use of nuclear arms.

The presence of all of these "nuances" and, obviously, of others in the command and control system alarmed the West even when the waning strength of the political center in the USSR was just becoming apparent. The Western countries' worries were compounded at the time of the August events and afterward, when the USSR began to disintegrate and the Soviet president became only a nominal ruler. As far as we can tell, these worries extended to two different time periods. The most immediate worries were, first of all, that the radical decrease in the actual power of the president of the USSR might also diminish his role in the command and control of nuclear weapons—i.e., effectively weaken "negative control" on the part of politicians. Second, the collapse of the USSR's governmental structures created serious worries about the physical safety of nuclear arms (Western estimates of the probability of various types of incidents involving Soviet nuclear weapons are illustrated in Table 3).

Table 3. Probability of Unauthorized Use of Soviet Nuclear Weapons or Their Components (rated by American experts)

Potential "violating" structure or group	Direct use (against United States)	Direct use (within former USSR)	Seizure in silos	Seizure and sale to other countries
Military high command	*	*	*	**
Regional military commanders	**	**	*	*
Army, Air Force, Strategic Missile Forces, Air Defense Forces (commanders)	***	***	**	***
Naval Missile Forces (commanders)	**	*	*	*
Strategic security guards in military units	***	***	**	**
Nuclear security guards outside military units	***	**	*	*
Local political movements and terrorists	?	?	*	*

* Probably possible.

** Probable but difficult.

*** Probably impossible.

? No rating.

Source: K. Campbell, A. Carter, S. Miller, and C. Zrakat, "Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union" (CSIA STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, November 1991, No 1, pp 19-20).

Over the long range the West had to be concerned about the kind of system the independent republics would establish for the command and control of nuclear weapons, especially the SNF, after the collapse of the USSR. The most dangerous option, in the opinion of Western leaders, and the least likely to meet the interests of the republics themselves, would be the division of strategic nuclear arms among Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan.

This "republicanization" of the SNF would be most likely to occur at a time of exacerbated relations between sovereign states (as a result, for example, of the disruption of the process that was begun in Belovezhskaya Forest in early December 1991) or might even cause this exacerbation. In any case, attempts to leave the SNF within these territories under individual command and

control would give communication within the CIS framework an unpleasant nuclear aftertaste, would stimulate an arms race in the former Union, and would put the once "fraternal republics" on the verge of economic ruin.

From the military-political standpoint, it must be said that all of the parties to this kind of division would lose something. Russia would have a relative advantage because it would keep up to 75 percent of all strategic potential, calculated in terms of weapons, and also most of the SNF technical command and control systems, including all central command posts. The other republics, however, would have strategic potential only in the nominal sense, because it would be a long time before they would have their own command and control systems.⁷ Furthermore, no one knows whether they are

even capable of developing these systems—i.e., whether they have the necessary technology, production capacities, and substantial financial resources.⁸

In the future, the actual military-political value of the republican strategic nuclear potential of the CIS members would probably even be lessened by the inability of all or most of them to keep operational systems in working order because of the difficulties that even Russia would encounter during the modernization of its strategic systems. Meanwhile, the systems would pose an increasingly serious threat to their owners (if only because of the physical aging process and the rising accident rate).

On the international level the emergence of new nuclear powers would have a severe negative effect on military-political stability in the world and on international relations in general. It would, for example, slow down the process of arms limitation and reduction dramatically and even affect existing disarmament "frameworks." One of the first victims could be the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is already being criticized pointedly by several developing states as an ineffective agreement infringing the rights of the "junior" signatories. The rapid and considerable growth of the "nuclear club" with the inclusion of the USSR's heirs would complicate the renewal of the treaty in 1995 and would stimulate the nuclear efforts of "threshold" states even before that time. In addition, documents of the NATO Council session of early November 1991 also express the fear that the independent nuclear republics might transfer or sell nuclear weapons and nuclear technology abroad.

The ABM treaty could be another victim of the "republicanization" of the Soviet strategic complex, because the emergence of new nuclear states in place of the USSR would probably speed up the work on the SDI.

The apprehensions in the West and within the former USSR did not begin to subside until after the agreement on joint measures by the four republics with respect to nuclear weapons was signed in Alma-Ata. It was significant that Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, which had occupied completely different positions on nuclear arms prior to that time, were able to achieve a certain degree of unity there. There is no question, however, that the specific decisions they made were also important, including the pledge by Ukraine and Byelorussia to become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as nuclear-free states; the assumption of a series of specific commitments by all four republics in the non-proliferation of nuclear arms and technology; the relegation of decisions on the use of nuclear weapons within the territory of Ukraine and Byelorussia to the president of Russia, who was supposed to reach an agreement on the decision with the leaders of the other

three republics; and the consent of the parties to elaborate a joint policy on nuclear matters.

Of course, there were many vague statements in the Alma-Ata accords. Some were clarified in the agreement on strategic forces, signed in Minsk on 30 December 1991 by 11 CIS members. Above all, this was the first clear stipulation of the need to retain unified control over nuclear weapons and the united command of all strategic forces (i.e., not only the SNF, but also other integral parts of strategic potential—the ballistic missile early warning system, the group of air defense forces, etc.). In the second place, according to the new agreement the president of Russia had the right to make the decision to use all of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR, including those within the territory of Kazakhstan, which was not mentioned in the Alma-Ata agreement. It also said, however, that the Russian president would have to reach an agreement on the decision in advance with the leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia and hold the necessary consultations with the heads of other CIS states.

The Minsk accords probably do not mark the end of the process of distributing nuclear responsibility within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The relegation of the right to make the final choice—to use nuclear weapons or not—to Russia is understandable in general in view of the fact that it probably will be the only CIS member with nuclear status in the future. The sequence for making the nuclear decision as it is presently stated, however, has several bottlenecks that need more work. We will discuss only the most significant of these.

The system of control originally proposed by Ukraine—"four fingers on the nuclear button"—would have secured strict "negative control" over the use of nuclear weapons on the political level, but it also would have weakened "positive" control considerably. The procedure approved in Minsk, however, could have the opposite effect in principle. This is why the terms "reach an agreement" and "hold consultations" must be clarified. Will Ukraine, Byelorussia, or Kazakhstan have the right to veto the use of nuclear arms during the agreement process? If so, will this veto right extend to all of the nuclear potential of the CIS or only to the nuclear weapons within the territory of the republics concerned? Will this right be backed up by material strength—i.e., by the necessary technical means? If not, how will "agreement" differ from "consultations"?

When Ukraine, Byelorussia, or Kazakhstan makes the transition to non-nuclear status, will the "agreement" requirement still apply, or will "consultations" be sufficient? When these republics achieve nuclear-free status, will they still have the right to participate in the elaboration of a joint policy on nuclear matters with Russia?

If Russia becomes the only nuclear member of the CIS, how much weight will the opinions of other republics with regard to the use (or non-use) of nuclear weapons carry?

To what degree can other CIS members be certain that Moscow will make the nuclear decision in the event of a nuclear attack on one of them? This is essentially a question about the reliability and effectiveness of nuclear guarantees. This question is addressed in the most general terms in the Minsk agreement, which says that nuclear arms will safeguard the collective security of all CIS members, but this is clearly not enough, and special documents with reference to these guarantees will have to be adopted sooner or later within the Commonwealth framework.

The weak "negative control" exercised by the political leadership of the former USSR was discussed above. Will this problem be solved in the CIS, or will military leaders still be able to circumvent the Russian president's political veto?

Finally, it appears that all of the other members of the CIS, which probably have fissionable materials and nuclear technology at their disposal, should become party to the section of the Minsk agreement pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation.

III

Now that attempts are being made to solve the problem of control over the strategic nuclear potential of the former USSR, the image of the Commonwealth of Independent States' strategic potential is becoming increasingly relevant.

Now that the republics no longer have any overt external adversaries, and the precept that "there can be no winners in a nuclear war" still applies, strategic potential should perform primarily political functions "appropriate" to the situation in the former USSR and in international relations. They should probably include the following: participation in securing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republics covered by the nuclear guarantees provided by this strategic potential; the prevention of political pressure on these republics and threats to their vital interests; participation in maintaining strategic stability on the planet;⁹ and the deterrence of a nuclear attack on the republics, whatever its source, with the guarantee of retaliation. The exertion of military-political and psychological pressure on partners in international relations and the offer of nuclear guarantees to foreign states should be excluded from the list of political functions.

On the purely military level the strategic complex should be capable of surviving any kind of nuclear attack and inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor. By the same token, the objective of the "total defeat" of a potential adversary, which was just recently high on the list of priorities, should be permanently "retired" as an almost unattainable and costly goal, stimulating military

rivalry and, what is most important, assuming the possibility of victory in a nuclear war.

Although strategic potential will play an essentially political role in the future, its combat capabilities must nevertheless be maintained at the highest level. After all, its performance of political functions will depend ultimately on its military effectiveness and its reliability in attaining combat objectives.

In turn, the ability of strategic forces to survive and to guarantee the punishment of any aggressor must be secured by the appropriate policy in the sphere of military organizational development. It will be the realization of the principle of "defense sufficiency" as it applies to strategic potential.

Whereas the theoretical objectives of the policy of sufficiency are understandable in general, its actual levels are subject to the most diverse definitions in principle. In 1956 N.S. Khrushchev felt that it was sufficient to have 60 strategic bombers and 500 medium bombers, which could threaten only Western Europe, as compared to the United States' 555 strategic and 500 medium bombers (all of which could deliver strikes at the USSR), in order to threaten England and France—the United States' allies—with nuclear retaliation and force them to stop the "tripartite aggression" against Egypt. In 1962 he almost escalated the Caribbean crisis with the same unfavorable balance of power (the USSR had 310 intercontinental and 1,750 "European" nuclear weapons, whereas the United States had 2,113 nuclear weapons capable of destroying targets in the USSR).

For many years afterward, until just recently, the level of strategic forces securing parity with the United States, actual equality in the number of strategic nuclear weapons, was considered to be sufficient. This approach to the calculation of sufficiency, which was based on the arithmetical equality of forces with the potential adversary, was extremely convenient for the elaboration of policy in the sphere of military organizational development and strategy in the sphere of arms control, but it never provided a precise assessment of the degree of actual military danger or threat, because numerical parity was always adjusted considerably by numerous military-technical, political, psychological, military-economic, geostrategic, and other factors.

Today parity is even less suitable for the determination of the specific criteria of sufficiency: The political and military-strategic situation has changed radically, East-West confrontation has come to an end, the technical-economic potential that served as the foundation for the construction of the Soviet half of the strategic balance is being destroyed rapidly on the territory of the former USSR, the parameters of geographic location and the financing of the former Soviet strategic complex are not changing for the better, and so forth.

As a matter of fact, the obsolescence of the concept of parity was already being officially acknowledged during the last months of the USSR's existence. The statement by M.S. Gorbachev with regard to the unilateral lowering of the Soviet treaty ceiling on warheads from 6,000 to 5,000 units, for example, effectively announced an updated, more "flexible" interpretation of sufficiency—allowing the possibility of falling "slightly behind" the United States but still "breathing down its neck." This would be an acceptable approach if only the next few years were at issue. After all, as the earlier discussion revealed, extremely deep cuts in SNF will be impossible anyway.

In the more distant future, however, the Commonwealth obviously does not have to make such an effort to keep up with the Americans. The republics need sufficient strategic forces for the attainment of their own military and political objectives, and not for quantitative accordance with American strategic potential—these are two different things.¹⁰ We can assume that sufficiency for defense over the long range will require a numerically smaller but qualitatively superior and structurally modernized strategic complex.

As for quantitative parameters, their "compression" is dictated by the disappearance of the bipolar confrontational model of international relations, the development of the disarmament process in any form, and the simplification of military objectives (as a result of the renunciation of, for example, highly polished varieties of counterforce operations). It is true that this tendency could be slowed down to some extent by foreign military-technical innovations (like the SDI program), the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and other unfavorable developments.

The quantitative reductions should apply first to the warheads themselves, and less to delivery vehicles. The reasons are the following. First of all, in view of all of the unpleasant things that might happen, there are many more strategic warheads than the number needed to inflict unacceptable damage not only on a potential aggressor, but also on all mankind. Second, this approach would effectively signify the "unloading" of multiple launchers, which would strengthen the stability of the military-political situation in the world (multiple nuclear delivery vehicles are considered to be the most suitable for the delivery of a first strike, and as a "convenient target" they could provoke an attack at a time of crisis). Third, the retention of large quantities of vehicles would seriously complicate the planning and delivery of the hypothetical first strike.

Any accurate assessment of the future need for warheads would be impossible today, of course, but there will have to be many more than 400 megaton weapons.¹¹

The realization of the principle of "strategic sufficiency" will presuppose special concern for the constant improvement of the qualitative characteristics of the strategic complex in the future, and this obviously

includes SNF. Only modernization, the enhancement of such characteristics as reliability (each year "defective weapons" cost the Pentagon 10-30 percent of its purchasing budget; we have to assume that the figure was no lower in the USSR), survivability (for the SNF this would mean the lessening of vulnerability in the launch phase and throughout the trajectory), controllability, operational flexibility, and capacity for rapid response (for the SNF this would apply to the systems on alert status), could secure the performance of combat missions with numerically smaller strategic forces even if the qualitative arms race should continue on the planet.

Because the instability in the sovereign republics might last for some time, strategic "sufficiency" should obviously have another qualitative dimension. It is connected with the safety of nuclear weapons—not only keeping them in constant working order, but also preventing their seizure and unauthorized use.

The achievement of a strategic complex of high quality will only be possible if the scales of financing for high-priority fields of military R & D are maintained, and even expanded in some cases. Finding the necessary funds will not be easy at a time of economic difficulty, of course, but the failure to do this could devalue all past and present financial and material expenditures in the military-strategic sphere. Furthermore, because we still do not have an integral and thoroughly considered conversion program, we do not know where the savings on military research would go: It is quite possible that the money would disappear without a trace in the present atmosphere of chaos, just as tens of billions of rubles have already disappeared in this atmosphere. Military research, however, will at least produce concrete results. Furthermore, the new technology does not necessarily have to be used in military production: It could be "put on the shelf" in case the international situation should grow worse, but it could also be sent to civilian industry (according to American estimates, of the 21 groups of advanced technologies under the constant scrutiny of the U.S. military-political leadership, 15 are in widespread commercial use). What is more, the R & D could be financed by further cuts in arms production. We have so many weapons, but the models coming off the conveyor belt often do not meet today's requirements.

The realization of the principle of sufficiency in the strategic sphere clearly also presupposes structural changes within the strategic complex to enhance its quality. This restructuring has already begun. The Strategic Deterrence Forces (SDF) have already been established; in other words, the operational portions of the strategic complex have been united in a single structure (the SDF are made up of the strategic missile forces; military space forces, including space monitoring systems and missile warning systems, ballistic missile defense, space vehicle launch and control systems and forces, and spaceports; naval and air strategic nuclear forces). In principle, this is not a revolutionary step—there was coordination between different subdivisions of

strategic potential even earlier. It is, however, an indisputably practical step. By eliminating some of the links on the highest level of military command and control, the new structure allows for, on the one hand, the stricter monitoring of the use of SNF and the further reduction of the probability of their unauthorized use and, on the other, a quicker response to commands when necessary. The elimination of some of the administrative structures might even reduce financial expenditures to some extent.

There are still many unanswered questions, however, about the composition and structure of separate elements of future strategic potential. There are questions, for example, about the future of the ABM system around Moscow. There are arguments "for" and "against" its retention and development. This system was established to "repulse missile strikes of limited scales against the supreme governmental and military agencies making the decisions on retaliatory operations."¹² There is no question that decisions of this kind have to be secured, but the ABM system will only be useful in the event of threats from the "South" in the future: Unexpected limited strikes could only come from that direction. A hypothetical attack in all other cases is unlikely to be limited and unlikely to be unexpected in view of the favorable political situation in the northern hemisphere, the military impact of Bush's initiatives, etc. Furthermore, if there is early warning, the supreme leadership will have enough time to move to reserve command posts. (There is also the consideration that an alternative system for making the decision to use nuclear weapons in the event of the destruction of the supreme military-political leadership would make the Moscow ABM complex unnecessary, but this kind of system would be difficult to establish. Furthermore, it would dramatically diminish "negative control" by the political leadership.)

The projected structure of the CIS armed forces does not include the Air Defense Forces. This is how the lengthy series of minor and major reorganizations (there were two in just the last decade—in 1981 and 1986—representing movement "back and forth") has come to an end. Obviously, this was the right decision: Expenditures on the maintenance of the Air Defense Forces were substantial, but their operations aroused serious complaints, which led to debates among military and civilian experts over the future of the air defense system (in 1989-1990). The orphaned troops and weapons will probably be distributed among the remaining branches of the Armed Forces. The SDF should also receive a share, consisting primarily of anti-aircraft missile systems to cover the main zones of the deployment of strategic offensive arms against strikes by manned and unmanned vehicles. But will the SDF receive a share? And if so, then what will it be?

The plans to stop deploying mobile rail ICBM's and MRV's and to stop the work on reduced-size mobile ICBM's have aroused some doubts: After all, in view of our geostrategic position, mobile systems are among the most viable, and invulnerability will be essential to the severely reduced SDF.

Gorbachev's announcement of the cessation of work on the modified short-range nuclear missile for strategic bombers in October 1991 is also questionable. (The comparable step the United States took was connected with the cancellation of the specific SRAM project, which was plagued by technical defects and financial difficulties.) If we want to keep our small and not very new bomber fleet as an operable branch of the SDF, missile modernization would not be an inconvenience.

The list of these examples could be continued.

Although this is far from a complete list of all the problems connected with the future of the CIS strategic complex, it is clear that the resolution of even these will be like working on a Chinese puzzle. This will require not only objectively intelligent technical, political, and legal approaches, elaborated by experts, but also the willingness of politicians to implement them. We hope that common sense will prevail in the determination of the future of our Commonwealth. Losing a game is just losing a game, but in the nuclear type of puzzle the security of the new independent states, stability, and peace throughout the world will be at stake.

Footnotes

1. N.S. Khrushchev, "Za prochnyy mir i mirnoye soshchestvovaniye" [For Lasting Peace and Peaceful Coexistence], Moscow, 1958, p 183.

2. Official data on the dynamics of Soviet expenditures on the maintenance and development of the strategic nuclear "shield" are not available, but their approximate share of the military budget of the USSR can be judged from the corresponding proportions in the U.S. military budget (see Table 2).

3. Since August 1991 the Kazakh leadership has repeatedly changed its stance on the nuclear weapons within its territory. At the time this article was written, it was inclined to keep the SNF that would remain in Kazakhstan after the conditions of the Soviet-American treaty on strategic arms had been fulfilled. This position was probably taken as a result of problems in inter-republic communication, especially the friction in Russian-Kazakh relations. If these problems are solved, Alma-Ata could return to the idea of its own nuclear-free status.

4. It is true that M.S. Gorbachev's statement included a pledge to abide by the same seven-year deadline, but this will probably be impossible: As a result of conversion and during the transition to the market, some of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex that might have been able to dismantle the vehicles included in the reductions will be respecialized or liquidated. Furthermore, the dismantling will require considerable resources. It is possible that the CIS will have neither the money nor the production facilities to undertake not only the additional unilateral measures, but even the "basic" disarmament commitments. This suggests that the new disarmament initiatives Russia announced in

February 1992 do not have a very strong material foundation either, despite all of their political appeal.

5. Ukraine, for example, has two huge ICBM bases where the modern SS-19 missiles with six warheads and the latest generation of missiles—the SS-24 with 10 warheads (silo-based)—are deployed.

6. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 52, 1991, p 2.

7. In the words of SDF Commander Yu. Maksimov, "the control of strategic missile complexes is strictly centralized, and they cannot be 'commanded' from republic territory" (IZVESTIYA, 10 December 1991). He was referring to Ukraine, but this obviously also applies to Kazakhstan and Byelarus.

8. Expenditures on the establishment, deployment, and operation of SNF command and control systems "are comparable only to the expenditures on the weapons themselves" (VOYENNAYA MYSL, No 12, 1990, p 34).

9. Strategic stability means—in the narrow sense—a steady correlation primarily between the strategic capabilities of the new sovereign states and the United States, in which a situation of mutual assured destruction is maintained reliably and the possibility of nuclear world war is held at a minimum. In the broad sense, in the words of one Soviet military official, it is "a state of intergovernmental relations in the military sphere distinguished by the resistance of the effects of destabilizing factors and the maintenance of mutually acceptable levels of arms, armed forces, and military activity" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 November 1991).

10. This is why the process of U.S. and CIS strategic arms limitation and reduction will probably not adhere to the familiar pattern of conducting official negotiations and concluding agreements with equal fixed ceilings for both sides: Their interests and approaches might seem too different. The choice of unilateral, or even coordinated unilateral, initiatives seems more realistic. This process has essentially begun.

11. This figure was mentioned often in the press recently in connection with the recent proposed "reductions" to the level of "minimal deterrence." It was accompanied by references to former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, who concluded that 400 warheads of megaton caliber would be capable of destroying the Soviet and American societies and should therefore be sufficient for each side for reliable mutual deterrence. In reality, however, McNamara was referring not to the number of missiles launched, but to the number reaching their targets. These are not the same thing. After all, part of the arms of the defensive side could be destroyed before launch or flight, another part of the aircraft and missiles would stay on the ground for technical reasons, a third part might be shot down or malfunction before reaching the target; in addition, some warheads might not detonate. Therefore, 400 "delivered" weapons could actually represent a few thousand—perhaps 2,000 or 3,000—launched warheads.

12. I.M. Tretyak, "Defense Sufficiency and Air Defense" (VOYENNAYA MYSL, No 12, 1990, p 5).

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Yeltsin on Nuclear, Biological, NATO, Kuriles

PM2705121192 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 27 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Russian President Boris Yeltsin by D. Muratov, Yu. Sorokin, V. Fronin in Moscow 23 May 1992: "Boris Yeltsin: I Am not Hiding the Difficulties and I Want the People to Understand This"]

[Excerpts] The Time Frame

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Boris Nikolayevich, if you would briefly, in a word or two, tell us from which actions, taken since last August, you would now refrain?

[Yeltsin] I would say, on the contrary, we should have acted more resolutely since August. That is the point!

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In other words, August should have been immediately followed by December, as it were?

[Yeltsin] Yes, August should have been followed by December.

[Passage omitted]

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What about the nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia? Is there a compromise solution to this problem?

[Yeltsin] Yes, there is. We have now signed an agreement with Kazakhstan: Over the next seven years Kazakhstan will transfer its remaining nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction—on the basis of a timetable agreed with Russia. Nazarbayev and I have signed this document, and he visited Bush and the United Nations with it. So everything is going to plan at the moment. The tactical weapons which were completely withdrawn to Russia were initially stockpiled. But now they have started to be destroyed at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. Strategic nuclear weapons will be left only in Russia.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Boris Nikolayevich, who commands the army? And who commands whom among you three—do you command Shaposhnikov, does Shaposhnikov command Grachev, does Grachev command Shaposhnikov, or do you command the two of them?

[Yeltsin] We delayed the creation of the Russian Army and I think that was justified. Only after similar processes had gotten under way in other states did we decide to create an army. And Nazarbayev agreed to that. Shaposhnikov and I found a common language—I would put it like that. It wasn't for me to command him, for he had, after all, been confirmed by the heads of state of the

whole CIS. Nevertheless a large part of the Army is in Russia. The Transcaucasus Military District (that is the 4th and 7th Armies) the 14th Army, the troops in the Baltic states, and the Western group of forces are all under the jurisdiction of Russia. We have more of the problems and questions relating to the army so we have to talk with Shaposhnikov and Grachev five or six times a day. So what we have here is not issuing commands but mutual understanding.

The situation has now changed. The new minister, Grachev, will operate independently and we will only discuss questions of strategic significance with Shaposhnikov.

Does Russia Often Say "Yes"?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You hear it said that Russia says "yes" too often in international politics...

[Yeltsin] Look, Bush and I came up with the initiative for deeper bilateral cuts in nuclear weapons. They have more nuclear-tipped sea-launched missiles than us. The numbers should be equalized, but this is a question for negotiation. When have we said "yes" to Russia's detriment? When people say "we are selling off our national wealth" or "we are selling off Russia," I say—tell me what we have sold off. Show me anything—even if it is only worth a kopek. People say that we have sold ourselves to the IMF for \$24 billion. We have not yet taken anything from the Americans—not a cent! This is still just a possibility, and later we will see how we can avail ourselves of this possibility without damage—in such a way that the debt is not handed down to our grandchildren.

[Passage omitted]

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is a military alliance between Russia and the West possible?

[Yeltsin] If you mean NATO, then I believe that we need to go first of all for a political alliance as France did. That is a first step. Russia was with Europe from time immemorial and we need to integrate ourselves into European institutions—the Council of Europe, the EEC—and we need to enter into political and economic alliances. For the time being we will not enter into any military alliances.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Your proposal on a five-stage settlement of the northern territories issue between Russia and Japan is well known. What is your view today?

[Yeltsin] I continue to advocate a five-stage solution to the problem. I emphasize—a solution to the problem.

I have visited the Kurils myself. The withdrawal of our military bases, from the military standpoint, will take around 10 years—the military stated this before. But now that we have analyzed everything, we have concluded that it could be done in the space of a single year. Shaposhnikov and I now agree that our division will be

withdrawn from the Kurils and that only border guards and coastal defense vessels will be left behind. Of course, a final resolution of the problem will be impossible in either 1993 or 1994. Although we would like to sign a peace treaty with Japan in 1993.

[Passage omitted]

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You knew about the development of bacteriological weapons in Sverdlovsk. But it was only recently that you first talked about it publicly. Why did you keep quiet all that time?

[Yeltsin] First, nobody asked me about it. And, second, when I learned that these developments were under way I visited Andropov...When there was an anthrax outbreak, the official conclusion stated that it was carried by some dog. Although the KGB had already admitted that our military developments were the cause.

Andropov phoned Ustinov and ordered these production facilities to be completely scrapped. I believed that this had been done. It turned out that the laboratories were simply moved to another oblast and development of the weapons continued. And I told Bush, Major, and Mitterrand this—that the program was under way...I signed a decree setting up a special committee and banning the program. It was only after this that experts flew out specially and stopped the work.

[Passage omitted]

Potential NATO Nuclear Threat to CIS

PM2805124392 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 May 92 p 1

[Report by Viktor Linnik: "Unremitting Nuclear Thirst"]

[Text] Yet another sensational scandal...NATO's new strategy, which permits a first use of nuclear weapons, has been published. The document confirming this was passed to REUTER by persons "committed to active public discussion of the issues treated in it."

It was adopted in December last year by the NATO countries' ministers of defense, immediately following the USSR's collapse on a heady wave of sovereignization. Here are the most noteworthy excerpts from it: "NATO is now threatened by a danger stemming from instability in a whole series of regions, including the territory of the former Soviet Union and the Near East...NATO may review the question of the selective use of nuclear weapons with the aim of ending military conflicts." The idea is to use nuclear aviation bombs or sea-launched missiles because, the document says, the capabilities of conventional armed forces could prove insufficient to repulse an aggressor's attack.

Translated from military-political gibberish into ordinary human language, these words say simply: If anyone in the republics of the former USSR misbehaves, then the stern NATO uncles can, if necessary, resort to the

nuclear flogging of the naughty pranksters. Since there is no noticeable shortage of "naughty kids" on the territory of the former USSR today, the reader is free to draw his own conclusions.

So, our new "partners" in the West, absolutely incapable of evaluating the rare spiritual nobility of the new generation of Christ-loving rulers in the CIS, are presenting us with one surprise after another. But are they surprises? The Russian president is targeting our nuclear missiles away from the United States (true, without specifying on whom they are now targeted). But the United States does not even entertain the thought of responding in kind, and is still setting its nuclear sights at the Kremlin and Staraya Ploshchad, as if Brezhnev, the superannuated leader of the "evil empire," was still there with his young protege Gorbachev. Bakatin hands over to his friends a unique bugging system—the Americans were plunged into such bewilderment that they did not even offer thanks for such a generous present. Their only response to this princely gesture was to "forget" through a blunder about their submarine in the Barents Sea. Back in the spring of last year the U.S. press published plans for armed intervention in the CIS hot spots—in case the people there really begin to get out of hand. Then it was a question of using conventional armed forces. And now, it turns out, the nuclear bomb may also be entirely suitable.

So then. An entirely muscular response, logical for the United States and NATO, to the new-thinking grimaces of Russian foreign policy. The torrent of foreign tours by Russia's leaders is inversely proportional to their effectiveness and Russia's current weight in world affairs.

What are the advantages? The 24 billion [dollars] promised by the West for the 300 million population of the CIS is akin to the Biblical parable of the seven loaves between 5,000 people. Then of course, this 24 billion does not exist—it is the authorities' latest bluff. Even if you believe in them, this sum does not enter into any comparison with the 11 billion received by Stalin under lend-lease during the Patriotic War. After all, that is about 150 billion in current prices.

Is the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ready to demand rational explanations from NATO and the United States over this latest nuclear sensation? This is what we would like to know in the "new era" which has set in relations between East and West.

Withdrawal of 7th Army From Armenia Delayed
LD0106154192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1334 GMT 1 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 1 Jun—The withdrawal of subunits of the 7th Army stationed on Armenian territory has not started yet. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the press center of the Russian Defense Ministry that no orders on this have yet been dispatched from the Russian

military command to the army. Its units and subunits are stationed at their places of permanent deployment.

Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev stated at a news conference held on 22 May that the start of the redeployment was planned for 1 June. According to the minister, it is planned to get a Motorized Infantry Division out to Russia and to disband two fortified areas. Other units and subunits of the 7th Army, Pavel Grachev noted, will be (?cut) within the framework of the program of the construction of the Russian armed forces.

[Moscow INTERFAX in English at 1614 GMT on 1 June, in a related report, adds: "In the wake of the reported beginning of the troop withdrawal from the Caucasus, Russian Defence Ministry official Nikolay Medvedev has confirmed that a political decision on the issue has been made. At the same time he told IF [INTERFAX] that army units, including those in Armenia had not received any instructions to begin the pull-out yet. Medvedev said troops in Trans-Caucasia were confined to their permanent location."]

START TALKS

START Protocol Called 'Unilateral Disarmament'
PM0106082192 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 92 p 3

[Yuriy Glukhov "Viewpoint" article: "Unrequited Love"]

[Text] The United States, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus signed a protocol to the START Treaty in Lisbon 23 May. The treaty was concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1991, but has not been implemented because of the collapse of the USSR. The commitment to carry it out now lies equally with the four former Soviet republics. Thus, seven years after the START Treaty comes into force Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan will be completely nonnuclear states, and Russia will be the only legitimate heir to the former Union's nuclear status.

Admittedly, there is a substantial difference between the situation when the START Treaty was concluded and the current situation. The previous parity in relations with the United States no longer exists. Russia is not the Soviet Union, but just part of it. But it is not just a question of a reduction in the scale of the economic, military, and political potential of one of the parties to the treaty.

Other major factors are at work too. The unified strategic space has been destroyed. Russia has no borders that are adequately protected along their entire length. There is no overall defense alliance among the Commonwealth countries. The collective security agreement covers only five of its 11 members. Moreover certain republics, including the largest—Russia and Ukraine—are in a

state of conflict. Dependence on foreign aid has grown sharply. A domestic front has been opened—a "hunt for Reds" is under way.

Under these circumstances the signing of the Lisbon protocol by Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan is a goodwill gesture and essentially an act of unilateral disarmament. It has been done without any corresponding step or commitment from the United States and NATO. It is being done at a time when Washington has gotten a taste for strong-arm politics and, in the wake of Iraq, is threatening to punish Yugoslavia.

Judging by everything, nothing was said about this in Lisbon, but it should be recalled for the sake of the truth, since unilateral pacifism is reminiscent of unrequited love.

USSR Nuclear Legacy Issue 'Considered Closed'

PM0506084392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 May 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Golts: "Ten Years Not Needed for CIS States To Agree To Implement START Treaty"]

[Text] I do not know if it was specially arranged or if U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker just got tired of flying to the former Soviet Union every month to coordinate the positions of the new CIS states. At any rate, it was supremely symbolic. The protocol on the implementation of the START Treaty was signed by Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States during the Lisbon conference on questions of aid to the former Union states.

These two problems—disarmament (primarily nuclear disarmament) and the provision of aid—have recently been the main, if not the only, subjects in CIS representatives' dealings with the outside world. The relationship between the two problems is obvious. The world is seriously concerned about the prospect that the social upheaval and interethnic conflict on one-sixth of the earth's surface will escalate into warfare involving the most sophisticated weapons, including nuclear weapons. That is why it is urgently necessary to reduce these weapons as quickly as possible. Aid should be provided in order to prevent any deterioration in the situation.

But some of the CIS states, seeing the link between disarmament and foreign aid, drew not entirely accurate conclusions. They expected that, if they took advantage of the fact that nuclear weapons belonging to the former Union are located on their territory and declared their rights to them, they could become de facto nuclear powers. Consequently their status in relations with the West would be enhanced.

The proposed ratification of the START Treaty, which has been worked on for a good 10 years, was a suitable opportunity for them to assert themselves in this new

capacity. So Ukraine and then Kazakhstan declared their intention together with Russia to become parties to the treaty.

Statements were issued one after another justifying the claims to nuclear weapons—which would, it seemed, require another 10 years of talks among the CIS republics on the implementation of the treaty already signed.

But the pretenders to the nuclear club failed to take account of the fact that Washington is able to defend what it considers its vital interests. And, unlike Moscow, it has the means to make people listen to what it says. L. Kravchuk's visit to Washington demonstrated quite visibly that there could be no question of any cooperation without clear commitments to an agreement on nonnuclear status. Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev preferred to state his intention to adopt nonnuclear status prior to his Washington visit.

As a compromise the Americans proposed that a protocol be signed which, although registering the accession [podklyucheniye] of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the START Treaty, at the same time required that they accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This was the protocol signed in Lisbon.

Thus, it seems as though the dispute about the former USSR's nuclear legacy can be considered closed. The Soviet Union's place in the nuclear club has been taken by just one state—Russia. We should heave a sigh of relief... and thank Washington yet again. And we should think again about why the CIS republics prefer to resolve their disputes and conflicts with the help of transatlantic coordinators and mediators.

Ukraine Role in START Protocol Examined

LD2705165492 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in English 0000 GMT 27 May 92

[Station Commentary by Mykola Kravchuk]

[Excerpt] A few days ago in Lisbon the foreign ministers of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine and US Secretary of State, James Baker signed a protocol to the START Treaty. Here is our commentary, read by Radio Ukraine's Mykola Kravchuk. [passage omitted]

Today many objections can be heard in Ukraine concerning its decision to be a non-nuclear state. Isn't it a mistake to get rid of the nuclear weapons and ask no guarantees instead? Of course it is hard to accept that 1200 nuclear warheads for which the Ukrainian nation paid a very high price mean nothing but extra loss connected with their annihilation. President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk dispersed such worries by a convincing argument. The most essential guarantees for Ukraine are domestic stability, development of new independent structures of power, national armed forces and a strong financial system. The status of a non-nuclear state will facilitate Ukraine's entrance to economic structures of Europe and promote its authority.

Commercial Space Project To Use SS-25 Missile Technology

PM2905212992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 May 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Boris Konovalov: "Missiles Need Not Be Destroyed; They Can Be Used For Commercial Space Projects"; throughout item term "rocket" is used as translation for "raketa" and "missile" as translation for "boyevaya raketa")]

[Text] Businessmen in our country are beginning to invest money in the development of our space program. A space project known as "Start-1" [as transliterated], which proposes to use for civilian purposes strategic missile systems known in the West as SS-25, is currently being implemented.

The investor in this project is the I.V.K. commercial joint-stock company, and "Start-1" is being developed by the "Kompleks" scientific and technical center. The first transportable civilian multipurpose rocket complex is being created, from which launches will, in principle, be possible from anywhere. Reliable, solid fuel missiles will launch satellites with a mass of up to 350 kg into low near-Earth orbits. A demonstration launch from the Plesetsk cosmodrome has been scheduled as early as December 1992. In 1993, "Start-1" will enter the space rocket market to provide services below world prices. Instead of nuclear charges, the missiles will carry satellites for scientific research purposes, satellite communication systems, the creation of new materials and substances, prospecting for mineral resources and ecological monitoring.

Under the commitments accepted by the USSR, whose legal successor Russia has now become, 154 SS-18 liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are subject to destruction, but there are plans to use them for commercial purposes as well. A joint-stock company which is open to foreign participants, has now been organized to create "Lavochkin" technological space complexes, which will be launched into orbit by SS-18 rockets. The name "Lavochkin" honors the initiator of this project—the Lavochkin science-and-production association.

"Lavochkin" can be developed rather quickly, because the Venus landing craft will be used as its basis. It has been proposed for the "Lavochkin" apparatus to be used to produce medical preparations and extremely pure semiconductor materials. "Lavochkin" will have a strong power system for these purposes, and the absence of cosmonauts will rule out micro-gravitational disturbances.

The SALT Treaty says that long-range missiles can be destroyed [unichtozhat] through launching useful, scientific payloads. So why blow up something that can be of useful service to people? The only cause for regret now is that 700 SS-20 missiles were blown up under the terms of

the treaty. If the treaty had been formulated more sensibly, they could also have been utilized for civilian purposes.

'Waiting Line' for Satellite Consumers Formed

PM2805114792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 26 May 92

[Video report by I. Ivanov, S. Urusov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Ivanov] Even not so long ago the inhabitants of the West were intimidated by SS-20 and SS-25 missiles. Then, under the treaties, they simply destroyed them. Now it has been decided to remove the deadly warheads and launch satellites for civilian use into space with the help of the rockets. This was discussed at a news conference in Moscow, where the design of Start, the first Russian space rocket complex, was presented. Its initiator is the joint stock company IVK, and Yegor Gaydar has shown interest in the project; he has included Start in Russia's state space program.

[S. Zinchenko, vice president of IVK] So far this work, which has only just started, has enabled us to save around 5,000 jobs. The total number of personnel involved is up to 15,000. This includes the army sub-units of strategic rocket forces—around 10,000 servicemen.

[Ivanov] Strange as it may seem, a spaceflight waiting line has now formed. It is made up of consumers waiting to launch their communications satellites with the assistance of the Russian rockets. Where are they from?

[L. Solomonov, chief designer] The United States, Germany, France, Britain, Brazil. All the advanced countries now need a way of ensuring that their small satellites can be sent out fairly efficiently.

[Ivanov] Incidentally, the Americans are taking \$80 million for a piece of a rocket analogous to the SS-20. Putting a payload of 1 kilogram into orbit costs around \$10,000. The participants in the news conference believe that the launching of the IVK project will finally enable us to make our conversion profitable. [video shows designs, models]

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Moscow ABM Defenses Said to Be Ineffective

92UM1112A Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 16-17 18 Apr 92-2 May 92 (3378-3379) p 8

[Article by Anatoliy Kravtsov under the rubric "Opinion": "For What Purpose Are We Building Missiles?"]

[Text] The author of the following article is not a diletante in the field of missile construction. He is a reserve

colonel whose career has taken him from junior military representative to head of the military delegation at a design office which develops ABM weapons and to service in the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate. His opinion might appear unacceptable to other, still active specialists. If we are firmly resolved to merge into the community of civilized nations, however, is the question posed in the headline of the article so invalid?

Chamberlain, Hitler, Stalin.... In the mid-'30s not one of them expected a future war to be waged against his capital, but each of them was building his bunker. All three were receiving reports from the military on the soundness of the air defenses (PVO) and on the impregnability of the cities, particularly the capitals.

Moscow's PVO plan provided for repelling an attack from any direction, at any time of day or night, in any weather, from any altitude. By 22 July 1941 the Moscow PVO zone had 1,044 antiaircraft guns and 585 fighter aircraft. At a time when German aircraft were pounding the retreating Soviet troops with impunity, paralyzing them, the best weapons were defending Moscow in anticipation of raids. Even then, however, after the raids began, 229 fascist bombers penetrated to the capital between 22 July and 5 December 1941 alone. The city center caught it too, even the Kremlin.

England and the Americans built their PVO system together. At a time when our PVO was equipped with echolocators for detecting an air enemy (and those in limited quantities) and relied mainly on the ears of an entire army of air observers, the allies had an adequate quantity of radar stations. There appeared to be no limits to the inventiveness of the British military engineers. But then 16 June 1944 came, and the Germans inflicted the first massive missile attack against London. Its effect on morale was great, despite insignificant British losses. The missile was the V-1.

The first ballistic missile, the V-2, fell upon London on 8 September 1944. This was a fundamentally new weapon. The only protection against it was the evacuation of an additional 700,000 Londoners and strikes at plants, missile storage bases and combat positions of the Germans.

Experience with this kind of confrontation lets us draw a major conclusion. It is that defensive weapons produce good results only after they have been perfected, redesigned and adapted for use against specific weapons of attack.

Look at our present PVO. Read the books and justifications of the apologists for the military-industrial complexes of the USA and the USSR, and now those of the CIS and of Russia itself. Read the dissertations, technical plans and reports of state commissions. Look at the calculations of the most skilled mathematicians-and-estimators. All of the intellectual might of the military-industrial complexes has attempted and is still attempting to prove that ABM defense is essential, that we cannot get by without it.

Our military and civilian ministers, PVO commanders in chief, bigwigs in the military-industrial complexes and the deputies who echo them have made full use of the limits set for ABM weapons in the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of PVO Systems. It permits the deployment of 100 missiles against space attack, and we deployed them.

Now we have the president's announcement: "We are ready jointly to develop and then build and jointly operate a global defense system instead of SDI."

What is this? Mental derangement? A mistake? Destitute Russia with its collapsed industry and its enormously backward foundation taking part in "star wars"?

Let us assume for a minute that the Americans have taken us on as partners. Let us assume that the achievements of our nuclear scientists in the development of airborne nuclear reactors such as the Topaz electric-energy generator, which the Americans have been talking about using for going on 4 years now, would be useful to our proposed partners in ABM defense. Let us assume even that we succeed in "palming off" on them our launch vehicles, built with hopelessly obsolete basic equipment, or succeed in linking our spaceborne intelligence systems. But this is all difficult to accept when one considers our lag with respect to dependability (there is a reason, after all, why our nuclear reactors are blowing up, why three quarters of the ballistic-missile submarine fleet is parked at docks and in roadsteads and not performing alert duty, and so forth).

Let us put aside the political subtleties. The world does not consist just of the USA and CIS (or perhaps Russia or a mini-CIS). Will the rest of the world want to be under our "umbrella"? What if one of the other large nations does not want to be under it or does not believe the advertising extolling its dependability? How will this affect stability in the world even with a reduction of nuclear arsenals?

The designers themselves are aware of the commercial hype and the impossibility of achieving absolute reliability for a PVO system, of course. This kind of reliability cannot be achieved even in such a rich nation as the USA, not even with the technological assistance of such titans as Japan. Such systems are possible only on paper, on a computer disk or in the head of an engineering genius. That is, they are only possible in theory. Aware of this, the trumpeters of ABM defense and SDI make certain provisions, express a slant toward a limited, so-called zonal PVO and attempt to make it appear that the latter is reliable. Let us say that Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Washington and Los Angeles are 100% protected. But then Chernobyl demonstrated that there is no such thing as oases in a nuclear desert.

If PVO is needed to protect presidential residences from insane politicians though, who says that nuclear bombs will be delivered only by missiles and not by civilian aircraft or river barges, not in suitcases or by earth-moving equipment? A madman could not care less about

the little umbrellas, when there are already 430 operating nuclear power plants, thousands of nuclear reactors and tens of thousands of chemical plants in the world. Far more missiles could penetrate PVO systems than suggested in the secret calculations, however. Such a system would not knock down even an individual missile launched, God forbid, by some madman. Do we not have adequate proof in recent cases in which it took the American PVO so long to identify false warning signals or from our experience with Rust's landing at the base St Basil's Cathedral?

With respect to the technical aspect of the matter, the probability of destroying a missile with one antimissile high-explosive fragmentation, shaped charge, rod charge or any other nonnuclear, axial-type projectile is very low. Even assuming that guidance was ideal (almost up to the point of impact) and the probability of a hit is 50%, it is not especially difficult to estimate that the launching of two missiles would increase the probability by only 25% and that it would take more than three missiles to increase the probability to 90%. Our ballistic missiles, known as Scud missiles, which are huge, high-contrast hulks and make fine targets flying from known directions at an anticipated time, were frequently shot down by the Israeli PVO system, which is considered to be fairly well perfected. Three or four Patriot missiles were used to shoot down one of Husayn's Scuds. Even this obviously poor performance, however, was used to advertise the Patriot system as an allegedly effective ABM weapon.

It is as though no one noticed that the Americans had modernized the system especially for destroying such ballistic missiles, even though the 1972 Agreement forbade the building of mobile ABM weapons. Our military and our politicians issued no statements on the matter. And why not? Perhaps because the Scud is an intercontinental missile with the corresponding speeds. Why no, it was because they themselves had assigned ABM missions to our own anti-aircraft missile systems. Specifically to the S-300 system.

The unabashed promotion of ours and American anti-aircraft missiles is proceeding at full speed and appears to be producing results. It is helping the military-industrial complexes obtain subsidies. This is disastrous, particularly for our depleted economy. Even more significant and dangerous, however, is the fact that this promotion is helping to maintain in the broad masses and among politicians the illusion that they are protected and is influencing the adoption of financial, military and political decisions by the latter. I shall venture to say that the illusion of the possibility of protecting cities, facilities and troops against nuclear missile strikes is just about the biggest hoax today

Thanks to the extremely high state of their disinformation art, the American and Soviet military-industrial complexes succeeded in obtaining allocations for SDI and for ABM defense. It took no special effort to get the controllers of finances to open up the purse strings. It was enough to create the appearance that each side

feared the ABM defense work being conducted by the "enemy," in order to tune the diplomatic, parliamentary and other lobbyists in onto the wavelength of its alleged stabilizing effect.

A declaration by leaders and representatives of 36 academies of sciences (including those of the USSR and the USA) signed in Rome in 1982 pointed out that there is no protection against nuclear weapons. Back when SDI had just been conceived, many prestigious scientists convincingly demonstrated the detriment of the very idea that an effective ABM defense was achievable and substantiated the impossibility of winning "star wars."

No one has yet refuted the fact that fewer than 1% of the nuclear warheads need to reach the target in order to strike a mortal blow. A "shield" capable even of repelling 99% of the strikes is therefore senseless. Even if nuclear arsenals are cut 10-fold, one can hardly count on reliability for the "shield," because shooting down 90% of all the targets is an absolutely unrealistic mission.

The author did not agree with the assertion that an ABM defense was needed by the USSR and does not agree that one is needed by the Russian Federation. It is not needed, because it is impossible even if enormous sums of money are spent. An absolute, global ABM defense system is unrealistic and unattainable the same as developing an eternal engine, finding the finite value for an irrational number or drawing a square circle.

One can agree with those specialists who believe that our ABM defense set up around Moscow is not only ineffective, although billions were spent on it and money is still being spent to keep it operable with the help of thousands of specialists. Worse than that, it is dangerous. And the sooner we dismantle it, melt it down for the metal and turn the motor vehicles, electric power plants and other equipment over to the national economy, the better it will be for Russia and for the entire world. Have we not done enough building "cannons for shooting sparrows" and polluting space with trash and garbage?

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Ukraine Yet To Sign Tripartite Defense Deal

*PM2605094592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 May 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Ukraine Promises To Stand Under Space Umbrella"]

[Text] In IZVESTIYA No. 116 we reported that Russia, Ukraine, and Byelarus signed documents 19 May in Moscow on instituting the "Vympel" Interstate Joint-Stock Corporation, which brings together under one roof the scientific-technical and production base of the defense complex engaged in developing and creating ABM systems and missile attack warning systems.

We must apologize to our readers. The news was premature. Russia and Byelarus signed the agreement. Ukraine did not. Why not?

The point is that the agreement creating "Vypel"—the first interstate concern in our defense complex—was signed by the three states' governments back on 15 January. It took some months to prepare and agree on the terms for bringing the stockholders together under one roof, on a joint scientific-technical policy, on tariffs [rastsenki]... The corporation's founders—the Russian State Property Commission, the Ukrainian State Property Fund, and the Committee to Manage State Property under the Byelarus Council of Ministers—had their actions approved by the states' governments. The heads of government of Ukraine, Russia, and Byelarus initialed the documents. But even in Moscow it turned out that Ukrainian delegation head Vladimir Pryadko, chairman of the country's State Property Fund Board, did not have from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which now exercises jurisdiction over the fund, the authority to sign the documents founding the corporation.

"We simply did not get it agreed in time in parliament," he told IZVESTIYA's correspondent. "I think we will get things together this week and we will sign the treaty."

Some experts see this technical hiccup as a political maneuver. The same one that is preventing Russia and Ukraine from agreeing on many other questions, beginning with Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. But corporation president Nikolay Mikhaylov reckons that, despite certain difficulties, Ukraine is objectively interested in signing the documents founding the corporation. An ABM space umbrella and employment in that sphere would also be to its benefit.

At any rate, "Vypel" specialists claim, the interstate joint-stock company will be operating. In Russia there are plants that will be able to reorganize production to meet defense science orders, not right away, but in two to three years. It will be more difficult, obviously, for the major production associations in Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolayev, and Lvov...

Meshkov on Conversion of SS-20, 22-25

92UM1126A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Meshkov: "There Won't Be any 'Black Boxes' in Orbit: A Project Has Been Developed for the Commercial Use of Ballistic Missiles"]

[Text] It is a simple matter to blow up a pile of SS-20's, reducing them to a heap of rubbish with one push of a button. It is more difficult with the technological, scientific-technical production that was created by military science and industry during the long years of strategic confrontation.

"IVK" Joint-Stock Company and "Kompleks" Scientific-Technical Center have developed the "Start-1"

Space-Missile Complex based on SS-20 and SS-25 ballistic missile manufacturing technologies. Its function is to launch commercial satellites with payloads of up to 550 kilograms into circular, polar orbit at an altitude of up to 700 kilometers. These spacecraft can be used for scientific research, deployment of a satellite communications system, ecological monitoring, and surveying natural resources as well as for the creation of orbiting mini-shops for the production of new materials and substances.

One of "Start-1's" important specific features is its transportability. This means that not only can the launch pads already in existence at missile ranges be used to launch a launch vehicle with a satellite, but launches can be conducted outside the cosmodrome. There is no doubt about the complex's reliability: it is based upon the SS-20 and SS-25 missile production technologies that were exclusively for military use, we always directed the best minds to those matters, and we all know that we did not scrimp.

The first launch of a "Start-1" launch vehicle should be in December 1992 from the northern range at Plesetsk. The project's developers calculate that the complex's commercial operation will begin in 1993. Judging by everything, there should not be a shortage of clients. There is an enormous demand for services of this type all over the world. According to "IVK" Vice-President Sergei Zinchenko's assurances, the waiting list to launch these and other objects in peacetime has already been formed until the year 2000 and totals no less than 300 payloads.

It turns out we were in a hurry with the extravagant destruction of SS-20 missiles. They could also have been used, at a great profit.

Since the "Start-1" Space-Missile Complex project has been very closely tied to the use of strategic equipment and technology, naturally the question arose during its recent presentation at the International Trade Center in Moscow: won't this be a repetition of the contract between India and our Glavkosmos [Main Space Administration]? "IVK" Vice President S. Zinchenko decisively rejected that possibility, stating that in this case it is a question only of the sale of services and not the equipment and technology itself. The procedures to conclude a contract to launch some object or other into space envisions obtaining exhaustive information about the satellite's function. The project developers assured us that they do not intend to launch "black boxes" into orbit.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

'Start' Launcher Based on SS-20 Missile

927Q0171A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 May 92 p 5

[Article by A. Kostin: "Conversion. The Missiles We Are Assembling"]

[Text] We have been talking about conversion for a long time. We have been engaging in it for approximately the same amount of time. Instead of tanks we have begun to make nails, and instead of grenades, ashtrays, but nobody has been able to think of anything to do with the ballistic missiles. The presentation of the first Russian "Start-1" complex took place yesterday. The project is unique in terms of both its complexity and its purpose.

The fact is that the missile launcher was created on the basis of the SS-20, which caused a big stir at one time, and it can put into orbit a quite peaceful payload with a mass of up to 500 kilograms. It costs one-tenth as much to produce as its foreign counterparts. The I.V.K. joint-stock company, which is working on implementing the project, hopes that the series production that has now been arranged will make it possible to put the "Start-1" on the international market fairly rapidly and even significantly reduce its price.

Here one must say a few words about the I.V.K. joint-stock company itself. It has a considerable scientific-production potential. An I.V.K. plant is now going on line for producing personal computers and also electronic equipment for its own developments. In addition to this, the joint-stock company works on software, processing and exporting timber materials, metal items,

energy bearers, and export-import operations, it provides marketing and transportation services, and it is developing financial and investment programs.

But let us return to the missiles "which we are assembling." The "Start-1" complex is intended for putting space equipment into orbit not only from the territory of the CIS but also from the territories of other states, for example, the United States and Canada.

It should be added that in all stages of the rocket they have installed solid-fuel motor components which use special fuel with a low content in the combustion products of compounds that are harmful to the environment, which provides for greater ecological safety of the launches.

If you just think about this project, you will for the umpteenth time come to this conclusion: The country which has almost the greatest scientific and production potential in the world is in a state of deep crisis as usual. Perhaps we should look at the possibilities of conversion again and again, and more attentively. (Of course, without paying any attention to the innocent jokes at the beginning of this article.)

P.S. And here is also just a little bit of information exclusively for specialists:

Maximum mass of payload launched into the equatorial orbit
(inclination 0 degrees, latitude of starting point 0 degrees)

Altitude of orbit, kilometers	350	500	700	1,000
Mass of payload, kilograms	500	450	380	300

Maximum mass of payload launched into polar orbit
(inclination 90 degrees, latitude of starting point 0 degrees)

Altitude of orbit, kilometers	350	500	700	1,000
Mass of payload, kilograms	300	260	200	135

Rocket Seen as Key to Space Market

927Q0172A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by O. Volkov and D. Molchanov: "Private Operators Going Out Into Space: The First CIS Commercial Rocket Takes Off in December"]

[Text] It was proposed in the first version of the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty that all missiles taken off combat alert be destroyed. Thank God the final version permitted use of the former military rockets and developed technologies for commercial purposes. And a couple of years ago, several plants of the former Ministry of Defense Industry undertook to create the Start system, based on the SS-20 and SS-25 missiles, which can be used to place small commercial satellites in near-Earth orbit.

The creation and commercial use of space systems require large capital investments. All the same, this is

considered a very advantageous business. Today, for example, interested firms will pay about \$60-80 million to charter a launch vehicle, an outlay within the capabilities only of a government or major corporation.

In the words of Yuriy Solomonov, director of the center "Complex," satellite launching services which use the Start system will cost a potential customer \$7-10 million.

"That is lower than market prices, but it is not dumping," he states. "Analysis of the international market has shown that we may receive about 300 orders prior to the year 2000. And we are still counting on participating in the American project "Iridium"—creation of a network of 77 communications satellites in low orbit, which will enable us to use telephones in the most remote corners of the planet. Participation in this program will bring us a profit and will open the way for Russia's entry into the world system of information and communications. The Americans were planning on using their own Delta and Pegasus rockets in this program. Now, having become

aware of our project, they say they will take the most inexpensive launch vehicle."

In addition to everything else, this project allows us to retain highly qualified personnel and resolve the employment problem.

For somewhat over two years the creators of Start wandered from ministry to ministry attempting to gain access to the government. Groups of experts under auspices of the president obtained approval, but...

"The Ryzhkov and Pavlov governments failed to make a decision on capital investments, although the return from Start should exceed expenditures many times over," states Yu. Solomonov.

Changes for the better were seen immediately following the putsch. And recently the Start-1 project was approved by Gaydar. Solomonov believes that the present government is simply more practical and businesslike. It must be clarified, though, that the project does not ask for a single kopek out of the state budget. Investments for the operation are being made by the joint-stock company I.V.K.

"Up until now we have not been involved in projects this significant," states Sergey Zinchenko, vice president of the I.V.K. company. "When representatives of the defense establishment approached us a year ago, we pondered over it for two months. It is an advantageous endeavor. According to our calculations, several launches of Start—an experimental launch will take place in December and commercial missions may take place as early as next year—will recoup all investments."

The concept of private operators in space is a new one for us and, if for that reason alone, we are somewhat suspicious of it. And the point here is not even the fact of dealing with a little-known investor, or in the dividends I.V.K. will obtain from the project, developed by state enterprises (20 percent of the capital, according to S. Zinchenko, still belongs to the state).

The point is that the project shows a definite orientation on the foreign market. True, the directors of "Complex" and I.V.K. assure us in a single voice that they are relying primarily on domestic orders and cite the example of such-and-such a bank which sponsored the launch of a satellite. Yet all the same, quite honestly, it is difficult to imagine how one of our new millionaires would today require the launch of a satellite. While those who truly need it—scientific research institutes, ecologists—cannot afford to charter a launch without government assistance.

On the other hand, analysis of the international small-satellite market shows that they are waiting impatiently for a cheap launch vehicle out there. And if, as Start developers assure us, their project truly is not being caused to fall under restrictions of different kinds, our

rockets will be able to successfully compete with American and French rockets and participate in long-term international projects.

In extracting ourselves from the domestic military-industrial complex, we may fall into the military-industrial complex abroad. After all, as one American specialist explained to us, "the largest number of potential clients desiring to launch small satellites will be found among the military—especially those connected with the Strategic Defense Initiative."

For the time being, it is true that all "Complex" and I.V.K. contacts with foreigners are established and maintained through the Russian Government. Later on, after becoming well known and attaining a certain prestige in the international arena, Start developers may well refuse its services.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Report on Missile Unit Withdrawal 'Premature'

PM2505132792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 May 92 p 1

[Captain Second Rank V. Gromak report: "Shore-Based Missilemen Remain in Ventspils for Now. They Will Leave When Ordered"]

[Text] Baltic Fleet, 20 May—The report carried a few days ago by RIA that a Baltic Fleet missile battalion had been withdrawn from Ventspils to Kaliningrad Oblast was somewhat premature. As Captain First Rank Nikolay Kuchma, assistant to the commander of fleet shore-based troops, said, only one train carrying needed technical stores has arrived at a related unit in Kaliningrad Oblast. All the personnel and equipment remain in Ventspils. Where they will be withdrawn to and when is still an open question. No decision has yet been made on this score by the Russian Government or the Russian Defense Ministry.

Grachev: Final Timing of Withdrawal to be Determined

PM2205193592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 May 92 Morning Edition p 8

[Report by Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Center: "Timing of Troop Withdrawal from Baltic States' Territory Will Be Decided at Talks"]

[Text] There was an inaccuracy in the report on the first session of the Russian Security Council published by IZVESTIYA (No. 117). Citing Army General P.S. Grachev, defense minister of the Russian Federation, the report maintains that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Baltic states will be completed in 1994. In actual fact, when talking with the newspaper's correspondent, General of the Army P.S. Grachev reported that it is planned to withdraw the

main groupings of Russian troops (forces) from the territory of the Baltic states after the completion of the withdrawal of units and combined units from Germany and Poland. At the same time, the necessary infrastructure has to be created at the new points of stationing—primarily the construction of housing.

It is proposed to withdraw 40 percent of the troops from the territory of the Baltic region during 1992-1994, and the remaining 60 percent after 1994. The timing will finally be decided on during the current talks among state delegations from Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Russian-Latvian Talks on Troop Withdrawal Open

*LD2705024992 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 1731 GMT 26 May 92*

[Text] The Latvian Embassy in Russia told the government information service that the delegations at today's talks between Russia and Latvia agreed that the Russian Army's withdrawal from Latvia must be examined first. The Russian representatives recognized that the troops' withdrawal was not directly connected with the observance of human rights in Latvia; however, they also pointed out that both these problems could not be separated from one another and that an indirect influence exists. Therefore, it was proposed to examine the question of human rights in this round of talks. The Russian delegation submitted a three-stage schedule for a gradual withdrawal of the army and a continuation of the withdrawal even until 1999. The Latvian delegation firmly defends the standpoint that foreign state troops must completely leave Latvia by the autumn of next year. The talks will continue 27 and 28 May. As the Russian side proposed, working groups on 27 May will discuss socioeconomic questions and the Russian troops' stay in Latvia.

Further on Latvian Talks on Troop Withdrawal

*LD2905022192 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 28 May 92*

[Text] The issue of the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries has gained some prominence over the last few days. On 27 May, talks between Russia and Lithuania were held in regards to this problem. On 28 May, the Russian-Latvian talks were completed. Russia offered to withdraw its troops from Latvia by 1999, while the Latvian Republic insists 1993 should be the deadline. As the negotiations progressed, the two parties found themselves unable to reach an agreement. Our correspondent Vyacheslav Osipov reports in more detail:

[Osipov] In contrast to 27 May's news conference at Lithuania's mission in Moscow, the Latvians acted more wisely: They invited Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation, to their embassy. There, the journalists heard two opinions and two assessments of one and the same

problem. Russia's delegation commented positively on the dialogue that had taken place. Specific guidelines have been blueprinted covering economic, humanitarian, and legal issues. Special envoy Sergey Zotov offered this assessment:

[Begin Zotov recording] Russia's delegation thinks it important that our delegations and countries share an understanding that our relations should be built on the basis of mutual respect and equal rights. We are not going to conceal the fact that the positions of the two countries on a range of important issues and questions of principle still differ considerably. We are aware that these deadlines do not satisfy the Latvian side, as it has stated. On our part, we have again confirmed our firm determination and our sincere readiness to effect the troop pull-out in the shortest time possible. We have no intention of manipulating the issue of pulling troops out or using them as a lever of any kind. [end recording]

[Osipov] Janis Dinevics, state minister and head of the Latvian delegation, expressed a different opinion of the negotiations that have just taken place.

[Begin Dinevics recording] The Latvian side is continuing to stick to its view that the troops must be withdrawn before September 1993 from Latvia as a whole, and from the Latvian capital, Riga, by the end of 1992. [end recording]

[Osipov] I asked Sergey Zotov to explain why Russia is proposing that the troops be pulled out by 1999. He said the main reason was that the withdrawal of an enormous group of troops was under way at the moment from Germany and Poland.

[Begin Zotov recording] So Russia is physically and materially incapable at the moment of meeting unrealistic deadlines for the withdrawal of a large group of troops such as the Northwest group of troops, numbering as it does, more than 100,000, including 58,000 from Latvia. We believe that understanding and mutual trust should exist between our two countries, our two democratic states. Latvia should not create added difficulties for the Russian leadership. The future of democracy in Latvia, it seems to us, does not so much depend on the schedule for the troop withdrawal as on the fate of democracy in Russia itself. So we believe that one, must above all, approach these matters not just from a military-political point of view, but from a purely human one. [end recording]

[Osipov] The special envoy also cited technical data which make it evident that the troop withdrawal schedule proposed by the Latvian Republic is unrealistic. More than 1,000 trains would be required, while Latvia can only provide one train every three days. Janis Dinevics, head of the Latvian delegation, parried these arguments:

[Begin Dinevics recording] The Latvian side has wondered if it receives international aid and if in two years it manages to build the required amount of apartments,

will Russia's troops leave Latvia then? We have not received an unequivocally positive answer. We were told this will also be connected with certain interests of Russia relating to national security. [end recording]

[Osipov] Still, both sides emphasized after the end of the news conference their sincere interest in deepening their cooperation and mutual understanding.

Talks With Lithuanian Delegation Open 26 May

OW2605183092 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1354 GMT 26 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On May 26, the official delegations of Russia and Lithuania are meeting in Moscow. Brought to the agenda of their meeting is the issue of the withdrawal of the former USSR troops from the territory of Lithuania.

According to the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow, the Lithuanian delegation is headed by the minister without portfolio Aleksandras Abisala, while the Russian by Viktor Isakov, the government's special ambassador. Following the completion of the talks this Wednesday [27 May], the parties plan to hold a press conference in the Lithuanian Embassy.

*** On May 26, in the vicinity of Moscow, the state delegations of Russia and Latvia are continuing the discussions of problems of their bilateral relations, the Latvian delegation being headed by the country's state minister Janis Dinievic, and the Russian by Sergey Zotov, the government's special ambassador.

The Latvian Embassy in Moscow informs Baltfax that the talks are focusing primarily on the withdrawal of the former USSR troops on the territory of Latvia. Among the other issues are the problems of property and ownership, and the status of the Russian-speaking population in the republic. The talks are expected to continue until May 28.

Vilnius 'Appears Unprepared'

OW2605212392 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2025 GMT 26 May 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Vilnius appears unprepared to discuss the Russian proposals at the bilateral talks, said Special Ambassador Viktor Isakov in his interview for Baltfax this Tuesday [26 May]. Viktor Isakov who heads the Russian delegation at the talks maintains that his Lithuanian opposite numbers were eager to address only the military issues, particularly, the withdrawal of all the Russian-jurisdictioned troops from the Republic by the end of 1992.

In the words of Viktor Isakov, the Russian delegation proposed that the participants of the talks concentrate on a broader scope of problems, including economic,

humanitarian issues, and the situation of Russia's Kaliningrad Region. "The need to discuss these issues has been predetermined by the Agreement between Russia and Lithuania which went into effect on May 4," said the Russian diplomat.

According to Viktor Isakov, the Russian delegation brought forward its draft agreements relating to some of these issues and nominated the officials who would take care of their realization.

The talks are expected to resume this Wednesday [27 May]. At 5 p.m. on May 27, in its Embassy in Moscow, the Lithuanian delegation will hold a press conference re the results of its talks with Russia.

Troop Withdrawal Talks Continue

LD2705120792 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 0500 GMT 27 May 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Talks between Russian and Lithuanian state delegations are scheduled to end in Moscow 27 May. The main subject of the talks is the withdrawal of the former USSR's troops from the republic. As you know, these troops are now under Russia's jurisdiction.

The Russian side intends to put forward its own plan for the withdrawal. Details are not known. However, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has put forward the following scenario: 40 percent of the troops should be withdrawn by the end of 1994 and the rest later. Lithuania is pressing for a totally different schedule: all the troops should be withdrawn by the end of this year.

The talks will show to what extent it is possible to bring closer these diametrically opposed positions.

Talks End

LD2705165592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1617 GMT 27 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow May 27 TASS—State delegations of Russia and Lithuania at talks on May 26 and 27 in Moscow could not set a date for their next meeting. "The Lithuanian side had the ability to discuss only the subject of withdrawal of troops of the former USSR from the republic," chief Russian negotiator Viktor Isakov told ITAR-TASS.

The Russian delegation was prepared to discuss the entire range of bilateral issues, Isakov said.

As a result of the meetings the procedure for further talks was practically fully agreed upon and an agreement was reached to appoint in the nearest time groups of experts to prepare bilateral agreements in concrete spheres and hold meetings, he said.

Isakov expressed hope that the next meeting of state delegations will be held this month.

At this stage of talks "the sides moved forward very little", chief Lithuanian negotiator Aleksandras Abisala told reporters today.

The Russian delegation failed to submit a schedule for the troop withdrawal from Lithuania and without this it is impossible "to discuss technical details of the withdrawal", he said.

Abisala said he regretted that the sides did not discuss compensation for damages incurred by the 50-year-long stay of the troops in Lithuania.

The damage is estimated at about 150 billion dollars and Lithuania is prepared to be compensated by hard currency and weapons.

Japan supports Early Russian Withdrawal from Baltics

*LD2705091892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0900 GMT 27 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovin]

[Text] Tokyo May 27 TASS—Prime minister of Estonia, Tiit Vahi, and foreign minister of Japan, Michio Watanabe, agreed today to support each other's country in putting pressure on Russia demanding an early withdrawal of troops from the Baltic region and the renunciation of its rights on the southern Kuril islands.

The presence of the 25-thousand strong contingent of the former Soviet Union armed forces personnel on the territory of his country is the "cardinal factor of internal instability," the head of the Estonian Government, who is on an unofficial visit, emphasised during the talks. He called on Japan to support Tallinn on the world arena, which is demanding from Moscow the complete withdrawal of its troops, at present under the Russian jurisdiction.

In his reply, the Japanese foreign minister said that his government intends to raise the question regarding the withdrawal of the Russian contingent from the Baltic region in the forthcoming July conference of heads of seven leading industrial nations to be held in Munich. At the same time he called on Estonia to help Russia in its dispute with Moscow over the South Kuril islands.

Tiit Vahi emphasised his "full support" to Japan over this question.

Michio Watanabe also informed that Estonia will be one of the first Baltic republics, where Tokyo will open its permanent mission by sending two diplomats. Japan also intends to invite seven Estonian technical specialists as probationers and one diplomat for learning the Japanese language.

Kravchuk Supports Prompt Withdrawal

*LD2705123192 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1700 GMT 26 May 92*

[Excerpts] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk was in Estonia today on an official visit. In the afternoon, Estonian Supreme Council Chairman Arnold Ruutel and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed a friendship and cooperation agreement between the two states. A Ukrainian-Estonian trade and economic agreement was also concluded today in Tallinn. It was signed by Economics Minister Heido Vitsur on behalf of Estonia, and by Anatoliy Voronkov, minister for external economic relations and trade, on behalf of Ukraine. Under the agreement, Estonia and Ukraine will grant each other most favored nation status in trade and economy.

Before signing the interstate agreement, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk held talks with Estonian Supreme Council Chairman Arnold Ruutel.

Leonid Kravchuk gave a news conference today. Peeter Kaldre has this to say about what he heard there.

[Kaldre] Undoubtedly the Ukraine president's visit is one of the key events of recent times for Estonian foreign politics. [passage omitted] Mr. Kravchuk acknowledged that in its struggle for freedom, Ukraine has followed the Baltic states, including Estonia. [passage omitted]

According to Leonid Kravchuk, the most important outcome of today's talks was that a joint position was reached on all the most important issues. For us, perhaps, the most significant is the fact that Ukrainian supports the prompt withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia. It is internationally accepted that the troops of one state should not be on the territory of another state, especially if the other state does not want this, Kravchuk said. He noted, however, that the troops must be withdrawn as a result of talks and by taking into account Russia's strategic position.

Incidentally, Ukraine is willing to call home its soldiers and officers serving in Estonia. These are said to number just over 2,500. Ukraine is also willing to accept the Ukrainians residing in Estonia; there are said to be 48,000 of them. Ukraine has the appropriate legislation to permit this; only the mechanism to achieve this is still needed between the states. [passage omitted]

It was revealed at the news conference that relations between Russia and Ukraine are not particularly good at the moment. Primarily, this concerns the situation in the CIS as a whole, and the crisis issue. [passage omitted]

Grachev on Troop Withdrawal From Baltic States

*LD2905130892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1110 GMT 29 May 92*

[Passages contained within quotation marks are recorded in Russian fading into English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] An acute problem in Russia's relations with the newly emerged Baltic States is that former Soviet troops still remain there. Now they are under Russia's jurisdiction. Russia transferred more servicemen recently to the Baltic States, allegedly to reinforce frontier troops. This aroused concern in the Baltic States, the more so that some of the military carried air force, signals and navy tabs. Russia's defense minister, Army General Pavel Grachev, clarifies the situation:

[Grachev] "Russia indeed is calling up new draftees to the frontier troops. But frontier troops include not only soldiers who patrol the borderline with a dog and a machine gun. They also include anti-aircraft defenses, air and naval forces.

"As the Baltic States undertook to protect mainly ground frontiers the responsibility for the other components of frontier control rests with Russia's armed forces. It would be unwise to considerably weaken the frontier. We have taken a decision to continue calling up draftees until a final agreement on the state frontiers is reached."

[Announcer] And what about the troops' withdrawal from the Baltic States?

[Grachev] "The withdrawal is necessary, as it is necessary to settle this issue in a civilized way through negotiations between Russia and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The optimal time to begin a pullout is late 1994. By that time the former Soviet troops will be completely withdrawn from Poland and Germany. Now Russia's government has set up negotiating groups led by its Foreign Ministry officials to tackle these issues."

[Announcer] Is it possible to speed up the pullout?

[Grachev] "I have already said that I will not withdraw my officers and soldiers from the Baltic and other states to open fields. The withdrawal could be accelerated only if the Baltic States give us financial assistance or practical assistance in building houses and barracks."

Kozyrev: 14th Army Withdrawal From Dniester Decided

*PM2905193192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 May 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Viktor Litovkin report: "The 14th Army Withdrawal from the Dniester Region Has Been Decided. But It Is Not Yet Clear How This Should Be Done"]

[Text] The decision adopted by the Russian president on the withdrawal of the 14th Army from the Dniester Region has evoked a stormy reaction in Tiraspol, Dubossary, and Bendery. Russian military units are being besieged by local inhabitants whose banners display a whole range of slogans and insulting inscriptions, ranging from "Traitors" to "Russian officers, do not leave Russian-speaking people without protection."

We have already reported (Issue No. 124) that a number of 14th Army officers and warrant officers are refusing to

comply with demands for maintaining neutrality. A combat engineer unit billeted at Parkany village, a few kilometers from Tiraspol, refuses to submit to the 14th Army Military Council.

The leaderships of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defense have refused to confirm or deny this report to the IZVESTIYA correspondent, or to comment on it in any way. They continue to insist that control of the army has not been lost, and that the army continues to comply with the instructions of its command.

However, independent military experts claim that it will be very difficult to implement the Russian president's ordinance on withdrawing the 14th Army from the Dniester Region. Incidentally, this has also been confirmed by Major General Yuriy Netkachev himself.

He told a journalist: "I have not yet received the order to withdraw the army, but I have no idea how this can be done."

The point is that the 14th Army is an army in name only. In actual fact it is a reduced-strength combined unit. That is to say, it has enough weapons and combat hardware for a full-scale army which can be deployed during war, but the number of officers and warrant officers is barely sufficient for an ordinary motorized rifle division. In a critical situation the army personnel are to be reinforced by reservists living in the area of the army's deployment.

It has to be borne in mind that more than half of the Army's current command personnel, and especially its middle and younger component, are local residents. It is only human that they side with their kith and kin and share and defend their interests.

Observers draw attention to the role played in the Dniester Region by Reserve Colonel General Albert Makashov. His assessments of the opposing sides' alignment of forces, and his constant emphasis on the weakness of the defense positions of the Dniester Region inhabitants are continuously stirring up the local population and further increasing tension.

Experts believe that the situation as regards the withdrawal of the 14th Army may be exactly the same as the situation with the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment in Stepanakert (Khankendy). At that time more than 100 people—officers and warrant officers of the regiment, Armenians by nationality, totaling almost 30 percent of its command staff, stayed behind in Nagorno-Karabakh together with their combat hardware and weapons. Not even the assault troops which covered the regiment's withdrawal to Georgia were capable of wresting these arms from them.

The question of the 14th Army withdrawal from the Dniester region has essentially been decided, Andrey Kozyrev, Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs, said at a meeting with Russian Federation

Supreme Soviet deputies and representatives of various Russian parties and public movements held at the Foreign Ministry press center. The only remaining problem is the question of timing and conditions.

According to the minister, this problem, that is the problem of the timing and conditions of the withdrawal, will be the subject of talks of foreign affairs and defense ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania which are to be held in Chisinau. According to Kozyrev, the question of the Dniester Region's political and legal status is also going to occupy a substantial place at the talks.

True, RIA reports that the meeting which was scheduled for 29 May will not take place, it is being moved to a later date, provisionally to 1 June.

News agencies report that the cease-fire in the Dniester Region is constantly being violated by automatic-weapon and machine-gun fire. According to Moldova's press bureau, a patrol came under fire during the last 24 hours near Delakeu village. There are dead.

The Russian Ministry of Defense press center has informed the editorial office that a group of military observers from the Russian Federation consisting of 25 people has arrived in Bendery and embarked on the implementation of its tasks in monitoring the observance of the cease-fire agreement and organizing the disengagement of the opposing sides.

A session of the Dniester Moldovan Republic Supreme Soviet is scheduled for 30 May. It will discuss the procedure of the implementation of the 30-day truce and other questions connected with the normalization of the situation in the Dniester Region, in particular after the 14th Army's withdrawal.

The session promises to be a stormy one.

Snegur Reacts

*LD3005112692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0920 GMT 30 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Excerpts] Chisinau, 30 May—"Triumph of common sense"—this was Moldovan President Mircea Snegur reaction today to a statement by Boris Yeltsin that the 14th Army deployed in Moldova would be withdrawn from its territory. Mircea Snegur said this in a interview to a correspondent of the London FINANCIAL TIMES newspaper, excerpts from which are published in the local media. The Moldovan president expressed hope that the decision by the Russian leader "will not be blocked by hostile forces." [passage omitted]

Fights and fierce exchanges of fire between forces of the Moldovan police and armed formations of the Dniester guard died down for the second day running already. A truce has become possible in many respects thanks to the efforts by field commanders on both sides who have

managed to agree on a cease-fire on the spot without politicians. Nevertheless, according to the press centers of the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Tiraspol, a Moldovan sniper killed a Dniester volunteer.

Army Leader Criticizes Decision

*LD3105224892 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 2130 GMT 31 May 92*

[Text] Vyacheslav Sitnikov, chief of staff of the 14th Army, said Yeltsin's statement on the withdrawal of the 14th Army units from the Dniester Region was not thoroughly thought out. He noted that most staff of the army were inhabitants of the Dniester Region. The officers and warrant officers have apartments in Tiraspol, Bendery, and Dubossary. It is hardly expedient to give all this up and move to no one knows where, noted the chief of staff. He did not exclude the possibility of some of the officers going over to the side of the Dniester Region's leader. Moldovan President Mircea Snegur also does not exclude such a possibility. In an interview to the London newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES he stressed that in the case of officers going over to Igor Smirnov, the international community would have to isolate that part of the world in order to avert a great human tragedy.

A meeting of the extraordinary session of the Dniester Region Supreme Soviet will take place on 2 June. It is planned to finally settle the issue of the state structure of the Dniester Region Moldavian Republic at the session.

Ukraine Asked To Back 14th Army Withdrawal

*AU2705175592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1415 GMT 27 May 92*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 27/5/1992—An open military aggression which is a continuation of the policy promoted by the pro-imperial and neo-Bolshevik forces that hope to revive the Soviet empire, so are the acts committed by the Russian Army in eastern Moldova characterized in an appeal the parliament of the Republic of Moldova addressed to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

The appeal shows that the aggression launched by the Russian military and mercenaries are a danger not only to Moldova but also to other states. Ukraine's parliament is called upon to set forth its stance on the aggression and to back Moldova's legitimate request for an immediate withdrawal of the 14th Army, of the Cossack and Russian mercenaries from its territory, demand Ukraine's Government to control the developments in the eastern districts of Moldova and take the due steps in the international arena for the cessation of the aggression.

Central Asian Meeting Urges Troops Withdrawal*LD3005193292 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 30 May 92*

[Text] A number of documents were adopted at the meeting of the Democratic Congress of Central Asia and Kazakhstan held in Bishkek. This was reported in an interview with INTERFAX by Turgunaliyev, one of the leaders of that movement.

A statement on troops on the territory of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was adopted at the meeting. The document states that, as new independent states are being created, the armed forces of the former Union continue to serve Russian interests under the pretext of protecting the Russian-speaking population. In fact, they interfere in the internal affairs of the states and may become the guarantors of the existence of totalitarian regimes. The Democratic Congress of Central Asia and Kazakhstan demands that the armed forces in the Central Asian region which are under Russian jurisdiction either must be withdrawn immediately or transferred to the jurisdiction of these states.

Baltic Assembly Calls For Army Withdrawal*LD3105150192 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 31 May 92*

["Text" of appeal on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from the Baltic states issued by the Baltic Assembly in Lithuania; date not given]

[Text] In spite of the many demands by the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Baltic Assembly, and the Baltic States Council regarding the unconditional and undelayed withdrawal of the Russian Army from the Baltic states, its withdrawal has practically not started. In addition, sovereignty continues to be violated, the laws of Baltic states and the decisions of the governments are not complied with, and new Russian soldiers are being brought in.

The fact that Russia refuses to transfer the protection of Lithuania's, Latvia's, and Estonia's state borders is also without precedent.

It appears as though Russia is interested in leaving its army within the Baltic states for a long time. This raises a threat to people's security and interferes with the successful implementation in the Baltic states of social and economic reforms, the development of democracy, and the strengthening of independence.

The hotbed of tension near the Baltic, may become an additional factor of instability in Europe.

Being aware of its responsibility concerning security and stability in Europe and the world, the Baltic Assembly appeals to all parliaments and interparliamentary organizations to focus attention on the fact that Russia continues to violate the sovereign rights of the Baltic

states and to help to completely liquidate the results of the criminal Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

The Baltic Assembly is of the opinion that CSCE representatives should, in the capacity of authoritative [word indistinct], participate in the bilateral negotiations between the Baltic states and Russia regarding the Army's withdrawal.

The Baltic Assembly appeals to the CSCE to include the following principles in the documents of the state leaders participating in the CSCE conference in Helsinki.

A state that is a member of the CSCE must implement without delay the demands of another member state of the CSCE and to withdraw unconditionally its army from the territory of that country. Circumstances to the contrary will result in its being regarded by CSCE members to be in violation of CSCE principles.

The states of the CSCE will regard that the army illegally present on the territory of another state, which is a member of the CSCE, threatens the security and stability of the region and will consider that region as a potential conflict region.

The CSCE participants will discuss the elimination of the threat through the mechanism of the Helsinki process.

Signed: Baltic Assembly Presidium Chairman Aurimas Taurantas, Lithuania; Baltic Assembly Presidium Deputy Chairman Marius Budovskis, Latvia; Baltic Assembly Presidium Deputy Chairman Ulo Nugis, Estonia.

NUCLEAR TESTING**Industry Opposes Grachev Nuclear Test Proposal***LD0206145292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1433 GMT 2 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow June 2 TASS—Representatives of war industry opposed on Tuesday [2 June] the call of Pavel Grachev, the Russian defence minister, to ban all nuclear tests and agreed only to limit the number of explosions.

Radiy Ilkayev, chief designer of the Federal Research Institute of Experimental Physics, told the international conference "Democratisation of Society and Military Security" under way in Moscow, that a complete ban on nuclear tests will lead to a degradation of the Russian nuclear potential.

The idea was reiterated by other representatives of the military-industrial complex, however several of them said they believe nuclear tests can be stopped without damage to any of the interested sides.

Grachev told the forum on Monday [1 June] that the Russian leadership resolutely stands for a complete stopping of nuclear tests.

However, Russia has not yet adopted the final decision on the issue. The moratorium on nuclear tests expires on October 26.

Siegfried Fischer, a German scientist attending the conference, told TASS nuclear deterrence can be provided without nuclear arsenal at all. There are so many nuclear power stations in the world, that in case they are destroyed during a war by conventional weapons, the effect will equal that of a nuclear strike, he explained, adding Western businessmen are ready to invest into scrapping former Soviet nuclear weapons.

Russia 'Ready' for Reductions in Nuclear Tests

*LD2605123892 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1125 GMT 26 May 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 26 May (TASS)—“The Russian side is ready to begin talks with the United States on further cuts to the number of nuclear tests. The fundamental settlement of this matter depends on it being agreed upon by the presidents of the two countries at the upcoming summit meeting in Washington in June. At present, Russia intends to adhere to the moratorium on nuclear tests.” This was said by Igor Polyanykh, an expert on nuclear test issues of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a conversation today with the ITAR-TASS correspondent.

He was commenting on yesterday's statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney in which he spoke out against proposals for the United States to halt or cut nuclear tests. In the U.S. defense secretary's view, the six tests on average carried out each year are the necessary minimum to maintain the security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Such statements, Igor Polyanykh noted, “do not reflect the objectives proclaimed by both sides on reducing arms and decreasing nuclear tension. The Russian side believes that it is possible to agree on a significantly smaller number of tests each year, up to and including stopping them altogether.”

Speaking about the position of other nuclear states, Igor Polyanykh recalled that France recently announced its decision to suspend nuclear weapons testing. “As for the underground nuclear blast carried out the other day by China,” the Russian expert noted, “its yield exceeded slightly more than six times the limits stipulated by the agreement between Russia and the United States on limiting underground nuclear tests.” China cannot formally be accused of violating any norms since it is not a

party to this accord. “However, this action does not help to reduce tension in the world,” the Russian diplomat stressed.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Grachev Statement on Withdrawal From Kurils

Grachev Comments

*LD2905172792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1434 GMT 29 May 92*

[Text] Moscow, 29 May (ITAR-TASS)—The information and press department of Russia's Foreign Ministry on 29 May, issued a statement by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, which reads as follows:

“In recent days, through the efforts of the mass media, my brief reply to a question which was asked after the end of my new conference about plans regarding our forces in the Kuril Islands has had unjustified reverberations. In Japan it has even reached the stage where questions have been raised in the Diet.

“I must say that our army and its command are acting in strict accordance with the political decisions adopted by the country's leadership. At present, with the participation of the Russian Defense Ministry, Russian leaders have begun to prepare steps which, as the logic of military life itself demands, will take the form of clear-cut directives on the withdrawal in the course of one or two years, all of Russia's servicemen from the southern Kuril Islands, except for border guards, as envisaged by Yeltsin's five-stage plan which is well-known in Japan. For the time being military, subunits in these islands are continuing to perform their service in a normal way. That was reflected in my answer at the news conference.”

Yeltsin Comments

*OW2705140192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1323 GMT 27 May 92*

[From “Diplomatic Panorama”; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] *** The withdrawal of Russian military bases from the Kurils can be effected within a year, not within ten years, as the military used to claim, said President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in his interview for the daily “KOMSSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA” published today.

Under an agreement reached with the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint CIS Armed Forces Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov “our division will be withdrawn, with only frontier troops and coast guard ships remaining there”, the president said. “A final solution to the problem can be reached neither in 1993 nor in 1994, of course, though it's desirable to sign a peace treaty with Japan in 1993”, B. Yeltsin pointed out.

There is an impression that the Russian leadership's attitude to the problem of Northern Territories and the approach of certain generals sometimes fail to coincide, a member of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow told DP's [Diplomatic Panorama] correspondent. He referred to a statement made by Major-General Vladimir Boruchenko, new commander of the Pacific Frontier District.

Speaking in Vladivostok recently at his first press conference given in the new capacity, V. Boruchenko emphasized that he doesn't view the Kuril Islands as a disputed territory. "The Kurils will continue to belong to Russia. Otherwise historic justice will be abused, and a dangerous precedent will be created for other territorial claims", said V. Boruchenko.

In an interview for DP's correspondent a prominent member of Russia's Foreign Ministry who specializes in relations between Russia and Japan said that he views Japan's fears as ungrounded. According to him, it's politicians, not the military, who determine this country's policy and its approaches to resolving one problem or another. "This relates in full to the South Kurils problem; V. Boruchenko received no new directives in this connection", the diplomat said.

According to him, the territorial dispute with Japan is "extremely complicated and many-sided". "Had the problem been simple, it would have been possible to voice only one attitude to it," the diplomat said.

He warned against the habit of considering "each new statement on the territorial dispute as deviation from the mainstream policy."

"Controversial comments concerning the destiny of four South Kuril islands only reflect the complexity of the current process of negotiations which, as a matter of fact, should not be dramatized", the diplomat said.

Spokesman Comments

OW2205132292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1242 GMT 22 May 92

[from "Diplomatic Panorama"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At today's briefing S. Yastrzembkiy touched upon the plans to demilitarize the South Kuril Islands. He referred to a statement by President Boris Yeltsin in which the Russian leader mentioned his striving to reduce the number of Russian servicemen stationed there.

"This striving is by no means connected with contacts concerning the territorial dispute. It was prompted by general considerations as to the need to reduce Russia's excessive military presence", he said.

According to S. Yastrzembkiy, the President's statement "concerned long-term, not short-term, plans". "At the moment the possibility of cuts in the number of

troops and total withdrawal of servicemen from the South Kurils is only under consideration", the spokesman for Russia's Foreign Ministry pointed out.

Mongolian Leader Reports Troop Withdrawal

LD3105230392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1335 GMT 30 May 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo May 30—Prime minister of Mongolia, Dashiyn Byambasuren, announced today that the withdrawal of the former USSR troops from the territory of Mongolia is expected to be completed by September 1992. In an interview with the Japanese "ASAHI" newspaper he said that, according to an understanding reached with the Russian side, it will be followed by the annulment of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Help, signed with the former Soviet Union in 1966.

The Mongolian prime minister, who was taking part in an international conference on problems of providing aid to this country, reminded that at a certain time the number of former USSR Armed Forces personnel on the Mongolian territory had reached 100,000 men. However, according to him, it has been reduced to approximately 5,000 at the present moment.

Following the beginning of the democratization and reform process in Mongolia in 1990, it started conducting a policy of "keeping itself equally away from the USSR and China" and not joining any alliances, "ASAHI" wrote. According to the paper, Byambasuren reaffirmed intention of intensifying this policy and follow "a policy of consistent neutrality."

Head of the Mongolian Government said that its own 20,000 strong armed forces are meant for protecting the borders of the country. According to him, the present number of the Armed Forces personnel is quite sufficient to fulfill these functions.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Rutskoy Expounds Views on Russian Army

PM2905151192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 May 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy: "We Must Build an Army Worthy of Great Russia"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The formation of the Defense Ministry and the Russian Army and Navy has begun in Russia. Naturally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers would like to know: What does the vice president think about this?

The decision to create a Russian Army and Navy was expected for a long time. But the federation leadership

deliberately refrained from hurrying over this, doing everything possible to avoid the uncontrolled collapse of former USSR defense structures. That is why I am convinced that nobody has the right to reproach the Russian president or the Russian parliament and accuse them of sluggishness. A show of restraint, especially in matters as these, is a sign of statesmanlike wisdom and a responsible political approach.

I will not conceal the fact that on many occasions I have asked myself this question: Has the time really come to create our own Armed Forces? After all, as a military man, I realized: Apart from the obvious advantages, such a decision is fraught with a sharp reduction in overall military potential, upon which a lot could depend in times of need. From a strategic viewpoint, this is not very far-sighted.

However, an analysis of the political and economic processes which have developed on Commonwealth territory led us to conclude that it is impossible to put off creating the Armed Forces any longer. From the point of view of Russia and her interests, this has become frankly dangerous in such contradictory and unpredictable times.

Let us analyze the previous situation. Russia, not having its own army, sought to persuade its neighbors not to tear the former USSR Armed Forces asunder but to resolve this vital question in a civilized manner. The first option was to create the Joint Armed Forces, and later, having re-shaped them through combined efforts, to create CIS member-state national armies. However, it proved "easier" to disband the unified Armed Forces, having broken them up along nationality lines. As a result, the leading and most combat-capable units, armed with the latest hardware, as well as strategic supply depots, fell to Ukraine and Byelarus. Rivers of weapons flowed into the arsenals of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

To the last, Russia stood for unified Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, citing the logic and advantages of a single military-strategic area. Russia advocated preserving the infrastructure of the ballistic missile early warning system, intelligence gathering, command and control, and other elements of the common defense system stationed in sovereign states along the periphery of the former USSR. But alas, what took place was an irreversible process of pilfering, the illegal acquisition not only of general purpose Armed Forces, but also of strategic forces. A number of states actually withdrew altogether from resolving questions linked with the USSR's military heritage. Others started to demand for their own armies an increase in the quotas accepted by the Soviet Union under the Paris Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE]. Realizing at the same time that, by thus consenting, Russia, the USSR's successor which promised the entire world that it would follow the signed document to the letter, would to all intents and purposes be left without Armed Forces. In these circumstances, could Russia afford not to have an Army?

There are of course other reasons which prompted us to decide on creating the Russian Armed Forces. One of the most important is uncertainty over the status of the former Union Army and Navy stationed on the territories of sovereign, independent states and involved in interethnic feuds. In addition, it is possible to list quite a few Armed Forces' problems which are unresolved to this day and which are being intensified because of uncertainty, lack of rights, a shortage of accommodation, low wages, and so on. Today, things are especially difficult for those whom fate led to the Baltic Region, to the groups of forces, and to the Transcaucasus. Whom do these people serve, which fatherland? Why have they buried and why are they burying comrades who have perished for some unknown reason? It has become impossible to find answers to such questions. But how could it be otherwise, if the military across the entire expanse of the CIS essentially found themselves in a legal vacuum?

So for what sins should Russia and the Russian military have to tolerate all this? Especially when Russia is carrying on its shoulders the lion's share of all military expenses. Could we look on calmly without reacting to what was happening, could we remain silent and indifferent while witnessing the final collapse and demoralization of the Army, and the concurrent departure of young officers, human deaths, looting of weapons, and desertion? Due to uncertainty, the defense industry—in the throes of haphazard conversion and economic disarray—is collapsing. Likewise, the once powerful scientific and technical potential of the military-industrial complex has been shaken to the core. Right now, 21 percent of Russian defense enterprises are on the brink of bankruptcy, and 43 percent will join the ranks of low-profitability enterprises if not today then tomorrow. What next? What actions?

In this connection, P.A. Stolypin's words spring to mind: "Concern about the fleet and the armed services [voynstvo] as a whole is the inherent characteristic of a true state leader. Soldiers and sailors are bound by oath to give selfless service—the state, aware of its own huge moral responsibility, must repay with concern. Especially a state which, since time immemorial, has had a national army which has repeatedly saved the people from annihilation by enemies who never waged war with Russia 'for fun,' but always to annihilate."

Guided by the Russian Federation Declaration on State Sovereignty, and in line with the 5 March 1992 Law "On Security," the Russian president made the decision to create a Russian Army. Undoubtedly, everything will fall into place. But daily and painstaking work is required. Not only work by the higher echelons of power, but also by the officers, soldiers, and citizens of Russia. At the same time, everybody should be aware: By reviving the Russian Army, we are reviving Great Rus. It will be difficult, but who will do it if not we? Can we afford not to revive our own fatherland?

Does the step taken signify a rejection, as some claim, of the idea of collective defense? On the contrary. Having assumed jurisdiction over troops and granted them the status of Russians, Russia simultaneously delegated to the Joint Armed Forces High Command the powers to deploy them effectively to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Commonwealth states. This applies both to strategic forces and to general purpose forces. Along with this, an immediate solution is required to the question of the presence (basing) of troops beyond Russian borders, founded not on servicemen's existing lack of rights, but on a distinct and clear understanding of their legal status, guaranteeing honor, dignity, and a real life for the military man.

Exactly how long will these powers vis-a-vis the Russian troops within the CIS Joint Armed Forces operate is another question. In my view, their "longevity" will be determined by multilateral agreements on joint defense and the assignment of national army units to the Joint Armed Forces. That is, once again a great deal here depends upon our neighbors and their stances. As for the Russian Federation, we are ready for constructive dialogue with everybody so that we can resolve, not in words but in deeds, the accumulation of neglected problems with the minimum of delay.

Thus, what kind of Army does Russia need? I think that today we have a unique opportunity to create truly renewed Armed Forces and resolve those questions which in past years have repeatedly been raised, examined, but not resolved.

Question number one: Where to begin? Military science and the experience of world civilization prove: Any self-respecting Army begins with a state military doctrine. Thus, first and foremost it is necessary to define the Russian Army's future tasks.

Nowadays, nobody can deny the obvious truth that the military threat as a whole has declined: No world war or other large-scale war is expected to break out in the foreseeable future. But to this day, the possibility of so-called small, localized conflicts still exists. Unfortunately, we still have a long way to go before reaching an era of universal, peaceful bliss. There are still no guarantees that threats from without will never again arise. Consequently, a balanced and considered defense policy cannot be renounced.

Upon evaluating the situation, it can be concluded that in today's circumstances it is necessary to build Armed Forces from positions of high mobility, protectability, and survivability based on the latest advances in military technical science and the high professionalism of servicemen. In this connection, strategic defense must be built in such a way so as not to hinder troop maneuverability, so that strategic boundaries constitute a powerful shield reinforced by highly mobile aviation, missile, airmobile, and naval rapid reaction forces. Of course, this cannot be done at one fell swoop, especially when the economy is in a reform phase. What is needed are

precise and consistent actions in line with the country's real conditions and potential.

What kind of guidelines should be used in creating the Russian Army?

As a basis, it is necessary to take the existing Armed Forces' structure as it undergoes simultaneous and radical cuts in numerical strength and in the quantity of all types of arms, bringing them down to the minimum necessary level to ensure the reliable defense of the state and its allies.

One of the Russian Army's main tasks will be to prevent outbreaks of local conflicts and wars.

For economic considerations, it is necessary to make maximum use of existing military potential and the existing infrastructure of the Armed Forces stationed on Russia's territory, together with troops being withdrawn from Germany, Poland, Mongolia, and the Baltic States, troop units from the Transcaucasus, and combined units and units which do not form part of CIS member states' national armies. Eventually, they could be transformed into highly mobile units and rapid reaction combined units.

The process of creating the Russian Armed Forces should be accompanied by a simultaneous and radical reshaping of all aspects of their activity. This primarily concerns the system of military-political command and control [upravleniye]. When restructuring this system, paramount attention must be given to elaborating a mechanism to provide reliable civilian control over the Army. What this envisages is an expansion of the rights and obligations of the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the Russian Government in the defense sphere, strict demarcation of the functions of state and military organs of command and control, a guarantee of maximum glasnost and openness in the sphere of military activity, and close links with the public.

Of course, in realizing this idea it is expected that power will be divided between the organs of direct military command and control—the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. The foundation of such a division of power should be provided by the principle of strict demarcation of functional duties regarding troop leadership.

In my view, it would be expedient to endow the Russian Defense Ministry with such functions and powers as forming and implementing military and military-technical policy; planning and conducting state mobilization measures (recruitment, developing the infrastructure, training reserves and the population, preparing the economy and command systems), elaborating the military budget, providing the Army with material resources, supplying arms and military hardware, pursuing defense industry conversion, implementing social programs in the Army and Navy, and others.

Direct leadership of the troops must be exercised by commander in chief of the Armed Forces through the General Staff, the commanders (commanding officers) of the Armed Forces' branches, large strategic formations, combined units, and units. At the same time, their command functions could include the strategic and operational planning of the combat use of Armed Forces; organizing measures to maintain combat and mobilization readiness; operational and combat training for troops (forces) and staffs; defining the regulation organizational structure [organizatsionno-shtatnaya struktura] for military formations, requirements for personnel, arms, and military hardware; organizing cooperation with the CIS Joint Armed Forces' command; and command and control of the Armed Forces in peace and wartime.

Insofar as military reform incorporates a whole range of complex and large-scale problems linked with the radical reorganization both of the state and of the Armed Forces with simultaneous and significant cuts in numerical strength, it will take some time. Historical experience in conducting military reforms in the Russian state proves that they can take decades. We have not got that much time, but nevertheless it would be wrong to speed up the process excessively without due consideration of economic potential and social tension within society. Clearly, we need to go through certain stages for reforming and creating the Russian Army. How would these stages look?

During the **first stage** (during 1992): To set up the Russian Defense Ministry, while it obviously would be expedient to assign the functions of the General Staff to the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, with the subsequent withdrawal from its composition of the organ which will carry out the functions of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces Staff. To assume full jurisdiction over troops (forces) located on Russian territory and abroad, including troops on the territory of CIS states which do not form part of their national armies. To immediately create a system of social guarantees for servicemen and members of their families, as well as for persons who have either been discharged (including prematurely) from military service into the reserves or have retired on pension. It is important to speed up the elaboration and ratification of the numerical strength and structure of the Russian Armed Forces, and to define the procedure, stages, and deadlines for reforming and reducing them. Particular attention should be paid to creating a legal basis for the functioning of the Russian Army, taking due account of the norms of international law and the agreements reached within the CIS.

At the second stage (1993-1994): To continue reducing and reforming the troops, and basically to conclude the withdrawal of troops onto Russian territory (from Germany, Poland, and Mongolia) and creating Armed Forces groupings.

During this stage, it is necessary to stabilize the situation in the Armed Forces: To switch to a mixed manpower

acquisition system, combining the draft with voluntary entry into military service by citizens on a contract basis; to raise the prestige of military service through legal protection, preferential access to all material comforts, high wages in excess of or commensurate with those received in industry and taking account of the risk factor, and introduction of insurance policies providing not just an existence but a dignified life for servicemen and members of their families in cases of disability or death.

The branch structure of the Armed Forces (Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense, Air Force, and Navy) should be retained until the end of this stage. This will make it possible to preserve the existing system of command and control safety and combat ability while avoiding any extra expense. Clearly, at the least in the transition period, there is a need to retain military districts, given their important role in settling troops withdrawn onto Russian territory, organizing, and providing for them.

The third stage (1995-2000): To completely withdraw the troops from the Northwestern Group of Forces (the Baltic countries).

This process could be accelerated if these countries were to agree to reciprocal actions (that is, we leave garrison installations and housing facilities in the Baltic countries, and the Baltic countries build garrison installations and housing facilities in Russia for the troops being withdrawn.)

Furthermore, it is necessary to complete the cutbacks in the Armed Forces in line with the START and CFE Treaties, and to reform them and transfer them to new organizational structures taking due account of the reorganization of the Armed Forces' branches and categories of troops. In particular, it is necessary to set about gradually reducing and reorganizing the command and control of military districts. And through this, to strengthen army and corps organs of command and control and their complement.

A radical cut in troop numbers (from 2.8 million men) should be implemented consistently during all stages of the reform of the Russian Army, taking it to 2.1 million men by the end of the second stage, and 1.5 million men by the end of the third stage, while simultaneously resolving all social problems of discharged servicemen. Here it is important not to apply methods used in past campaigns to cut and withdraw troops under Krushchev and Gorbachev.

Proceeding from the above, it seems that it would be expedient for the Russian Armed Forces to comprise:

- 1) Numerically small forces (airmobile regiments, brigades, and divisions) on permanent standby (rapid reaction), deployed in such a manner as to effectively counter any external threat, and capable of repulsing aggression on a local scale.

2) Airmobile reinforcement troops, equipped with heavy and salvo-fire weapons, and capable of swift redeployment and for performing tasks in support of rapid reaction troops (forces) with the minimum of delay in any region of the country.

3) Strategic reserves, formed from reserve troops in periods of potential danger and during aggression to enhance efforts in the event of it being impossible to halt the development of armed conflict with rapid reaction and airmobile forces.

This structure of troops ensures an opportunity for a commensurate buildup of combat might and the containment or repulsion of aggression in any direction.

When creating and reforming the Russian Army, fundamental transformations will affect all branches of the Armed Forces, significantly altering their numerical strength, combat composition, and organizational structures. In doing so, it is necessary to retain the Strategic Rocket Forces' role as the main component of the strategic nuclear forces, a role determined by their contribution to performing the tasks assigned to them.

In accordance with this concept, I deem it necessary:

To switch the Ground Forces primarily to the corps, division, and brigade system, significantly reducing the number of large military formations and combined units while at the same time raising the new formations' combat potential, air mobility, and autonomy of action in any strategic area. It is necessary to move away from the strategy of victory through numerical strength, especially since the time has come to learn from history (The Finnish war: For every Finn who died, 10 of our servicemen died; The Great Patriotic War: for every dead German soldier, 14 USSR servicemen died.)

It would be expedient to build the Air Defense Forces on the territorial principle. To this end, all Russia's territory is to be divided into air defense zones, whose borders will coincide with those of air defense districts (armies).

The Air Force, as one of the most effective and maneuverable branches of the Russian Armed Forces, should be organizationally distinct from the aviation under the Supreme High Command and the tactical and military transport aviation.

The Navy must also undergo radical transformations. In the light of the Baltic countries' well known stance, there will be changes in the combat structure and the basing system of the Russian Baltic Fleet, which will require significant additional appropriations.

To resolve the tasks of defending Russia from the direction of the sea in the southwest, it is necessary, come what may, to preserve the Russian Black Sea Fleet, comprising no less than 80 percent of current personnel strength and fleet ships. Here, too, additional expense will be required to develop the basing system.

It would be expedient to retain the existing structure of Russia's Northern and Pacific Fleets until 1995, at the same time resolving quickly the question of the repair and technical maintenance of ships and the submarine fleet, and carrying out the requisite organizational changes. The need to create mixed rapid reaction forces within the Navy to defend the open seas and the coastline emerged long ago. There is an objective need to strengthen the system of naval base defense with salvo-fire weapon systems, air defense forces, and a naval infantry.

Significant transformations in the composition of specialized troops are also inevitable. In particular, it will be expedient to exclude civil defense forces from the composition of the Russian Armed Forces and to entrust their leadership to the State Committee for Matters of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and the Liquidation of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, which was created by presidential decree.

In the course of the reform of the Armed Forces today, the significance of military construction troops, which bear the brunt of resolving tasks for providing accommodation and facilities in the social sphere for servicemen (including troops withdrawn from abroad) and for creating special facilities for the Armed Forces' branches, and which are subordinate to various civilian departments and cause 70 percent of all accidents in the Armed Forces, increases. The military construction troops should be reformed into engineering troops and transferred to Russian Defense Ministry subordination.

A special place in building the Russian Armed Forces must be given to problems of military-technical policy. Given the cuts in financial appropriations to defense, it is possible to maintain the minimum necessary level of equipment for the Armed Forces only by defining priorities in developing and procuring arms and military hardware. In my view, these priorities should be given to developing strategic arms, anti-air defense, long distance, military transport, and tactical—particularly army ground-attack and helicopter—aviation, high-precision multiple rocket launchers and salvo-fire weapons [zalpovoye oruzhiye], intelligence-gathering systems, integrated reconnaissance and strike missile systems of short-range, medium-range, and long-range capacity, radio-electronic warfare, and high mobility "hardened" systems for directing battle and commanding troops.

An important area of the reform of the Russian Armed Forces is the legal backup for their organizational development and social guarantees for servicemen. In this context, I think that the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet should enshrine the status of the Russian Armed Forces in the Constitution and adopt laws "On Universal Service Duties and Contract-Based Military Service," "On Producing and Supplying Products for Defense Needs," "On Mobilization Preparations in the National Economy," "On Servicemen's Status," and

others. This would pave the way for bringing all normative legal acts defining the role and position of the Armed Forces in the political organization of society and the responsibilities and duties of state organs of power and command in respect of the Russian Army into line with Russia's new political structure.

These are some of the general approaches to the organizational development of Russia's Armed Forces. Their creation is an extremely complex, labor-intensive process. In embarking on its implementation, it is necessary to have detailed plans substantiating all aspects of the problems linked to withdrawing, reducing, reshaping, and reprofiling [pereformirovaniye] troops, and to have comprehensive and substantiated calculations on numerical strength and the quantity of necessary arms and military hardware, including those which are being destroyed, those that have spent their serviceable life, and those being delivered by industry.

A result of realizing this project could be the creation of a small, highly mobile, professional CIS and Russian Joint Armed Force, capable of reliably defending peace, and securing a worthy place in the democratic development of the world community for the Commonwealth and for Russia.

It is encouraging that the processes which have developed recently in the sphere of defense building in the CIS are reflected at a political level as an important and binding beginning, giving grounds to expect the creation of an adequate security system.

In signing the agreement on collective security in Tashkent, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin and the leaders of the other four CIS states performed an indisputable service. In this way, the one true road toward strengthening the military-political stability of Russia and the CIS, as well as European and international security, has been mapped out.

Ukraine Claims Long Range Aviation Units

*PM2605152592 Moscow KRA SNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 22 May 92 p 3*

[Report by correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Ukraine Sets Up Long-Range Air Grouping"]

[Text] Kiev, 21 May—In accordance with a decree by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk and an order by Defense Minister Colonel General K. Morozov, long-range air units stationed on the republic's territory are subordinate to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. Those that have nuclear weapons in their arsenal remain only operationally subordinate to the Commander of Strategic Forces of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Division Commander Major-General of Aviation V. Grebennikov and Colonels of Aviation B.Yu. Kozhin and P. Androsov, commanders of long-range air regiments, who did not wish to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

have been removed from their posts, and other officers have been appointed temporarily to replace them.

Nazarbayev Tells Journalists of U.S. Trip

*PM2705123592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 May 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Vladimir Nadein: "We Have Something To Say to Kazakhstan People"]

[Text] "Naturally, Kazakhstan has never had any intention of becoming a nuclear state or of joining the nuclear club," Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev said in an interview which he gave to a group of journalists just a few minutes after the president's aircraft had gained altitude on its return journey from New York's Kennedy airport.

Not Ambitions but Security

Not only a few weeks before N. Nazarbayev's visit to Washington but literally the day before the two presidents' meeting in the White House, Kazakhstan's true attitude toward nuclear weapons was still a subject of debate for analysts. "We have not signed the quadripartite document on the creation of the (CIS) unified forces either as a nuclear state or as a nonnuclear state," N. Nazarbayev said.

The president said that his visit to the United States had been under preparation since March last year, when Kazakhstan was still a republic within the USSR. But the preparation was particularly intensified after the acquisition of independence. Over this time N. Nazarbayev had had three exchanges of letters with G. Bush, had had several telephone conversations with J. Baker, and had acted through the secretary of state's deputies and the recently appointed U.S. ambassador to Alma-Ata.

Working until literally the actual start of the visit, Nazarbayev stressed, he had succeeded in bringing the state of mutual relations with the United States and within the CIS to a state where Kazakhstan felt sure that the country's two main problems—security and prosperity—can be effectively resolved.

Among new phenomena the president highlighted the change in the U.S. stance: "The United States has acknowledged us as a party to the treaty (on strategic arms) both now and in subsequent talks." That is the first point. Second, "together with Russia we signed a treaty on collective security... So that there is an 'umbrella,' including a nuclear umbrella, over Kazakhstan." Third, "I have received a written assurance from (U.S. Secretary of State) Baker that the United States will make every effort to ensure that the international community defends this state (that is, Kazakhstan) in the event of a nuclear attack or threatened attack.

"Within the package of these questions we deemed it necessary to sign the nonproliferation treaty as a nonnuclear state," Nazarbayev said, expressing full satisfaction with the results of the visit as a whole.

Successful Business Feeds Us Better Than Humanitarian Aid

N. Nazarbayev was particularly satisfied by the business contacts. The larger part of the five days the president spent in the United States was devoted to them. "You all saw for yourselves," he said, addressing the impressions of the journalists who accompanied the president during his numerous visits to banks and exchanges, companies and business associations.

In addition to specific documents which representatives of the Kazakh Government signed with the Rothschild group, the J.P. Morgan Bank, the Washington branch of a major Austrian bank, and so forth, Nazarbayev says that he values highly the prospect of the talks he had with major firms specializing in the processing of agricultural output, nonferrous metals, and gold mining.

But further movement will require a resolute change to Kazakhstan's legislation to encourage foreign investments. "We must now urgently create an agency for foreign investments in Kazakhstan," he said. "We need one organ which will conduct all talks on the involvement of Western investments in Kazakh business."

"They are angry at the bureaucracy when they reach agreement with one minister but then spend a long time doing the rounds of various ministries," said Nazarbayev, touching on a problem common to all heirs of the CIS [as published]. "Ministers send them from one to the other, each has its own favorite firm, I do not even know what dividends we are trying for, we still have to look into that."

The president said that the resolute review, in the very near future, of legislation to encourage foreign investments, the lowering of taxes, and guarantees of security—it was planned to do all this at the Kazakhstan parliament session before his U.S. visit, it is simply that the U.S. visit has reaffirmed the urgent need for such measures.

Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev said, does not have plans to leave the ruble zone. That was his only reply to the numerous questions from U.S. businessmen who asked whether this fact will not affect the country's independence in making decisions. "But the example involving the Chevron corporation was very convincing. I have always said that the success with Chevron in addition to hard currency will bring us a political result. Other firms have followed Chevron."

The ruble was not the only subject connected with Russia which was discussed during the visit.

Nothing Behind Russia's Back

Nazarbayev believes that it is fundamentally important that during all political and business contacts he invariably confirmed Kazakhstan's loyalty to economic and military cooperation with the former USSR republics and primarily with Russia. He said that he would consider it beneath his dignity to use his visit to the White House to openly or secretly accuse Russia of anything. "I am sure that in our deeds we can sort things out for ourselves," the Kazakh president said in his interview on board the aircraft.

The signing of the treaty on military cooperation and mutual aid about which Nazarbayev reached agreement in principle with the Russian president before his visit to the United States left its mark on all the Kazakh leader's talks in America. This concerned not only talks in the White House, where the loyal attitude toward Russia was welcomed with obvious understanding, but also all business contacts.

"Kazakhstan is vitally interested in the success of economic transformations in Russia," N. Nazarbayev said, urging the journalists to recall that in all his meetings he repeated again and again the idea of the importance of helping Kazakhstan's northern neighbor in its efforts to organize the economy. "I said that the billions of dollars which the West intends to earmark for Russia to stabilize the ruble fund should go to work as soon as possible."

At the same time the Kazakh leader did not conceal a certain dissatisfaction over the lack of resolve with which many people in the CIS, including Russia, approach the solution of mutual relations with the former republics which are displaying an overt lack of interest in joint measures. "We must help them to end up as rapidly as possible in the situation for which they are striving," the Kazakh president believes. "Let them live absolutely separately and see for themselves how advantageous and convenient it is for their peoples."

Paper Views Nazarbayev's Washington Talks

*PM2505144592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 May 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Vladimir Nadein report: "United States Has Secured Renunciation of Nuclear Missiles by Kazakhstan, But Has Taken No Commitments Upon Itself"]

[Text] Washington—Nursultan Nazarbayev did not betray by a single facial muscle how difficult he found his very first talks in the White House. Outwardly Nazarbayev was impassive and calm.

G. Bush, on the other hand, radiated cheerful smiles. He read his speech from a previously prepared piece of paper and did not deviate from it for a moment. There was evidently no need for last-minute corrections to his homework. Bush knew he would be able to convince his guest, and low and behold, he achieved what he wanted.

Nazarbayev, on the other hand, departed from the approved text repeatedly in order to invite Bush and his wife to Kazakhstan, and in order to say to the White House incumbent: "We are grateful to you for such a high degree of trust, and Kazakhstan will do all it can to justify this trust." It seemed to me that at this point Bush, who is not used to the vocabulary of the 23d CPSU Congress, started, as if to say: "That's too much, dear comrade. I ascribe everything you say to the Republican Party which nurtured me."

But that only lasted a short moment. Then the American continued to pay curious attention to the praise of the guest from afar, whose country sits on the globe in almost exactly the same way as the United States, only upside down—that is, exactly on the other side of the planet.

Clearly this is not the end of the contrasts. Kazakhstan is potentially rich, but aside from the potential it is painfully poor. Even in years of recession America has no equals in economic might. When Bush was already a trained diplomat and coauthor of new relations with the PRC, Nursultan Nazarbayev had just become party organizer at a coal mine.

Casting all illusions aside, all this knowingly excluded the fundamental elements of equality.

By the time both presidents went out into the Rose Garden to sign three documents normalizing economic relations between the two countries, Nazarbayev—from the heights of his artificial though logically consistent model of a state which became nuclear "by the will of a malevolent fate"—had finally come down to earth on the flawed reality of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Of course, the Kazakh president has realized that he will still have to give up nuclear weapons. But like his Ukrainian colleague Leonid Kravchuk, Nazarbayev would like to obtain something in exchange for the voluntary dismantling of a threat of planetary significance.

It is now clear that neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan will receive anything in exchange for the elimination of their missiles. Nor will they receive anything for adhering to the nonproliferation treaty—even as a nuclear-free state. Bush himself is hard pushed for carrots, as is evident from his election campaign. Therefore he could not use both the carrot and the stick during the talks on Kazakh nuclear weapons.

Instead he used two sticks, although they were of different sizes. The stick to punish nuclear disobedience is heavier—a trade embargo, and interaction with partners to blockade Kazakhstan, which would of course eliminate Alma-Ata's economic ambitions.

The stick for voluntary departure from the nuclear scene is lighter and there is even a small carrot—most-favored-nation status in trade and guarantees for private investments.

But just when does Kazakhstan intend to break into an American market which is seriously overflowing with every conceivable and inconceivable thing. Not for nothing does THE NEW YORK TIMES stress that "in the next five years most of the petroleum from the Tengiz oil field will be sold within the former Soviet Union."

So that is that as far as petroleum is concerned. But will the splendid Kazakh television sets find their way to America in the near future?

As has become known from a reliable source, on the eve of his White House meeting the president of Kazakhstan sat up late into the night seeking a solution to the nuclear problem that would enable him, if only for the sake of appearances, to avoid giving the impression of unconditional capitulation.

He did not find one. Nazarbayev's hope that, once he handed over his nuclear umbrella to Russia, he would straightaway hide in the shade of the American umbrella also came to nothing.

The United States stated that it would fulfill the conditions of the 1968 treaty—but no more than that. That is, America will definitely not hasten to cobble together some kind of anti-Husayn-style coalition in the event of a nuclear threat to Kazakhstan. America will of course appeal to the UN Security Council, but that is all.

The Americans energetically persuaded Nazarbayev that his country's transition to nuclear-free status, like the observance of the treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons signed by Gorbachev, will prove to be a blessing for Kazakhstan again and again.

Clearly, Nazarbayev did not object. It is simply that it was difficult for him, just as it was for Leonid Kravchuk who was here two weeks ago, to reconcile himself with the thought that all the 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads, which cost such a lot of money, will bring his country no more than the inevitable expenditure on dismantling them.

Although Nazarbayev will not take any new credits or old ambitions out of Washington, nevertheless the nickname "weakling," popular among Washington wits, will not stick to him any longer. Newspapers and speakers at official dinners do not tire of being enraptured by Nazarbayev's resoluteness and tact, which enabled Kazakhstan to sharply increase its share of the revenue from the Chevron deal and not alienate a prospective partner by making tough demands.

It is possible that President Bush was not moved by Nazarbayev's statement that Kazakhstan wants to become a loyal pupil of the United States. There are plenty of countries in the world which long for American

standards. But Nazarbayev has proved that he knows how to learn. It is possible that during his next visit he will not be required to make statements about being able to justify trust.

Shaposhnikov Cited on Ukrainian Strategic Forces

*PM2805082392 Moscow TRUD in Russian
28 May 92 p 1*

[Report by V. Badurkin: "Black Sea Fleet No Longer Strategic"]

[Text] The composition of the Commonwealth Strategic Forces was maybe the main question the CIS countries' defense ministers managed to agree on at their 26 May session. Henceforth they will include only the Strategic Missile Troops, the nuclear forces of the air forces and the navy, the missile attack warning system, and space-based components. The Black Sea Fleet's future will now be decided solely at talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations.

The question of the status of Ukrainian strategic forces remains open. Ukrainian delegation head Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan said that his republic was not claiming control of the nuclear button, although it had taken charge and administrative control of strategic forces' units and subunits stationed on its territory. But according to Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, representing Russia at the meeting, Kiev's decision is an infringement of the the Russian Federation's rights and responsibility to the world, which were granted to it by the heads of the CIS states, and casts doubt on nuclear security.

But there is hope of a successful solution of this problem, Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, told your TRUD correspondent. The day before he had spent more than 90 minutes talking about the NATO strategic forces' command and control system with Admiral Crowe, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, according to Yevgeniy Ivanovich, "It seems that a solution has been found that should satisfy both sides."

Byelarusian Defense Minister on Armed Forces Reforms

*LD0106143992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1417 GMT 1 Jun 92*

[By BELTA correspondent Leonid Tratshevskiy]

[Text] Minsk, June 1 TASS—"Instead of former divisions, overloaded with tanks in accordance with the offensive military doctrine of the former Soviet Union, the Army in the Byelarusian armed forces will include highly-mobile mechanized brigades of an exceptionally defensive character," Byelarusian Defence Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy said in an interview published in local newspapers today.

Republican air defence armies and air force units will be united with air defence and air force units attached to other formations, Kozlovskiy said. This will lead to the creation of reliable and powerful air defences and air forces, capable to defend Byelarus's sovereignty, he said.

Officers for the republican army will undergo training in schools in Minsk, as well as military departments at civilian colleges, he said.

When drafting servicemen, the armed forces will not discriminate against non-Byelarusians and high professional skills and dedication to national interests will be the only criteria, he stressed.

In the future, the armed forces will be speaking in Byelarusian, since by the end of next year half of the officers corps and most soldiers will be ethnic Byelarusians, he said.

Government To Gradually Decrease Size of Army

*OW0106113292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1110 GMT 1 Jun 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Byelarus Defence Minister, General Pavel Kozlovskiy has announced that the planned 50-percent national army reduction will be gradual without harm to the servicemen's moral and material interests. The Army will be more than 90 thousand men strong by the end of the reform.

General Kozlovskiy revealed in an interview with "IF" [INTERFAX] that 62 military units would be disbanded this year. He disclosed that at the Defence Ministry's Headquarters and Departments, the number of officers would be cut by 15-20 percent. The generals' total in the Byelarus Armed Forces will be halved to comprise 45-47 men.

Ukraine Confirms Nonnuclear Status to NATO

*LD0306203492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2002 GMT 3 Jun 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Trotsenko]

[Text] Kiev June 3 TASS—The foreign minister of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko, during a meeting with ambassadors of member countries of NATO accredited at Kiev, announced the special significance for Ukraine of the coordinated statement issued on 22 April 1992 by the NATO council in respect of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and also the protocol on the START treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992.

The minister handed over a note to ambassadors, in which it is emphasised that Ukraine realizes the immense threat to world peace and security posed by the process of nuclear proliferation, stands by ensuring the universality of this treaty and joining of it by all countries. The document states that "Ukraine voluntarily

concedes the right to possess nuclear weapons, which it had as one of the equal states, legal successor to the former Soviet Union. The right and the burden to possess nuclear weapons belonging to the former Soviet Union with the direct consent of Ukraine and other states, legal successors to the former Soviet Union rests with the Russian Federation, as insisted upon by it."

Ukraine has the undisputed right to receive guarantees to its national security from a possible threat of force or its use against Ukraine by any nuclear state. Ukraine hopes to receive such guarantees prior to the ratification of the START treaty and counts on support from NATO member states on this issue," the document said.

A considerable part of this important document is devoted to interrelations between Ukraine and Russia. It is in particular underscored that Ukraine can really become a non-nuclear state only when "conditions are created excluding the very possibility of launching strategic nuclear weapons against any other state from the territory of Ukraine. Ukraine will insist that in accordance with understandings achieved within the CIS framework, the Russian Federation goes ahead with the creation of a system of effective control from the side of the president of Ukraine over not using of nuclear strategic weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine until the period of its total destruction." In order to fulfill this fully justified and very important ensurance of this international security demand, Ukraine counts on support from member states of NATO, it states.

"Ensuing from its principal stand, Ukraine cannot recognise any kind of special status for the Russian Federation in comparison with other states, legal successors to the former Soviet Union, regarding treaties, properties or pledges of the former Soviet Union. The exclusion is the understanding reached within the CIS framework regarding the continuation by the Russian Federation membership of the United Nations organization, including its permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council," the announcement emphasised.

Kravchuk on Weapons Destruction

*OW0206204192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1942 GMT 2 Jun 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons in 11 Commonwealth nations will cost 150 billion rubles, and the destruction of weapons in Russian warehouses can be accomplished no earlier than the year 2000, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said in Kiev Tuesday [2 June] during a meeting with the Mongolian Minister of Foreign Relations Gombosuren.

Kravchuk also said that there are 176 strategic missiles in Ukraine. In addition, aviation, which belongs to the Combined Command of the Commonwealth, has strategic nuclear ammunition.

The President said Kiev's main problem is that Ukraine, the third most powerful nuclear power in the world, is unable to attain its goal of becoming nuclear-free without outside help. 130 of the 176 strategic missiles are loaded with liquid fuel; a safe method for their destruction has not been developed. Assistance from Western nations is needed.

Need Seen To Rethink Nonnuclear Status

*92UN1469A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
8 May 92 p 2*

[Interview with Yu. Kostenko, chairman of the Temporary Deputy's Commission for Development of a Concept of National Security, by S. Taran under the rubric "International Realities"; place and date not given: "A Ukraine With Missiles or Bananas?"]

[Text] All kinds of accusations were leveled against our young state as soon as the president gave instructions temporarily halting the shipment of tactical nuclear missiles from Ukrainian territory. What compelled Ukraine to make this step, inviting misunderstanding with the West as the Russian leadership threatened it with an aggressive Ukraine? The absence of guarantees that the arms taken out would be destroyed, as the president says, or something else?

We spoke with Yuriy Kostenko, chairman of the temporary deputy's Commission for Development of a Concept of National Security.

[Taran] First of all, I would like to ascertain whether Ukraine is in fact violating its obligations with regard to the pace of removal of nuclear arms.

[Kostenko] Much speculation is appearing concerning this. The Declaration on Sovereignty does indeed talk about the intention of Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state. But that is only an intention—which we wish to see Ukraine fulfill in the future. It does not mention any specifics. There is also the Statement of the Supreme Soviet on the Nonnuclear Status of Ukraine. This is a genuine legal document, but it does not mention specific deadlines either.

I also wish to point out that when the Statement was adopted, the USSR existed. After declaration of independence and secession from the USSR, Ukraine did not have the right to claim the nuclear arms of the latter. But now, with the collapse of the Union, in its place have been created many states which have become the successors of the USSR. As a result Ukraine, as one of them, has the right to the nuclear arms that are located on its territory and were created by the labor of the Ukrainian people.

[Taran] The most radical Ukrainian politicians say that we should totally repudiate the removal of nuclear arms from Ukraine. Their logic is simple—Western states will respect a strong, armed Ukraine. The West is flooding Russia, for example, with humanitarian aid because it

understands that a country which is simply hungry is one thing, while a country which is hungry and armed with nuclear missiles is quite another.

[Kostenko] Although it is democratic, the Western world is also rather pragmatic. Unfortunately it is not intentions that they respect, but strength. We need guarantees that after a final repudiation of nuclear arms Ukraine will not become a third-rate country. A nonnuclear status is for us a complex technical and political problem. We have the right to demand from world political circles an adequate response to our obligations—in other words, to be able to count on appreciable material aid and credits. After our declaration of a nonnuclear status we expected just such proposals, but now we see that all the aid is being directed at Russia.

But what about our national security? In the world there exist three ways to protect a state—military might is the first, extremely high integration in the economy of other countries—for example, a threat to Finland or Switzerland is automatically a threat to all of Europe—is the second, and the third: The high scientific and technical potential of the FRG, Japan, and today—South Korea. None of these will apply to Ukraine—we will give away our nuclear arms, our economy is only integrated in the economy of Russia, which itself may threaten us, and we have no developed scientific and technical potential. In addition, after the removal of nuclear arms we need guarantees of national security, for example in the form of a protectorate—the protection of influential Western countries.

Incidentally, here is an interesting fact: In accordance with international agreements, so-called strategic technology—computers of the latest generation and important scientific products—are not brought onto the territory of countries that do not have nuclear arms. This is so that those countries will not create their own nuclear weapons. Unless we wish to see Ukraine become a “banana republic,” we must also conclude the appropriate treaty to ensure that these agreements do not extend to Ukraine.

As a result, although we have accepted nonnuclear status over the long term, before passing a program of nuclear disarmament we need to make a deep analysis of all the consequences of such disarmament. And to talk now about any deadlines—by 1994 or 1992—is nonsense in general.

I will not even mention the fact that nuclear missiles cost a great deal of money. And we cannot just give them away like that.

[Taran] How justified for Ukraine is the nonalignment and neutrality proclaimed by the Supreme Soviet? For example, the neutrality of Switzerland is understandable—such a policy is most favorable for a small country, but for a country that is 1/20th of Europe?..

[Kostenko] In fact, these days no country can exist as an independent element in international politics. Recently we heard that traditionally neutral Sweden is abandoning its nonaligned status. And what would have

happened to Kuwait if it had not been part of the international system of security?

Nonalignment and neutrality of Ukraine does not mean that we will not be able to enter into this or that ecological or political union. Instead, it means not entering into military unions—with NATO or Russia. But even this should not be dogma. Political realities change quickly. You see how the international situation has changed over the last 10 years—from cold war to cooperation of former Soviet republics with the countries of NATO. We too should always act in accordance with the situation.

Russia Denies Loss of Any Nuclear Weapons

LD0306103992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1022 GMT 3 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow June 3 TASS—“Not a single case has so far been recorded of nuclear weapons, belonging to the CIS Joint Armed Forces or the Russian Army, being lost. Every type of nuclear weapon is registered per piece and kept in specially equipped and guarded storehouses,” ITAR-TASS was told today by an official of the Russian Defence Ministry’s press centre.

The official said that some means of mass information continue to publish reports directly or indirectly claiming that some nuclear weapons, belonging to the Russian Army or the CIS Joint Armed Forces, have been lost. Thus, the newspaper “VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA” recently published a report on the disappearance of 23 nuclear warheads, which allegedly vanished from one of the Far Eastern arms depots this March.

The official denied reports that the South Ossetian leadership possesses nuclear weapons by saying that there were no such arms in South Ossetia or in Transcaucasia as a whole.

Further Report on Missing Warheads

LD0306093692 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
1846 GMT 2 Jun 92

[From the “Military News” section]

[Text] Vladivostok—The chief of the Far Eastern Military District stated that the district had nothing to do with 23 nuclear warheads, reported missing in Komsomolsk-on-Amur last March. On June 2, the deputy chief of the missile troops and artillery department of the Far Eastern Military District Major-General Leonid Shvidiakov further stated to PF [POSTFACTUM] that it was for the first time that he had heard of that loss in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

As competent persons reported to PF on June 2, PF information dated 27 May, this year, published by a number of mass media, foreign ones included, on the search for 23 nuclear warheads aroused the wish of

certain specialists of the RSM to look into the loss (if it actually happened) of ammunition not relying on the good preparation in the field of nuclear armaments of the RF [Russian Federation] presidential envoy in Khabarovsk territory Vladimir Desyatov, who had made the data on the loss of the ammunition public and allegedly was personally making a search for it.

PF has gleaned from sources close to the nuclear weapons in the Far East, that, according to all the indices, the nuclear warheads belong to the navy, which has been responsible for their security. The same sources reckon that the warheads are likely to be part of the armaments of the unfinished nuclear submarines at Leninskiy Komsomol shipyards and should not have been stored in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

FRANCE

Need for European, Nuclear Defense Stressed

92P20286A Paris *LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS*
in French 18 May 92 p 15

[Article by Jean-Christophe Rufin: "France Without Defense?"]

[Text] It is not an exaggeration to say that France is the country most directly and seriously affected by the change in the world's military situation.

The United States was a superpower: It remains one. France, on the other hand, was neither a front-line country nor a pole of world power in the confrontation between East and West, in spite of its independent defense. Today, it has become those things, somehow in spite of itself. This position entails new responsibilities and a strategic inventiveness that the new law on military planning (to be presented to Parliament next month) does not seem to include.

New military challenges are facing our country in all the dimensions of its security. As a nuclear power, we are confronted with the sudden obsolescence of the strategic concepts born of the cold war and we have no definite and circumscribed target. However, this does not mean that the nuclear danger has disappeared. No longer are there today two giants, but a growing number of autonomous nuclear centers, more or less technologically advanced. All of a sudden, France is propelled to almost the top of this club. Compared with the USSR, France weighed little. Paired with a crumbling Russia, or with newly sovereign Ukraine, the comparison is no longer absurd. However, to keep this place we must reconvert our means and our doctrines.

As a Mediterranean power, we are on the front lines in an area of high demographic pressures and political instability. Iran, the Islamic bomb, and the uncertainties of proliferation in other states of the South show that managing danger is no longer an issue going above our heads as in the days of the cold war. We must assume the responsibility of developing intelligence and alarm systems adapted to this new situation.

As a former colonial power, we are involved on the African continent in the protection of dispersed, threatened interests. Almost all of the countries in the area are today subjected to the threat of war, be it overt (Chad, Mauritania, Djibouti) or dependent on worrisome political developments (Zaire, Senegambia, Central Africa). If many of these areas of conflict were to provoke a large-scale French military intervention, it is to be feared that we would rapidly reach the limit of our means.

As a European power, we are directly affected by the end of the status quo in the area. Two contradictory dangers are arising. An imbalance by the excessive concentration of powers—and one thinks, of course, of the unknown

factor represented by the evolution of a unified Germany. An imbalance by the crumbling of a certain power is more real and more immediate, if less threatening, as shown by the Yugoslav crisis and the multiple zones of ethnic fragmentation.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, we have military responsibilities in the peacekeeping forces which, from Yugoslavia to Cambodia, are attempting to respond to the instability born of the post-cold war conflicts. Will we be able to shoulder for long the financial efforts that such a participation entails?

Finally, as a producer and exporter of arms, we are directly affected by the evolution of the international military market. Its disorganization and depoliticization, the appearance of Russia outside its traditional area of influence as a run-of-the mill commercial supplier, the effects of the U.S. strategic leadership in the Middle East, all pose the problem of maintaining our export capability and, in the long term, of the future of our military industry.

France's security policy is, at this time, at a decisive turning point. It is no longer a matter, as it was in the sixties, of building our independence in a stable and rather peaceful world. This time, we must preserve this independence and assume the responsibilities it presupposes in a world which threatens us directly. This demands basic political choices and orientations for many decades.

What are we noticing? The law on military planning to be presented next month is eclipsed by the debate on constitutional revision and the Maastricht treaty. Decisions are announced slowly and piece-meal and without overall consultation, seemingly dictated by short-term financial problems (which impose barracks closings and troop reductions) or by political and electoral goals (to satisfy the ecologists by announcing the unilateral suspension of nuclear tests).

There is nothing in all this that clearly answers two principal questions:

1. What means will be available to develop our conventional intervention capability in distant places? This is an issue that depends exclusively on our sovereignty.
2. How will the uncontrolled nuclear risk arising from states or terrorist groups be managed? It is obvious that management can only be national. It presupposes a large-scale military intelligence network, an active policy to monitor nonproliferation and probably the establishment of an antimissile protection system.

France must be able to acknowledge that it cannot do this alone. If the defense of our territory and of our distant interests remains a national issue, managing the uncontrolled nuclear risk can only be viewed on a European scale. The more difficult it is to imagine an active European defense, the more admissible it is to set up a defensive umbrella. But the will must be there,

without which the GPALS [Global Protection Against Limited Strikes] project proposed by the United States will be the one to prevail. There is in all this an urgent and clear prospect for a European defense; some will even say that it is more urgent and clearer than economic and monetary union....

Joxe on Army's Preparations for Next Century

92ES0842A Paris LE FIGARO in French

19 May 92 p 6

[Guest commentary by Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe: "The Army's Future"]

[Text] The French Army has embarked upon a profound transformation that will not be complete until the end of the century. On three separate occasions I have gone before Parliament to outline the direction of that movement: in June 1991, in an orientation debate aimed at drawing the lessons from the Gulf war, then in the fall of the same year, when the law on military service came up for a vote, and finally, during the budget debate. Nevertheless, I have had the feeling even recently that too many persons interested in the future of our defense had not taken an overall view. I therefore believe it is necessary to present in a synthetic fashion the vision that drives those officials who, along with me, are responsible for the evolution of our defense.

It is not my intention here to paint a picture of the geostrategic changes that have led us and many others to effect the transformation now underway in our defense arrangement. Everyone is familiar with it and sees, both in Europe and elsewhere, the new pattern of threats and uncertainties. If unpredictability itself can be considered a threat, then our world is perhaps as fraught with danger as it was yesterday, but the dangers are obviously not the same ones.

In view of the shifting nature of the terrain, let us set forth a few fundamental points:

Our attachment to national military service because it creates between the national community and defense a link other than the mere financing of forces by taxes and, in keeping with our country's tradition, establishes the union of the Army and the nation.

Our determination to defend ourselves with countries whose alliance and unity will soon have brought Europe a half century of peace and prosperity and to move forward toward what we now lack the most: a common European defense.

Our conviction that foreign intervention and positioning have no meaning unless they clearly contribute to the continuation and restoration of peace and support for democratic trends.

Finally, our determination to set military spending at a fair, necessary, and adequate level. Now then, the decline in the direct threat to our country in Europe

authorizes us, in keeping with the practices of other countries, to make reductions in our efforts over a period of several years.

Having set forth these convictions, it is possible to establish five guiding principles for the evolution of our defense as the next century approaches.

1—Adapting our deterrent to the new strategic situation.

Deterrence will remain at the heart of our defense unless we observe a complete, general, verified nuclear disarmament and, first of all, a final halt to all testing, which we encourage other nuclear powers to do. We cannot yet guarantee that some future reversal of events in the East or subsequent developments which one senses in the rest of the world will not lead us to throw into the balance our determination and capacity to protect our supreme interests.

However, it is difficult to discern the type of threat we might face: reemergence of the previous threat, against which our deterrent is well-organized, or the affirmation of a new threat for which we would be much less prepared? We are therefore forced to consider the means of preparing for a much more wide-open range of scenarios than in the past.

Since the concept of strict sufficiency implies a need to adapt to the evolution of the threat, it will undoubtedly be necessary to correct programs launched within the framework of a single threat in the East, one making steady technical progress. Alongside our weapons allowing for massive strikes on specific targets in remote areas, we must perhaps develop more flexible weapons systems that will create deterrence by the precision of the strike rather than the threat of a general nuclear exchange.

2—Improving our capabilities of prevention, prediction, and crisis management.

This goal supports two major types of projects underway:

One, of an organic nature, is aimed at creating within the Ministry of Defense, but based on scattered agencies, a single military intelligence directorate under the authority of the minister and Armed Forces chief of staff, in close synergy with the General Foreign Security Directorate responsible for political and defense intelligence.

The other is aimed at crossing as quickly as possible several technological thresholds involving the gathering, deciphering, storage, and use of intelligence. This means the development of various types of observation satellites (optical, thermal, radar), as well as observation aircraft and aircraft equipped with computers and the capacity to wage electronic warfare. The cost of such programs and the global dimensions of information gathered justifies their being undertaken in cooperation with other countries.

3—Developing our capacity for inter-armed forces operations inside and outside Europe.

It was in order to draw the lessons from the Gulf war that we recently launched a far-reaching reorganization of our conventional means into reservoirs of forces, organic groupings to be drawn upon, depending on the crises to be managed, by two operational inter-armed forces staffs being set up: One will plan interventions in Europe within the framework of collective actions and the other interventions outside of Europe, with our allies or alone, if necessary. In all cases, specific questions relating to the interoperability of procedures and materiel with our main partners, as well as the coordination of planning, will be the main thrust of the work of our staffs.

Let us review the list of these reservoirs of forces:

A surface fleet, carrier-based aircraft, and attack submarines; an air force for combat and transport; four armored and mechanized divisions from the 1st Army, including the French elements of the future European corps; four light divisions from the Rapid Action Force; and Special Forces, soon to be reorganized under a single operational command, as I announced.

4—Increase our projection capacity.

The war in the Gulf exposed our limitations.

In order to move forward, it will be necessary for us to:

Strengthen the capabilities of professional immediate reaction units (better equipment, improved officering ratio), possibly preceding the sending of units including enlisted men and volunteers, if necessary, in accordance with the law.

Improve our air and maritime transport capabilities, both tactical and strategic, by passing laws now being drafted concerning auxiliary civilian air and maritime transport; beef up and modernize our military air transport means, currently inadequate and nearing the end of their useful life.

Reorganize our forces already based abroad while preserving whatever is necessary to prevent local crises and incorporate support elements; review, and in some cases expand, our network of agreements.

Join with our allies in developing a protected worldwide system of military satellite communications.

5—Upgrade the regular army.

Beyond purely doctrinaire considerations underlying our choices, the army has a profound and long-range need for draftees, unless we are willing to pay very dearly for many indispensable support tasks and recruit at market rates all the specialists for which it has a very vital need in the most varied domains, ranging from rare languages and electronics to medicine. We must be able to use such draftees abroad where our armed forces will be in

increasing demand. However, the example of Yugoslavia proves that this is perfectly possible and well understood by public opinion.

A short period of service, ten months, that may be extended by long-term reenlistment and voluntary enlistment to serve on carrier-based units or outside French territory: These are formulas to be preserved and upgraded. At the same time, the reserve system, still based on mass call-ups, is now undergoing thorough review by Secretary of State Jacques Mellick and will retain only an essential number of specialists and volunteers.

Such a setup will make it possible to avoid the prospect of a two-speed army: on the one hand, professional troops enjoying every possible type of benefit and, on the other, draftees whose service will perhaps be shorter but who will be poorly trained, motivated, and officered and therefore quickly scorned, a situation that would gradually ruin the very idea of national service to which we are attached.

These are the ideas that have guided our work.

Sacrifices are necessary if we are to move from an army based on the concept of an overall defense of our "little plot of ground" facing a major invader, a tighter army based on the ability to move quickly and respond, a capacity for sufficiently quick, precise, and powerful strikes to discourage the adversary. This army may also be a high-performance tool serving humanitarian purposes and engaging in operations aimed at maintaining peace as already demonstrated in Kurdistan, Yugoslavia, or Cambodia.

It is this orientation, drafted over several months of productive teamwork by the staffs I head, that I wish to share with the world's defense industry, an industry hit hard, it is true, as many local communities have been, by reorganizations now taking place. I also hope to make public opinion better acquainted with it. Public opinion can understand and has the right to know what happens to the contributions which the French people make to their defense and to the sacrifices, personal or financial, that are demanded of them.

I hope the broadest possible debate will begin on these ideas in Parliament, the Armed Forces, and the country as a whole. France needs such a debate and both Europe and world peace will benefit from it. More than many of our fellow citizens realize, the latter depends on the "mother of the arts, arms, and the law" that is so admired and respected throughout the five continents.

Mitterand Chairs Discussion on Military Programming Law for 1992-97

PM0106111292 Paris *LIBERATION* in French
28 May 92 p 7

[Interview with Defense Commission Chairman Jean-Michel Boucheron by Dominique Garaud; date, place not given]

[Text] *Francois Mitterrand chaired a meeting of the defense council yesterday which gave the final decisions on the 1992-1997 military programming law. The draft law is due to be submitted to the National Assembly in mid-June to be debated during the fall session. We interviewed Jean-Michel Boucheron, Socialist Party deputy for Ille-et-Vilaine and chairman of the National Defense Commission.*

[Garraud] What are the main guidelines of the programming law?

[Boucheron] This military programming law will have three fundamentally different characteristics from the previous ones: a complete cultural break because the aim is no longer to block an aggressor streaming across the Belgian plains or sweeping down from the Thuringian salient. This law will be a turning-point in a new geostrategic situation—a transitional law between two historical periods each with an entirely different rationale. It will have to be of short duration and bring about numerous fundamental changes.

Finally, its structure will be different. Defense Minister Pierre Joxe announced that the traditional division into army, air force, navy, and nuclear forces will be replaced by a six-section system: nuclear deterrent, space and intelligence, air and ground forces, air and naval forces, coherence and logistics, and future planning.

[Garraud] Pierre Joxe wants to give priority to space and intelligence.... What will become of nuclear deterrence and how far will the reduction of the army's equipment go?

[Boucheron] Although the arms race has slowed down considerably, the threat has not completely disappeared: Four new countries (of the former USSR—LIBERATION editor's note) have nuclear weapons. These weapons are still central to our concept of the deterrence of the strong by the weak, and its capabilities on all fronts must be strengthened. The aim is therefore to assess the new threshold of strict adequacy by giving priority to the missile-launching nuclear submarines. The efficiency of the new generation of these submarines would make it possible to reduce their number.

The airborne component, which is more flexible in its use, should be preferred to Albion (ground-based missiles—LIBERATION editor's note) whose mission could end in the first decade of the next century.

According to the same rationale, the reduced probability of a conventional East-West clash in Europe would make it possible to reduce the army by at least 20 percent and the expected volume of heavy tanks by 60 percent.

Moreover, uncertainty about U.S. policy, based on the inconsistency between a growing isolationist rationale and the desire to maintain the dominant U.S. world

position, will force us to organize our strategic independence in the spheres of intelligence and communications. This will be done by radar observation and listening projects on the satellites Osiris and Zenon.

[Garraud] A reduction in the defense budget is proposed for the coming years. How far will it go?

[Boucheron] We must first argue in terms of budget stability. Faced with the general reduction in the threat, the high priorities of international economic competition, and the social needs, the submission of a budget which has increased in volume would not be credible and would be based on culpable demagoguery. No government will escape this logic. The reductions in defense budgets in Britain (down 6 percent), Germany (down 3 percent), and the United States (down 10 percent this year) confirm this trend.

However, we must ensure that public opinion does not feel too complacent about disarmament, which still has to be achieved, or about the ease with which the Gulf War was won. Our defense tool must therefore be restructured with a constant budget.

[Garraud] How does the programming law take account of the new strategic situation?

[Boucheron] The potential conflicts to the East and South will take place more than 1,000km from our borders or our coasts. The means provided to halt an invasion over the Rhine must be able to be dispatched on a massive scale, quickly, and over a long distances. The new conditions of intervention outside the European zone require a total reorganization of our army based on the formation of units suited to the demand and with a single command.

The Gulf War gave the logisticians six months. We will probably not always have the same amount of time. This new situation will make necessary the acquisition of heavy strategic aircraft, possibly bought secondhand from the United States or the CIS. Finally, these units would have to be fully composed of professional soldiers, using in particular people who enlist voluntarily.

Moreover, nuclear and ballistic proliferation will characterize the historical period now starting. It will be necessary to acquire a knowledge of the area thanks to two Helios satellites and an autonomous capability to detect attack signatures (identification of enemy weapons—LIBERATION editor's note). In this framework, a debate on cooperation with the United States and the CIS should be opened notably on the observation and warning part of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes [GPALS] project (the watered-down version of the American "star wars" which, in addition to observation satellites, makes provision for launching "killer" satellites called Brilliant Pebbles—LIBERATION editor's note). This situation will also require the drafting of

a conventional deterrence strategy aimed at the deterrence of the strong by the weak leading to the continued development of the Apache subsonic missile using air and naval platforms.

[Garraud] What alliances are desirable for this new situation?

[Boucheron] Possible future conflicts will give rise to temporary alliances. Our independence is based on membership of several possible intervention systems. It could be the Atlantic Alliance, the Western European Union, or the CSCE in the future, or any other coalition adding other nations to these big entities. The interoperability of our forces and those of our traditional allies is an absolute priority which must be tackled ahead of the rest of the program.

The commercial and capitalist alliance of our enterprises and of all our armaments enterprises with our European partners is also a necessity. Our areas of excellence must be assured that they can continue their research and development programs. European defense will be established as much by military organization as by industry.

All these elements are, for the military and industrial world, a cultural revolution which has already been started. The capacity to adapt to new situations is probably one of the main qualities of our armed forces. It will be put to the test.

GERMANY

First British Military Units Leave Berlin

*LD3005085892 Hamburg DPA in German 0750 GMT
30 May 92*

[Text] Berlin (DPA)—The British Armed Forces have begun their troop reductions in Berlin with the withdrawal of combat units. A tank unit of the King's Hussars and the 1st Infantry Battalion of the Royal

Welsh Fusiliers held a farewell ceremony at a parade at the Olympic Stadium yesterday evening. The ceremony was accompanied by a joint music corps formed by the regiments stationed in Germany.

At a reception in honor of the birthday of Queen Elizabeth II, General Sir Charles Guthrie, Commander-in-Chief of the Army on the Rhine, expressed gratitude for the goodwill shown by the Berlin people toward the British soldiers. Officers of the former Soviet Army and the Bundeswehr were also present.

Maj Gen Foertsch: CIS Troop Withdrawal 'On Schedule'

*LD0106180192 Hamburg DPA in German 1716 GMT
1 Jun 92*

[Text] Leipzig (DPA)—According to Major General Hartmut Foertsch, the government's authorized representative, the withdrawal from eastern Germany of former Soviet troops is "completely on schedule." The garrisons in Leipzig, Naumburg, Weissenfels, Merseburg, Zeitz, and probably Riesa will be vacated by the end of this year, Foertsch said in an interview in Tuesday's edition of LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG. The paper says that a total of 164,500 people, including 100,000 soldiers, are to return to the CIS republics in 1992.

So far about 230 former Red Army personnel have applied for asylum in the Federal Republic this year, the article says. But there have been no decisions on the applications yet. Foertsch said that the units have 20,000 soldiers on constant deployment to recultivate army sites. But the major general did not rule out the possibility that there could still be some environmental "time bombs" ticking away. Foertsch said that where it could clearly be proven that damage has been caused by the former USSR troops, the Russians will have to clean it up or pay for it.

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